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ABSTRACT 
Motivated by the widespread adoption of AT in financial markets, this dissertation investigates 
whether algorithmic trading (AT) reduces the Post-Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD), the 
financial anomaly where investors under-react to earnings information. Studies suggest AT is 
associated with sophisticated trading and lower transaction costs and these two factors 
contribute to lowering PEAD. I conjecture algorithmic traders have an incentive to profit from 
(and therefore reduce the presence of) PEAD; however the evidence presented in this thesis 
fails to show that AT attenuates this anomaly.  
This thesis is composed of three essays. The first essay (Chapter 2) identifies the factors that 
explain PEAD and asks two questions: 1) does PEAD still exist; and 2) if so, has it been fully 
explained. I find PEAD remains a statistically and economically significant anomaly and that 
low investor sophistication, arbitrage risk and transaction costs are robust but nevertheless 
incomplete explanations. In other words, one, albeit incomplete, explanation for PEAD is that 
investors with low sophistication systematically under-react to earnings information and 
sophisticated traders cannot fully arbitrage the mispricing due to unhedgeable idiosyncratic 
risks and transaction costs. 
The second essay (Chapter 3) considers whether AT’s association with lower transaction costs 
and sophisticated trading implies AT attenuates PEAD. I further conjecture that if sophisticated 
algorithmic traders are better at extracting trading signals from earnings information AT should 
also improve price discovery around earnings announcements. After controlling for other 
explanatory factors, however, my findings show that AT does not contribute to the attenuation 
of PEAD, but that it is associated with improved price discovery. 
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The third and final essay (Chapter 4) provides an explanation for why the relation between AT 
and PEAD may be insignificant. I suggest order-splitting can result in the under-estimation of 
transaction costs (measured by effective spreads) and I argue one predominant function of AT 
is to execute large orders via sequences of small transactions. I therefore adjust for a potential 
bias in the measure of effective spreads by treating sequences of consecutive buy or sell orders 
as a single transaction. I then revisit a popular study which documents the market impact of 
AT but show that a structural increase in AT is associated with insignificant improvements in 
effective spreads. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
What has been the impact of electronic trading in financial markets? And specifically has the 
rise of algorithmic trading (AT) reduced the presence of financial anomalies? To investigate 
these questions this thesis presents three empirical essays on the post-earnings announcement 
drift (PEAD) and algorithmic trading (AT). PEAD (the phenomenon whereby investors under-
react to earnings information) represents the earliest and best-documented financial anomaly. 
At the turn of the 21st century PEAD, remains statistically and economically significant; AT 
embodies the new form of electronic trading used by sophisticated investors dealing in financial 
exchanges. A large body of literature suggests the characteristics embedded in AT are 
contributing factors towards attenuating PEAD; however the evidence in this thesis fails to 
show that AT lowers PEAD. The first essay provides a motivation for this thesis by showing 
PEAD is associated with factors linked to AT and therefore is a suitable financial anomaly for 
examining the impact of algorithmic traders; the second essay shows that the relation between 
AT and PEAD is statistically insignificant; and the third essay presents one explanation for this 
insignificant relation. This thesis aims to contribute both to the literature on PEAD (where a 
full explanation of the anomaly remains elusive) and to the public policy debate about the role 
and utility of AT. 
While the computerisation of U.S. financial markets began as early as the 1970s the wide 
implementation of AT is very much recent phenomenon. Recent studies mostly assess the 
impact of AT by quantifying changes in market quality benchmarks (such as effective spreads, 
realised spreads, adverse selection etc.) while few studies have examined the role of AT in 
attenuating financial anomalies. Financial anomalies however can be symptoms of imperfect 
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markets – a sign that real-life frictions faced by traders are unaccounted for in a financial 
model’s assumptions. For example, the common assumption of frictionless markets is 
unrealistic if investors face significant transaction costs; the assumption of investor rationality 
can be compromised by behavioural bias and low investor sophistication; and the assumption 
of perfect information is undone by informational opacity, agency cost and asymmetric 
information. 
In contrast, the proliferation of algorithmic trading and computerised markets is championed 
as one of the great levellers of market inefficiencies. The literature gives the sense that AT has 
brought investors closer – more so than ever before – to frictionless markets; that sophisticated 
algorithms are a step closer to perfect rationality; and that additional provision of exchange 
order-book data-feed leads sophisticated algorithmic traders closer to perfect information. 
Repeatedly AT has been argued to improve liquidity; and the origination of AT by institutional 
investors, as well as the sophisticated embedded algorithms, reinforces the view that AT is 
associated with sophisticated investors. The expectation for algorithmic traders is therefore, 
generally speaking, that any mispricing in the financial market which may be profitably 
arbitraged away will be arbitraged away – and done so quickly.  
Given the above viewpoint I investigate whether AT attenuates PEAD; the financial anomaly 
is well-documented to be robust and persistent and has been noted by Nobel Prize Laureate 
Eugene Fama as “the granddaddy of under-reaction events” (Fama, 1998, p.286). Factors that 
are argued to reduce PEAD effects are high investor sophistication and low transaction costs, 
and both are associated with high AT activity. This thesis therefore in essence seeks to 
understand the role of AT by considering how one of the most recent developments in 
electronic trading relates to one of the oldest and most robust financial anomalies. 
17 
 
In Chapter 2 I show that high investor sophistication and low transaction cost attenuate PEAD. 
The chapter considers the anomaly for the sample period July 1995 to June 2011 and addresses 
the extent to which PEAD effects remain unexplained. My results show PEAD is a stubborn 
anomaly in the sense that it remains statistically and economically significant half a century 
after its discovery. Although it cannot be fully explained away, robust explanatory factors are 
low investor sophistication, unhedgeable idiosyncratic risk and high transaction costs. In other 
words one, albeit incomplete, explanation is that investors with low sophistication 
systematically under-react to earnings surprise and sophisticated traders cannot fully arbitrage 
the mispricing due to arbitrage risk (represented by unhedgeable idiosyncratic risk) and high 
transaction cost. My analysis also addresses concerns associated with risk-mismeasurement, 
data-snooping and the over-finding of PEAD. 
In Chapter 3 I consider whether AT attenuates PEAD, given the association between AT, high 
investor sophistication and low transaction cost. I conjecture algorithmic traders will attempt 
to profit from the PEAD anomaly, and therefore AT activity and PEAD are potentially 
inversely related. I also argue that if sophisticated algorithmic traders are extracting trading 
signals from earnings information then price discovery may improve around earnings 
announcements. My analysis begins by testing whether a significant decline in PEAD during 
the early 2000s is associated with variations in AT. I then control for alternative explanations 
and my results show that across different test methods the relation between AT and PEAD is 
weak and insignificant. This finding contests the view that AT lowers transaction costs. I then 
further my analysis by constructing a measure for price discovery as a function of PEAD and 
show AT improves price discovery.  
In Chapter 4 I present one explanation for my findings. Interpreted conservatively, Chapter 3 
suggests earnings announcements are an exception to the general case that AT reduces 
transaction costs. However, interpreted more broadly it also suggests AT does not lower 
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transaction costs. I consider the empirical evidence between AT, liquidity and order-splitting 
(one of the major functions of AT) given one aspect of AT is that it encourages the camouflage 
of order size by splitting larger orders into sequences of small orders. I question whether 
increasing incidences of order-splitting cause mis-measurement of the transaction costs borne 
by traders. I then revisit a well-known study on the relation between AT and liquidity and find 
AT contributes substantially less to liquidity after the adjustment is made for order-splitting (I 
treat sequences of consecutive buy or sell orders as a single transaction). My findings also show 
that algorithmic traders behave opportunistically, taking advantage of their speed to mitigate 
price impact while imposing higher adverse selection costs on slow traders.  
1.2. Contribution 
This thesis contributes to the academic literature on PEAD and to the regulatory and public 
policy debates on the effects of algorithmic trading. Due to a relatively new sample period the 
first essay serves as an out-of-sample robustness test on previously factors posited to explain 
PEAD and on the robustness of the anomaly itself. The essay identifies the competing factors 
with the highest explanatory power for PEAD and therefore reconcile the literature (the first 
essay jointly considers 13 explanatory factors documented to explain PEAD). The research 
methods and results also serve as a reference source for future research into the anomaly. The 
findings add to the critique of asset pricing theory (such as limits of arbitrage arguments) that 
the assumption of perfectly rational representative investors ignores the frictions faced by 
traders. My results suggest revealed preferences of rational traders have an association with 
unhedgeable idiosyncratic risk and transaction costs. 
The second essay contributes to the ongoing academic and public policy debate on AT’s effects 
on market liquidity, price efficiency and price discovery. The empirical literature currently 
suggests that overall AT improves both liquidity and price discovery in equity markets (the 
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exception is for stocks with small market capitalisation). This thesis contributes to the empirical 
literature by taking an alternative approach and examining the effects of AT via financial 
anomalies. The relation between AT and PEAD, to this author’s knowledge, remains 
undocumented but the results can shed considerable light on the role and function of AT. My 
findings suggest AT does not lower transaction costs and therefore contests the view that 
algorithmic traders improve liquidity. My findings further suggest that a potential event where 
transaction costs are not reduced are earnings announcement periods. My findings however 
support the view that AT generally improves price discovery and the improvements are 
concentrated among firms releasing higher quality earnings information (this supports the idea 
that obtaining, processing and acting upon new information takes time and AT has the 
advantage of reducing search costs and rapidly synthesising large quantities of information). 
One issue to be addressed in the academic literature is whether algorithmic traders uses only 
limit order book information or do they also incorporate public news announcements into their 
trading decisions; my findings suggest that news that signals a change in a firm’s fundamental 
value influences algorithmic traders, which is potentially associated with the practice of news 
agencies providing digitalised corporate announcement information for AT. 
The third essay contributes to both academic and public policy debates on AT’s effects on 
transaction costs and the distribution of AT externalities. My results suggest that while order-
splitting is intended to reduce market impact and reduce transaction costs, a high incidence of 
order-splitting may bias transaction cost measures. The study therefore emphasises that 
differing research methods for measuring liquidity may significantly influence the outcome of 
empirical market microstructure studies. The study also shows AT shifts transaction costs from 
fast to slow traders and therefore contributes to the debate on whether fast and slow traders 
should be subject to different fees and exchange trading rules. 
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The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 is entitled Entering the 21st 
Century: Have We Fully Explained the Post-Earnings Announcement Drift? and sets out to 
identify the explanatory factors for PEAD. Chapter 3 is entitled Does Algorithmic Trading 
Attenuate the Post-Earnings Announcement Drift? and argues the explanatory factors for 
PEAD are potentially embedded in AT. It tests the relation between PEAD and AT and finds 
the relation to be statistically insignificant. Chapter 4 is entitled Does Algorithmic Trading 
Improve Liquidity After Adjustment for Order-Splitting? and serves as an explanation for the 
finding of an insignificant relation between AT and PEAD. It argues current measures of 
effective spreads may be over-estimating the positive contribution that AT has on liquidity. 
Chapter 5 discuss avenues for further research and concludes this thesis. 1 
 
  
                                                 
1 To alleviate ambiguity formulas and notations have chapter-specific meanings. For example, the notation ߚ 
expressed in chapter 3 does not share the same interpretation in chapter 4, unless stated otherwise.  
21 
 
CHAPTER 2: ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY: 
HAVE WE FULLY EXPLAINED THE POST-
EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT? 
2.1. Introduction 
Does the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) still exist? And if so has PEAD been 
explained fully? Declared “the granddaddy of under-reaction events” (Fama, 1998, p.286) 
PEAD is the tendency of post-event abnormal returns to drift in the same direction as earnings 
surprise (Foster, Olsen and Shevlin, 1984; Bernard and Thomas, 1989). The phenomenon 
implies new earnings and accounting information is not fully impounded into stock prices, and 
debate on the financial anomaly has continued for nearly five decades (Ball and Brown, 1968 
and 2013). I consider whether PEAD persists at the turn of the century by following the method 
of Fama and French (2008) with tests controlling for a range of different firm characteristics.2 
This chapter addresses the extent anomalous PEAD effects remain unexplained and it is also 
an out-of-sample examination of PEAD given the sample test period generally has no temporal 
overlap with studies published before the early-2000s.  
My results show that at the turn of the century PEAD remains statistically and economically 
significant and resembles size, book-to-market and momentum effects in that it can, beyond 
firm beta, explain cross-sectional stock returns (see Fama and French, 1992; Carhart, 1997). 
From 1995 to 2011 the average 60-day PEAD return is 3.67% and this figure is derived by 
simulating a strategy that takes a long position on firms with the highest earnings surprise and 
                                                 
2 Fama and French (2008) note a robust test for financial anomalies require two elements: 1) demonstrating 
robustness in a cross-section of portfolios that capture different firm characteristics; and 2) employing robust test 
statistics such as applying the Fama and Macbeth (1973) test method. 
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a short position in firms with the lowest earnings surprise (i.e., buying good news and selling 
bad news). After jointly controlling for a range of explanatory factors average PEAD declines 
but remains significant at 1.90%. The results show a portion of the anomaly is associated with 
low investor sophistication, high arbitrage risk and high transaction costs. In other words one, 
albeit incomplete, explanation is that investors with low sophistication systematically under-
react to earnings surprises and sophisticated traders cannot arbitrage fully the mispricing due 
to trading risks (such as the high idiosyncratic risk that must be borne by undiversified or 
partially diversified investors) and high transaction costs. 
To conduct my analysis I augment standard event study methods to control for risk-
mismeasurement bias. This is because the traditional event study model assumes a constant 
firm beta which produces model estimates unconditional to earnings surprise; earnings 
announcements however can shift firm risks. Conditional on earnings surprise, I find 60-day 
PEAD range from 3.56% (under the Carhart (1997) four-factor test) to 4.10% (under standard 
CAPM test). Following Fama and French (2008) I show significant PEAD effects are found 
across various portfolio classifications although the anomaly attenuate for firms characterised 
by high investor sophistication, low structural uncertainty, low arbitrage risk and low 
transaction costs.  
To assess whether these factors can jointly explain away PEAD I then implement a multivariate 
analysis framework based on regression modelling with scaled interaction terms. This method 
controls for non-linearity between dependent and independent variables and is increasingly a 
common framework to test financial anomalies. My results show that after jointly controlling 
for other explanations PEAD is statistically significant, and therefore remains anomalous.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the background of this study 
and Section 2.3 presents the data. Section 2.4 introduces first stage methods and results while 
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Section 2.5 considers multivariate analysis and regression results. Section 2.6 concludes this 
chapter. 
2.2. Background 
First documented by Ball and Brown (1968)3 and now considered “the best-documented and 
most resilient capital markets anomaly” (Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006, p.181) PEAD is 
associated with under-reaction to unexpected earnings news (Bernard and Thomas, 1989).4 The 
discovery of this financial anomaly however has been subject to criticisms associated with 
over-publishing, data-snooping and measurement error bias.5 For example Schwert (2002) 
notes there is bias to over-discovery of financial anomalies due to the research community’s 
incentive to accrue citations and publications while Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1999) write 
“there is little theoretical motivation” for the anomalies literature “which opens up the 
possibility that the evidence against the CAPM is overstated because of data-snooping and 
sample selection biases” (p. 212). In contrast, one of the strongest counter-arguments is that 
persistent out-of-sample significance points to the alternative explanation of model inadequacy 
(see Banz, 1981; Basu, 1977, 1983; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Debondt and Thaler, 1985). 
In the context of PEAD, criticisms of over-finding or mismeasurement error have been 
generally discredited (Bernard and Thomas, 1989) and the empirical literature finds robust 
evidence across time, across markets and across methods (see Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Liu, 
Strong and Xu, 2003; Gerard, 2012; Bernard and Seyhun, 1997; Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006; 
Foster, Olsen and Shevlin, 1984; Kothari, 2001; Sadka, 2006; Vega, 2006; Kim and Kim, 2003; 
                                                 
3 As documented by Ball and Brown (2013), the origin of the discovery of PEAD dates back to Ball and Brown 
(1968), to the nascent beginnings of modern research in financial economics represented by the “Chicago” School. 
The introduction of rigorous economic methods to the study of finance and the creation of the first stock price 
dataset (the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data tape was the first to be 
machine-readable), contributed significantly to new empirical and market-based research.  
4 The magnitude of under-reaction is positively correlated to earnings surprise while the persistence of under-
reaction can last up to three quarters (Bernard and Thomas, 1989 and 1990). 
5 Initial reservations about the discovery of the anomaly include Watts (1978) and Reinganum (1981). 
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Abarbnell and Bernard, 1992; Mendenhall, 2004; Sadka, 2006; Battalio and Mendenhall, 2005; 
Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka and Shivakumar, 2009; Boehmer and Wu, 2013).  
Three schools of thought have arisen to explain PEAD’s existence and persistence: 1) 
behavioural; 2) structural uncertainty; and 3) limits of arbitrage constraints. Behavioural 
explanations argue PEAD is a function of investor naivety and anchoring, biased self-
attribution and psychological distraction. Structural uncertainty explanations consider the 
uncertainties of trading against informed participants and argue PEAD compensates for 
informational uncertainty and opacity. Limits of arbitrage explanations argue the risks and 
costs borne by rational traders impedes the complete of arbitrage of market mispricing. 
2.2.1. Behavioural Explanations 
PEAD is documented to be associated with 1) naive investors anchoring on seasonal random 
walk expectations; 2) biased self-attribution associated with conservatism (over-confidence) of 
public news (private news); and 3) psychological distraction. Investor sophistication is 
commonly employed to proxy the level of investor behavioural bias. 
Naive investor expectations cause both the existence and persistence of PEAD. The empirical 
evidence is consistent with investor expectations on firm earnings following a seasonal random 
walk which ignores earnings momentum effects and therefore manifests as under-reaction to 
earnings surprise (Bernard and Thomas, 1989 and 1990; Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 
1996). Analyst forecasts also exhibit a naive seasonal random walk, so that the reliance by 
investors on analyst forecasts accentuates under-reaction (Abarbenell and Bernard, 1992).6 
Another explanation is that investors anchor on past performance and therefore are subject to 
systematic conservatism. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) consider evidence on the 
                                                 
6  Naive investor expectation is also consistent with Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who argue that under 
conditions of uncertainty and imperfect information investor actions can be overwhelmingly a function of 
heuristics and behavioural traits and biases. 
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representativeness bias whereby people overweight recent events (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974) and show investors reveal themselves to believe earnings are mean reverting while 
Narayanamoorthy (2006) shows PEAD is consistent with accounting conservatism. Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) find investors exhibit biased self-attribution, being 
conservative with public news but over-confident about private news, leading to under-reaction 
(over-reaction) to public (private) information.  
High investor sophistication is associated with low behavioural bias (Bartov, Krinsky, 
Radhakrishman, 2000) and a common proxy for high investor sophistication is a large 
proportion of institutional ownership of company stock. Individuals are generally less 
sophisticated compared to institutional investors and Kaniel, Liu, Saar and Titman (2012) show 
in the post-announcement period individual but not institutional traders are ‘news-contrarian’ 
and hence slow down the price adjustment process to earnings surprise, generating persistence 
in PEAD.7 Bartov et al. (2000) show that firms with large institutional ownership are subject 
to smaller PEAD attenuation while Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) show from short-term 
stock holdings data that institutional investors overall profit from trading away mispricing 
generated from PEAD. Alternative proxies for investor sophistication demonstrate similar 
findings: Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2003) consider stocks covered by analysts with superior 
experience and show reduced PEAD effects; Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) proxy high 
investor sophistication by large trade size and show only small-size trades exhibit under-
reaction. Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz (2009) demonstrate institutional trading 
anticipates both earnings surprise and PEAD because institutional investors trade in the same 
direction both before and after the corresponding surprise. In other words, institutional 
investors anticipate both earnings news surprise and the subsequent PEAD. 
                                                 
7 I note this is in contrast to Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers and Teoh (2002) who find investors are net buyers after 
both good and bad news. 
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An alternative behavioural explanation is that PEAD also reflects the constraints of traders in 
processing large quantities of information. Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) consider research 
in the field of psychology and show PEAD effects are consistent with investor attention being 
a scarce cognitive resource (Kahneman, 1973). The authors search for days with a high number 
of earnings announcements and find under-reaction is associated with periods when investors 
are more likely to be distracted due to a high inflow of new information (see Hirshleifer and 
Teoh, 2005; Peng and Xiong, 2006; DellaVigna and Pollett, 2009).  
2.2.2. Structural Uncertainty Explanations 
Structural uncertainty explanations argue variations in informational uncertainty and opacity 
are a source of investment risk (see Brav and Heaton, 2002; Vega, 2006). Earnings 
announcements can be periods of structural uncertainty because: 1) announcements can be 
uncertain or opaque; 2) the announcement period is subject to unexpected variations in the 
arrival of private information; and 3) announcement periods are also subject to different levels 
of probability of informed trading. 
Yan and Zhao (2011) show high information opacity is associated with high book-to-market 
ratio (BM) and high PEAD. “Value” stocks proxied by a high BM receive on average less 
media attention and are followed by fewer analysts relative to low book-to-market “glamour” 
stocks. Brown and Han (2000) proxy high information opacity with low institutional holdings 
and low analyst coverage and show the factors are positively correlated to PEAD. Information 
uncertainty proxied by idiosyncratic volatility is also positively correlated to PEAD (Gerard, 
2012). Finally Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) argue disagreement in investor opinion is an 
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explanatory factor and Kim and Kim (2003) argue analyst disagreements can be proxied by the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts.8  
The unexpected arrival of private information is also a source of structural uncertainty. Sadka 
(2006) shows the variable component of liquidity is correlated to PEAD9 and argues PEAD 
returns are therefore compensation for unexpected variation in the ratio of informed trading to 
noise. Vega (2006) extends the literature by clarifying that there is a distinction between private 
information and informed trading and that PEAD varies according to the arrival rate of 
informed trading rather than from the arrival of private information. For example, traders 
exceptionally skilled at extracting information from public news sources are nevertheless 
highly informed. Accordingly Vega (2006) shows that a high probability of informed trading 
(PIN) is associated with low PEAD.  
2.2.3. Limits of Arbitrage Explanations 
Trading strategies that seek to profit from PEAD effects will involve holding large positions in 
individual stocks as well as generating high portfolio turnover. Relevant limits of arbitrage 
constraints are transaction costs and arbitrage risk.  
Jensen (1978) argue financial anomalies can rationally persist because transaction costs make 
the arbitrage of mispricing unprofitable. Ng, Rusticus and Verdi (2008) show in a standard 
market microstructure context the magnitude of under-reaction is positively correlated to 
trading commissions and quoted spreads while Bhushan (1994) finds investor heterogeneity in 
the cost of processing information can explain cross-sectional variation in PEAD. Chordia et 
                                                 
8 I note it has been argued that analyst dispersion is a market-wide risk factor (Kim and Kim, 2003). Diether, 
Malloy and Scherbina (2002) however find evidence inconsistent with this assertion. 
9 The variable component of liquidity can be interpreted as being associated with shifts in private information (see, 
Kyle, 1985). 
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al. (2009) demonstrate a significant amount of paper profit from a long-short investment 
strategy of PEAD is removed after controlling for liquidity and transaction costs.  
Unhedged idiosyncratic risk contributes to the limits to arbitrage and Mendenhall (2004) 
identifies this risk as “arbitrage risk”. The author argues unbiased rational arbitrageurs are often 
specialised traders holding relatively large positions in few stocks and hence do not derive the 
full benefit of diversification. Following Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Mendenhall (2004) defines arbitrage risk as the idiosyncratic portion of stock 
volatility and finds it monotonically increases with PEAD. The author argues arbitrage risk is 
correlated to factors such as analyst coverage, turnover and firm size and the inclusion of 
arbitrage risk as a control variable removes the significance of other positively correlated 
control variables. In other words, other explanations may potentially be indirect proxies of 
arbitrage risk. I note limits of arbitrage constraints also encompass agency frictions which 
cause money managers to under-react to price-sensitive information (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
and short-selling constraints (Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch and Tice, 2009). 
2.3. Data 
I obtain the following data: 1) daily stock returns; 2) quarterly disclosures of corporate 
accounting and stock ownership; 3) quarterly earnings announcements; 4) historical analyst 
forecasts; 5) daily returns of the risk-free rate; and 6) daily returns of the Carhart (1997) four 
factors. I follow Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and obtain the CRSP-Compustat merged database and 
the I/B/E/S database. 10  CRSP provides daily stock price data, Compustat data provides 
quarterly accounting filings, and I/B/E/S data contains quarterly analyst forecast and earnings 
                                                 
10 Obtained from the Wharton Research Data Service. 
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announcement information.11 CDA Spectrum provides the Form 13F filing for institutional 
ownership data. 
My sample period covers the period 1st July 1995 to 30th June 2011. I select only data after 
1994 as it is shown to be robust for event studies (Hirshleifer et al., 2009; DellaVigna and 
Pollett, 2009). One benefit of selecting this sample period is that there is no temporal overlap 
with Bernard and Thomas (1989 and 1990) and many core studies published especially prior 
to the early-2000s. My tests therefore can serve as an out-of-sample examination of these 
studies (Schwert, 2003s). I select from the CRSP-Compustat merged data all firms with 
primary stock listing on the New York (NYSE) and American (AMEX) Stock Exchanges.12 
Closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts, American Depository Receipts and foreign 
stocks are excluded.13 The sample data is then matched to the I/B/E/S dataset via a CRSP-
Compustat-I/B/E/S matching procedure provided by the Wharton Research Data Service 
(WRDS). Berkman and Truong (2009) show a substantial number of earnings announcements 
are made after trading hours and therefore the immediate price response may only be 
impounded to stock price in the next trading day. To control for this potential forward-looking 
bias all announcements made after 16:00 hours are assumed to be made the following trading 
day.14 I remove the following observations: 1) firm-quarter observations with less than $5 
million in market capitalisation (Mendenhall, 2004); 2) firms with stock prices less than $1 
before stock-split adjustment (Hirshleifer et al., 2009); and 3) firm-quarter observations where 
the actual or median earnings per share forecast is higher than the end-of-quarter stock price 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2009). 
                                                 
11 I/B/E/S contains data collected every third Thursday of the month from analysts giving forecasts to the next 
quarter’s corporate earnings. 
12 It is common in PEAD studies to consider only NYSE and AMEX stocks (see Bernard and Thomas, 1989 and 
1990; Bhushan, 1994; Bartov, Krinksy and Radhakrishhnan, 2000; Sadka, 2006; Ng, Rusticus and Verdi, 2008).  
13 I select for CRSP stock codes of 10 and 11. 
14 If there are discrepancies in announcement time between Compustat and I/B/E/S I select the earlier of the two 
dates (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). 
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As PEAD is shown to be associated with a large number of explanations I construct thirteen 
factors as control variables (the construction of each variable is explained in detail in Section 
A.2 of the Appendix). Briefly, for firm i and quarter q (where ݍ ∈ {ͳ,ʹ, … ,͸Ͷ}) the factors are:  
1) Instii,q the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors, proxying investor 
sophistication (Campbell et al., 2009);  
2) Distract_Ui,q the number of earnings announcements per trading day, proxying 
investor distraction (Hirshleifer et al., 2009);  
3) Analysti,q the number of analyst forecasts, proxying information diffusion (Brown 
and Han, 2000);  
4) Volatilityi,q the volatility of abnormal returns, proxying uncertainty (Gerard, 2012);  
5) ArbRiski,q the residual variance from the stock’s one-factor market model 
regression,15 proxying unhedgeable risk (Mendenhall, 2004);  
6) ExpRiski,q the explained variance from the stock’s market model regression, proxying 
hedgeable risk (Mendenhall, 2004);16  
7) Illiqi,q the Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor, proxying stock illiquidity (Sadka, 2006);  
8) Spreadi,q the average end-of-day bid-ask spread, proxying direct transaction cost (Ng 
et al., 2008);  
9) Pricei,q the end-of-quarter stock price, proxying trading commissions (Blume and 
Goldstein, 1992);  
                                                 
15 The market model is the returns of the S&P 500 index (inclusive of dividends) adjusted for the risk-free rate. 
16 Inclusion of this variable follows Mendenhall (2004), Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and Chordia et al. (2009). 
An insignificant relationship with hedgeable risk affirms PEAD is not compensation for risks that can be hedged 
away by a market portfolio. 
31 
 
10) Turni,q the average daily dollar volume of shares traded, proxying indirect trading 
costs and order processing costs (Bhushan, 1994);  
11) Mcapi,q the market capitalisation, proxying size (Foster, et al., 1984; Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989);  
12) BMi,q the book-to-market ratio, proxying informational opacity (Yan and Zhao, 
2011); and  
13) Momi,q the cumulative abnormal return for the 40 days prior to earnings 
announcement, proxying momentum effects (Vega, 2006).17  
2.3.1. Summary Statistics and Correlation  
The summary statistics of the explanatory factors are presented in in Table 2.1 and the 
computed values align with previous studies. For example, the mean and median of market 
capitalisation is $8.17 billion and $1.829 billion, respectively (the 25th percentile is $606 
million and the 75th percentile is $5.64 billion). The mean of daily turnover is $14.46 million 
and the 25th and 75th percentiles are $367,000 and $15.74 million respectively. The 25th and 
75th percentiles of stock price are $16.75 and $43.09 respectively; and number of analysts is 2 
and 9 respectively. These values align with Mendenhall (2004, Table 2, p.885) and Jegadeesh 
and Livnat (2006, Table 1, p.27). My computed values for arbitrage risk and hedgeable risk are 
also nearly identical to that of Mendenhall (2004) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002).18 The 
mean of arbitrage risk is 0.0121 and the 25th and 75th percentiles at 0.0041 and 0.0142 
respectively; and the mean of hedgeable risk is 0.0025 and the 25th and 75th percentiles at 
                                                 
17 In Section A.1 of the Appendix I also consider 1) Volume-Synchronised Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN) 
as a proxy for the level of informed trading (Vega, 2006). The analysis of this factor causes a loss of observations 
and therefore I consider it separately from the main body of this chapter. 
18 Mendenhall (2004, p.885) shows an arbitrage risk mean of 0.014 and the 25th and 75th percentiles at 0.004 and 
0.017 respectively; and shows a hedgeable risk mean of 0.002 and the 25th and 75th percentiles at <0.001 and 0.003 
respectively. 
32 
 
0.0004 and 0.0027, respectively. My values are also consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2009, 
Table I, p.2300) where the number of earnings announcements per day ranges from 22 to 150 
per trading day at the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively. Please note that the distribution of 
the bid-ask spread is relatively wide and this is attributable to the significant decline in 
transaction costs over the sample period (see Bessimbinder, 2003b; Chordia et al., 2009). 
The factor correlation coefficients also align with the literature (see Table 2.2). The three 
factors that have noticeably high correlations are analyst following, illiquidity and firm size. 
For example, analyst following has a 𝜌 = -0.48, 0.48 and 0.46, respectively with Illii,q, Turni,q, 
and Mcapi,q. In other words, firms with a high analyst following tend to be associated with 
improved liquidity, higher turnover and larger market capitalisation. This is consistent with the 
correlation matrix in Vega (2006, Table 1, p.110). My values are also consistent with Amihud 
(2002) in that large firm size has a relatively strong correlation to lower spreads (𝜌 = -0.35), 
higher turnover (𝜌 = 0.76), and higher price (𝜌 = 0.47). The log of illiquidity is also correlated 
to the log of bid-ask spread (𝜌 = 0.49), price (𝜌 = -0.44) and the log of market capitalisation (𝜌 
= -0.77). Not surprisingly, one of the strongest correlations is between firm turnover and the 
log of illiquidity with a correlation coefficient of 𝜌 = -0.84. This supports Bhushan (1994) and 
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) who argue turnover is a robust proxy for liquidity. Overall the 
distribution and correlation of my explanatory factors are consistent with the literature. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
 
The table values are computed summary statistics across NYSE and AMEX firms in the period July 1995 to June 
2011. For firm i in quarter q the variables are earnings surprise (ESi,q); institutional ownership (Instii,q); number 
of announcements released on the same day (Distract_Ui,q); number of analysts issuing forecasts within the 90 
days prior to earnings announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR) in the 
40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk 
(ExpRiski,q); average of Amihud (2002)s illiquidity measured across 40 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement (Illiqi,q); average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement 
(Spreadi,q); stock price at the end of the quarter q (Pricei,q); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured 
from 271 trading days to 22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); market capitalisation (Mcapi,q); 
book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Momi,q); BHAR from 
the 2nd to the 61st trading day after  earnings announcement (PEADi,q); and BHAR from the 1st trading day before 
earnings announcement to the 1st trading day after earnings announcement (3DRi,q). ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ = ∏ ሺͳ +ே௡ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻ − ∏ (ͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ )ே௡  where for announcement date t, ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ measures BHAR returns, ݎ௜,௤,௧   is the daily 
stock return, ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  is the daily return of a market-adjustment portfolio, and n represents the holding period from 
the nth day after the date of announcement to the Nth trading day. For the adjustment-portfolio ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  I use 5x5 size 
quintile and book-to-market quintile matched portfolios. 
 
 
  mean std 
1st  
percentile 
25th  
percentile 
median 
75th  
percentile 
99th  
percentile 
ESi,q -0.0026 0.09667 -0.05474 -0.00033 0.00036 0.00165 0.02422 
Instii,q 0.63 0.22 0.07 0.49 0.66 0.8 0.98 
Distract_Ui,q  114.62 118.34 4 22 62 150 316 
Analysti,q 6.29 5.42 1 2 5 9 24 
Volatilityi,q 0.0207 0.0135 0.0061 0.0122 0.0174 0.0252 0.0709 
ArbRiski,q 0.0121 0.0149 0.0012 0.0041 0.0078 0.0142 0.0683 
ExpRiski,q 0.0025 0.0046 0.000 0.0004 0.0011 0.0027 0.0224 
Illiqi,q 0.0835 0.9679 0.00002 0.0004 0.0018 0.0107 1.4534 
Spreadi,q 0.0107 0.0163 0.00026 0.0011 0.0053 0.0140 0.0681 
Pricei,q 32.2 72.85 2.35 16.75 28.11 43.09 102.25 
Turni,q 14.46 39.80 0.001 0.367 2.72 15.74 538.37 
Mcapi,q 8,170 23,893 45 606 1,829 5,640 118,445 
BMi,q 0.69 0.77 0.06 0.33 0.53 0.82 3.46 
Momi,q -0.002 0.159 -0.371 -0.074 -0.007 0.062 0.421 
PEADi,q -0.001 0.186 -0.442 -0.092 -0.008 0.079 0.524 
3DRi,q 0.003 0.072 -0.199 -0.028 0.001 0.034 0.203         
Number of 
Observations 
65,368       
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Table 2.2: Full Sample Correlation Matrix 
 
The table values are computed correlation coefficients across NYSE and AMEX firms in the period July 1995 to June 2011. The variables are, across firm i and in quarter q, 
earnings surprise (ESi,q); institutional ownership (Instii,q); the decile rank based on number of announcements released on same day (Distracti,q); number of analysts issuing 
forecasts within the 90 days prior to earnings announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage 
risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); the logarithm of average Amihud illiquidity measured across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (LogIlliqi,q); the 
logarithm of average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (LogSpreadi,q); stock price at the end of quarter q (Pricei,q); average 
daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); the logarithm of market capitalisation 
(LogMcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Momi,q); BHAR from the 2nd to the 61st trading day after earnings 
announcement (PEADi,q); and BHAR from the 1st trading day before earnings announcement to the 1st trading day after earnings announcement (3DRi,q). ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ =∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻே௡ − ∏ (ͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ )ே௡  where for announcement date t, ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ measures BHAR returns, ݎ௜,௤,௧   is the daily stock return, ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  is the daily return of a market-
adjustment portfolio, and n represents the holding period from the nth day after the date of announcement to the Nth trading day. For the adjustment-portfolio ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  I use 5x5 
size quintile and book-to-market quintile matched portfolios. 
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ESi,q 
                
Instii,q 0.05 
               
Distracti,q  0.01 0.03 
              
Analysti,q 0.02 0.2 0.04 
             
Volatilityi,q -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 
            
ArbRiski,q 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 0.41 
           
ExpRiski,q 0.05 0.16 -0.02 0.11 0.16 0.29 
          
LogIlliqi,q -0.03 -0.26 -0.06 -0.48 0.26 0.24 -0.06 
         
LogSpreadi,q -0.06 -0.31 -0.02 -0.24 0.32 0.16 -0.11 0.49 
        
Pricei,q 0.01 0.14 0.07 0.23 -0.31 -0.36 -0.11 -0.44 -0.27 
       
Turni,q 0.03 0.27 0.05 0.48 -0.21 -0.24 0.06 -0.84 -0.44 0.53 
      
LogMcapi,q 0.01 0.15 0.06 0.46 -0.26 -0.31 0.01 -0.77 -0.35 0.47 0.76 
     
BMi,q 0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.21 0.07 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 
    
Momi,q 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.00 
   
PEADi,q 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.00 
  
3DRi,q 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 00.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.03   
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2.4. Test for a Significant Alpha  
I now assess whether PEAD remains a financial anomaly by testing whether a PEAD-based 
investment strategy generate robust and economically significant alpha returns. My results 
show PEAD remains significant after controlling for the common market risk factors but in 
general attenuates for portfolios characterized by high investor sophistication, low structural 
uncertainty and low limits of arbitrage. I begin this section by defining measures of earnings 
surprise and abnormal return before proceeding to the formal tests.  
2.4.1. Measures of Earnings Surprise 
Measures of earnings surprise  (ES) can be earnings-based or analyst forecast-based (Livnat 
and Mendenhall, 2006). 19 Shortcomings of earnings-based measures include: 1) the quality of 
information revealed by earnings information can differ across firms, industry and time; and 2) 
records of historical earnings data are occasionally restated causing a forward-looking bias (see 
Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006). Throughout this paper I proxy ES by analyst forecast error. 
Several factors suggest analyst forecast is a robust proxy for ES. First, analysts are incentivised 
by both career advancement and reputation to provide accurate information to both current as 
well as prospective shareholders. Second, they are relatively informed due to experience and 
analytical ability. Third, they maintain personal access with company managers (see Lim, 
2001). Analyst forecasts also contain private information (Dimson and March, 1984; and 
Womack, 1996; Givoly and Kakonishok, 1979; Francis and Soffer, 1997) and the speed at 
which prices reflect public information tends to increase if firms have analyst coverage (Hong, 
Lim and Stein, 2000; Elgers, Lo and Pfeiffer, 2001). Forecasts can still be subject to upward 
analyst bias (I provide a discussion on the matter in Section A.3 of the Appendix). However 
                                                 
19 In the past five decades many variations and alternative methods of testing PEAD have been considered. My 
approach builds from the ongoing developments in the PEAD literature. 
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Lim (2001) argues analysts trade off the bias to improve access and relationships with firm 
management and therefore analysts ultimately minimise forecast error and improve forecast 
accuracy. 
I define the forecast error equal to the actual earnings minus the median of analyst forecasts (as 
proxy for expected earnings) and then standardized by the stock price (Brown, 1987):21  
 ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ = ஺௖௧௨௔௟𝑖,𝑞−ெ௘ௗி௢௥௘௖௔௦௧𝑖,𝑞௉௥௜௖௘𝑖,𝑞  ( 2.1 ) 
Where for firm i in quarter q (where ݍ ∈ {ͳ,ʹ, … ,͸Ͷ}), ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ is earnings surprise, ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௤ is 
the announced earnings per share22, ܯ݁݀ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௤ is the median of the analyst forecasts23 
and ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௤ is the price per share reported at the end of the quarter by Compustat.24  
2.4.2. Measures of Abnormal Returns 
I measure abnormal returns by buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR).25 Following Barber 
and Lyon (1997) and Hirshleifer et al. (2009): ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ = ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻே௡=ଶ − ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ ሻே௡=ଶ  ( 2.2 ) 
Where for announcement date t, ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ measures PEAD returns, ݎ௜,௤,௧  is the daily stock 
return, ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  is the daily return of a market-adjustment portfolio, and n represents the holding 
period from the nth day after the date of announcement to the Nth trading day. BHAR is a popular 
alternative to the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and statistical tests on the measure are 
                                                 
21 The drawback is that the measure excludes stocks that do not have an analyst following.  
22 To proxy for ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௤ I use the actual earnings data (primary earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, 
adjusted for stock splits and dividends) from I/B/E/S. It should be noted that despite being in both Compustat and 
I/B/E/S the common practice is to take earnings data from I/B/E/S. The reason being that for some Compustat 
data, earnings are restated after an announcement while in contrast I/B/E/S includes the originally reported 
earnings (see Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002).  
23 Using only the latest forecast for each analyst issued within the 90 days prior to earnings announcement. 
24 Prices are adjusted for stock-splits. 
25 Compared to cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) BHAR more closely represent investor returns from holding 
a position in an asset. 
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robust for sufficiently large sample size (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelean, 1995; Barber 
and Lyon, 1997).26 The market-adjustment portfolio is commonly the 1) return on S&P 500 
index; 2) return on S&P 500 exchange traded fund; or 3) a matched size and book-to-market 
portfolio. The distribution of BHAR is assumed to have a mean of zero if prices fully reflect 
announcement surprise. 
While PEAD effects are documented to last up to three quarters (see, Bernard and Thomas, 
1989) I select N equal 61 and therefore compute PEAD over 60 trading days. This is because 
measures of BHAR across long periods contain more noise and reduce the reliability of test 
statistics (Fama, 1991; Kothari, 2001).27 It is also common practice among PEAD studies to 
measure BHAR from 2 trading days to 61 trading days after the date of earnings announcement 
(see Mendenhall, 2004; Hirshelifer et al, 2009).   
2.4.3. Adjusting Standard Event-Study Methods to PEAD 
The standard event-study method is a two-stage regression process. The first stage is to estimate 
the coefficient betas in the pre-earnings period and the second stage is to project the estimated 
betas onto post-event factor returns (see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997). The pre-earnings 
announcement estimation window is generally between 12 and 48 months while the post-event 
period generally covers most of the quarter following the announcement date.  
  
                                                 
26 One benefit of computing abnormal returns using BHAR is that it yields well-specified test statistics. Via 
simulation Barber and Lyon (1997) demonstrate that methods for calculating abnormal stock returns (such as 
CAR) are mis-specified and adjusting buy-and-hold returns by matching sample firms to control portfolios based 
on similar size and book-to-market ratios yields improved and well-specified test statistics. 
27 The measure of cumulative abnormal returns across a long horizon “require(s) extreme caution” (Kothari and 
Warner, 1997, p.301) and generally “the analysis of long-run abnormal returns is treacherous” (Lyon, Barber and 
Tsai, 1999, p.165). Also Fama (1991, p.1602) advocates for the shortest period in order to obtain the “cleanest 
evidence”. 
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The estimated daily abnormal return for firm i is then computed by the following: ̂ݎ௜,௧ =  ݎ ௧݂ + ∑ [̂ߚ𝑧ܴܫܵܭܨܣܥܱܴܶ  ܵ𝑧,௧]௓𝑧=ଵ   ( 2.3 ) ܣܴ௜,௧ =  ݎ௜,௧ − ̂ݎ௜,௧ ( 2.4 ) ܲܧܣܦ௜,௤,௧ =  ∑ ܣܴ௜,௧+௡ே௡=଴  ( 2.5 ) 
Where ̂ݎ௜,௧ is the expected return for firm i on day t, ݎ௜,௧ is actual return, ݎ ௧݂ is the daily risk-
free rate return; ̂ߚ𝑧  are the coefficients estimated using the pre-event window regressions; ܴܫܵܭܨܣܥܱܴܶ  ܵ𝑧,௧ are the return of risk factors where z ∈{1, 2, 3... Z}. The risk factors are 
either the daily returns on the 1) risk-free rate adjusted market portfolio; 2) Fama-French three-
factor portfolios; or 3) Carhart (1997) four-factor portfolios. The latter two are used to address 
the critique that the one-factor CAPM market model is an insufficient specification of the true 
market pricing model (see Fama and French, 1992; Carhart, 1997).  ܣܴ௜,௧ is the daily abnormal 
return and ܲܧܣܦ௜,௤,௧ is the cumulative abnormal return.  
A criticism of this approach is that the two-stage regression produces biased ̂ߚ𝑧 (Bernard, 1987) 
given the method ignores earnings announcements shifting firm risk (Chordia et al., 2009). One 
popular remedy is to use post-event data to estimate firm risk rather than pre-event data (see 
Ball and Kothari, 1989; Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter, 1992; Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 
1995) and I control for risk-mismeasurement bias by estimating alpha with only post-
announcement returns (see Kothari and Warner, 2001; Sadka, 2006; Ng et al., 2008; Chordia 
et al., 2009). This is analogous to the one-stage “Jensen’s alpha” method (Jensen, 1968): 
 ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ = ܽ௜,௧ +  ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܴܫܵܭܨܣܥܱܴܶ  ܵ𝑧,௧]௓𝑧 + ߝ௜,௧ ( 2.6 ) 
Where ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ = ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ ௧݂  and ܴܫܵܭܨܣܥܱܴܶ  ܵ𝑧,௧  reflects the post-announcement 
variation of firm risk factors. To remain consistent with my choice of using BHAR, instead of 
taking daily returns the dependent and independent variables in Equation 2.6 are computed 
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based on 60-day buy-and-hold returns from the 2nd trading day after earnings announcement to 
the 61st trading day. A significant estimate of ܽ௜,௧ therefore indicates a positive finding of 60-
day PEAD. 
Throughout this paper I compute robust t-statistics following Fama and Macbeth (1973) (Fama-
Macbeth) which is the standard test procedure for market anomalies (Fama and French, 2008). 
Daily stock returns are assumed to be independent across time but correlated across stocks 
(Bernard, 1987; and Petersen, 2005) and therefore due to temporal overlap of PEAD panel data 
pooled-sample tests will generally fail the assumption of independence and result in pooled 
sample bias (i.e., over-finding bias) (Fama and French, 2008). The Fama-Macbeth test 
mitigates over-finding bias.  
The Fama-Macbeth procedure is as follows. For each calendar quarter q I run pooled OLS 
following Equation 2.6. The Fama-Macbeth estimate of the mean and variance of ߛ?̂? is then: ߛ?̂? = ଵொ ∑ ̂ߛ𝑧,௤ொ௤=ଵ  ( 2.7 ) 𝜎ଶሺߛ?̂?ሻ = ଵொ ܸܽݎ(̂ߛ𝑧,௤) = ଵொమ ∑ ሺ̂ߛ𝑧,௤ொ௤=ଵ − ߛ?̂?ሻଶ ( 2.8 ) 
In other words, the estimated mean is equal to the average of the quarterly estimates of ̂ߛ𝑧,௤ and 
the variance is computed from the distribution of the quarterly estimates. ̂ߛ𝑧,௤ is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed. I note another advantage of the Fama-Macbeth test 
is that it addresses concerns that returns variance generally increase when conditioned on 
earnings surprise. Ignoring increased variance leads to an over-rejection of the null hypothesis 
that abnormal returns are insignificantly different from zero (Brown and Warner, 1985; and 
Corrado, 1989) and therefore the Fama-MacBeth test again serves to prevent over-finding. 
40 
 
2.4.3.1. Results 
To test the significance of PEAD I create quarterly ES quintiles based on break points 
computed in the previous quarter and obtain quarterly alpha estimates for each ES quintile. 
Estimated alphas that monotonically increase with respect to ES quintile rank are consistent 
with the PEAD anomaly. Each quarter’s PEAD is proxied by the estimated alpha of the highest 
ES quintile minus the estimated alpha of the lowest ES quintile (i.e., good news alpha minus 
bad news alpha).  
Results in Panel A of Table 2.3 show PEAD is statistically and economically significant after 
controlling for common risk factors. Irrespective of model specification PEAD remains 
significant, and estimated alphas increase monotonically with respect to ES quintile rank. The 
first row in Panel A shows the computed quarterly means of buy-and-hold returns (without 
adjustment to other risk factors). For bad (good) news the average of quarterly mean is 1.49% 
(5.05%); and the average PEAD is 3.56% (significant at the 1% level). The 3rd ES quintile 
proxies the quarterly drift of market returns for firms with near-zero ES and shows a return of 
1.91% (significant at the 10% level). Going down the rows, as returns are adjusted for more 
risk factors the return of the 3rd ES quintile centres towards zero but the magnitude of PEAD 
remains almost constant. For example, the second row shows computed BHAR where the 
adjustment-portfolio ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  is the daily risk-free rate. Returns for the 3rd ES quintile decline 
from 1.91% to 1.22% while estimated PEAD remains almost unchanged at 3.53% (significant 
at the 1% level). The last three rows show variants of Equation 2.6: 1) CAPM; 2) Fama-French 
three-factors; and 3) Carhart (1997) four-factors, and show PEAD ranges between 3.56% and 
4.10%. Looking at the one-factor CAPM model, across ES quintiles from bad news to good 
news the mean of quarterly estimated alphas are monotonically increasing. 60-day alpha returns 
are -2.49% for firms announcing bad news (significant at the 5% level) and  
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Table 2.3: 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response Across ES Quintiles 
 
Following Fama and Macbeth (1973) I run quarterly regressions for each ES quintile and test whether the mean of quarterly alphas are statistically different from zero. In the 
right column I take the quarterly difference between top and bottom ES quintile firms’ estimated alpha and compute the sample mean. I conduct quarterly regressions following  ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏ_ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊i,t = ߙ௜,௧ +  ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܴܫܵܭܨܣܥܱܴܶ  ܵ𝑧,௧]Zz + ߝi,t  where the dependent variable is measured by ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ = ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻே௡=ଶ − ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ ሻே௡=ଶ  with ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ   as 
the daily risk-free rate. ܴܫܵܭܨܣܥܱܴܶܵ 𝑧,௧  represents buy-and-hold (BHR) market risk premium, Fama and French (1992) three-factors or Carhart (1997) four-factors. Panel A 
measures BHR from one trading day to 61 trading days after earnings announcement and Panel B measures BHR from one trading day prior to earnings announcement to one 
trading day after. Period: July 1995 to June 2011. ***. **, * represent t-test significance level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
 
Panel A: 60-day Drift 
 Earnings Surprise Quintile   
 Bad News 2 3 4 Good News Good News minus Bad News 
BHR 0.0149   0.0107   0.0191 * 0.0290 ** 0.0505 ** 0.0356 *** 
BHAR (adjusted by risk-free rate) 0.00805   0.00369   0.0122   0.0220   0.0434 * 0.0353 *** 
             
CAPM -0.0249 ** -0.0109   -0.00244   0.00482   0.0161 * 0.0410 *** 
Fama-French 3 factor -0.0228 ** -0.0101 * -0.00427   0.00548   0.0138 ** 0.0367 *** 
Carhart (1997) 4 factor -0.0226 ** -0.00550   -0.00184   0.00573   0.0130 ** 0.0356 *** 
Panel B: 3-day Response 
 Earnings Surprise Quintile   
 Bad News 2 3 4 Good News Good News minus Bad News 
BHR -0.0301 *** -0.0145 *** 0.00210 ** 0.0199 *** 0.0353 *** 0.0654 *** 
BHAR (adjusted by risk-free rate) -0.0305 *** -0.0149 *** 0.00174 ** 0.0195 *** 0.0350 *** 0.0654 *** 
             
CAPM -0.0313 *** -0.0157 *** 0.000510   0.0182 *** 0.0332 *** 0.0645 *** 
Fama-French 3 factor -0.0308 *** -0.0153 *** 0.000994 * 0.0186 *** 0.0335 *** 0.0643 *** 
Carhart (1997) 4 factor -0.0310 *** -0.0151 *** 0.00106 * 0.0185 *** 0.0330 *** 0.0640 *** 
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1.61% for firms announcing good news. The returns for quintile 2, 3, and 4 are -1.09%, -0.244% 
and 0.482% respectively. The right column shows the average PEAD is 4.10% (significant at 
the 1% level). In other words PEAD effects are in excess of 4% after controlling for firm beta. 
Looking further down at the 4th and 5th rows, controlling for Fama-French three-factors, the 
estimated PEAD is 3.67% (significant at the 1% level) and 3.56% after controlling for 
momentum effects (significant at the 1% level). These results suggest PEAD remains a 
statistically robust anomaly. 
As a matter of comparison I also show how the market responds to ES around the immediate 
announcement period vis-à-vis the post-announcement period. Panel B in Table 2.3 compares 
the 3-day response (3DR) which is defined as the BHAR measured from one trading day before 
the date of the earnings announcement to one trading day after. Consistent with expectations 
this measure is also monotonically increasing with respect to ES quintile which is consistent 
with bigger news surprise impounding more information into stock prices. For example, the 
last row shows in the Carhart (1997) four factor model the 3DR is 6.40% (significant at the 1% 
level); the mean of estimated alphas is -3.10% for bad news (significant at the 1% level) and 
3.30% for good news (significant at the 1% level). Irrespective of specification the difference 
on average between good and bad news firms is between 6.40% to 6.54% (significant at the 
1% level), which is approximately twice that of PEAD.  This result is consistent with the 
literature. 
2.4.4. Portfolios Classified by Firm Characteristics 
Following Fama and French (2008) I now assess the robustness of the PEAD anomaly by 
running Fama-French three-factor regressions across portfolios classified by different firm 
characteristics. The intuition is that a finding of significant alpha, irrespective of how portfolios 
are constructed, indicates robust evidence in favour of PEAD. For each of fourteen explanatory 
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variables30 I compute within-quarter break points at the 33rd and 67th percentile and group firm-
quarter observations into “low”, “mid” or “high” portfolios based on the break points. This 
borrows from Fama and French (1992) and seeks to identify whether factor variation can 
explain PEAD. For each portfolio I then again estimate PEAD by computing the average 
quarterly difference between estimated alphas for the highest and lowest ES quintiles (i.e., good 
news alpha minus bad news alpha). 
Results in Table 2.4 show that irrespective of firm characteristic at least one of the low or high 
portfolios exhibit a significant PEAD. Consistent with the literature PEAD is not uniform in 
the cross-section and is generally larger in portfolios characterised by low investor 
sophistication, high structural uncertainty, high transaction costs and high arbitrage risk. Take 
for example, the second panel in the right column which shows PEAD across different sizes of 
bid-ask spreads. For firms with the narrowest spreads PEAD is 0.636% (insignificant at the 10% 
level) while for firms with the widest spreads PEAD rises to 3.83% (significant at the 1% level). 
This suggests the anomaly is associated with transaction costs. Similarly the results show 
PEAD attenuation is associated with high institutional ownership, high analyst coverage, and 
high stock price (which proxy high investor sophistication, low information opacity, and low 
trading costs respectively). PEAD also attenuates with low volatility, low dispersion, low 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity and low spreads (which respectively proxy for low investor 
uncertainty, low analyst disagreement, low illiquidity and low transaction costs). High 
momentum is also associated with smaller PEAD which is consistent with Sadka (2006) and 
Vega (2006) finding that PEAD is positively correlated to momentum effects. My results 
                                                 
30 I include the additional analyst dispersion factor which is computed by the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts and proxies for investor disagreement. To compute this variable I omit all firm-quarter observations with 
only one analyst forecast. 
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Table 2.4: 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response Across Factor Portfolios 
I take the difference of estimated alphas between good and bad news across each tercile group for 14 explanatory factors. Ranking of low, mid, high are based on quarterly 
within-quarter sort. Following Fama and Macbeth (1973) I run quarterly regressions for the top and bottom ES quintile within each tercile. I then take the difference in estimated 
alpha between the top and bottom ES quintile and test whether the mean is significantly different from zero. I conduct regressions following  ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏ_ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊i,t = ߙ௜,௧ + ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܴܫܵܭܨܣܥܱܴܶ  ܵ𝑧,௧]Zz + ߝi,t  where the dependent variable is measured by ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ = ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻே௡=ଶ − ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ ሻே௡=ଶ  with ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ   as the daily risk-free rate. The ܴܫܵܭܨܣܥܱܴܶܵ 𝑧,௧  represent BHR for Fama and French (1992) three-factors. The variables below are institutional ownership (Instii,q); number of announcements released on 
same day (Distract_Ui,q); number of analysts issuing forecasts within the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (Analysti,q); the standard Deviation of Analyst Forecast 
for firm i in quarter q (Dispersioni,q) (note: denotes the group of announcements with only one analyst forecast and hence dispersion is zero); volatility of daily BHAR in the 
40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); average of Amihud illiquidity measured across 40 trading 
days prior to earnings announcement (Illiqi,q); average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Spreadi,q); stock price at the end of 
quarter, q (Pricei,q); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); market 
capitalisation (Mcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across the past 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Momi,q); Period: July 1995 to June 2011. ***. **, 
* represent t-test  significance level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
    Good News minus Bad News      Good News minus Bad News  
  3-day Response 60-day PEAD    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Instii,q 
low 0.0534 *** 0.0399 *** 
Illiqi,q 
low 0.0441 *** 0.0109   
mid 0.0604 *** 0.0363 *** mid 0.0554 *** 0.00940   
high 0.0639 *** 0.0126   high 0.0667 *** 0.0451 *** 
Distract_Ui,q 
low 0.0662 *** 0.0251 ** 
Spreadi,q 
low 0.0464 *** 0.00636   
mid 0.0553 *** 0.0642 * mid 0.0543 *** 0.0195   
high 0.0499 *** 0.0210   high 0.0648 *** 0.0383 *** 
Analysti,q 
low 0.0603 *** 0.0512 *** 
Pricei,q 
low 0.0634 *** 0.0400 *** 
mid 0.0632 *** 0.0106   mid 0.0568 *** 0.0149   
high 0.0489 *** 0.00437   high 0.0459 *** 0.0188 * 
Volatilityi,q 
low 0.0441 *** 0.0167   
Turni,q 
low 0.0647 *** 0.0443 *** 
mid 0.0590 *** 0.0139   mid 0.0568 *** 0.0105   
high 0.0654 *** 0.0382 *** high 0.0482 *** 0.0215 ** 
ArbRiski,q 
low 0.0384 *** 0.0143   
Mcapi,q 
low 0.0672 *** 0.0393 *** 
mid 0.0579 *** 0.0200 ** mid 0.0529 *** 0.0138   
high 0.0690 *** 0.0352 *** high 0.0438 *** 0.0248 * 
ExpRiski,q 
low 0.0500 *** 0.0231 ** 
BMi,q 
low 0.0721 *** 0.0367 * 
mid 0.0570 *** 0.0389 *** mid 0.0579 *** 0.0107   
high 0.0681 *** 0.0284 ** high 0.0548 *** 0.0364 ** 
Dispersioni,q 
           
low 0.0737 *** 0.00831   
Momi,q 
low 0.0622 *** 0.0380 ** 
mid 0.0653 *** 0.0201   mid 0.0568 *** 0.0386 *** 
high 0.0489 *** 0.0215 ** high 0.0578 *** 0.0121   
45 
 
therefore align with the behavioural, structural uncertainty, and limits of arbitrage explanations. 
I note PEAD does not monotonically decrease with respect to market capitalisation, nor 
monotonically increase with respect to BM, which supports my findings in Table 2.3 that 
Fama-French three-factors alone cannot explain away PEAD effects. PEAD is also significant 
across all low, mid and high hedgeable risk portfolios which affirms Mendenhall’s (2006) 
argument that hedgeable risks is unrelated to PEAD and investors will not be compensated for 
carrying risks that can be hedged away by the market portfolio. 
Two factors that are inconsistent with previous studies are turnover and investor distraction. 
My results show PEAD is significant for both high and low turnover portfolios: low turnover 
stocks have a PEAD of 4.43% (significant at the 1% level) while high turnover stocks have a 
PEAD of 2.15% (significant at the 5% level). The mid portfolio has a PEAD of 1.05% and is 
insignificant at the 10% level. This suggests the indirect cost to processing market information 
is potentially a poor explanation for cross-sectional variation in PEAD. The results for investor 
distraction are also inconsistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and I find days with a high number 
of announcements are associated with insignificant drift. Notwithstanding, later in my 
multivariate analysis I show regression results for the two factors align with the literature. 
For additional robustness I also group my observations into 5x5 portfolios based on ES quintile 
by factor quintile and take the average of quarterly PEAD for each of the 25 portfolios (see 
Section A.4 of the Appendix). I compute the quarterly mean rather than estimated quarterly 
alpha for each portfolio given univariate tests on BHAR are well specified (Barber and Lyon, 
1997)32 and show the computed values are consistent with Table 2.4. For ease of interpretation 
                                                 
32 Barber and Lyon (1997) empirically demonstrate that common methods for calculating abnormal stock returns 
are mis-specified and that correcting buy-and-hold returns by matching sample firms to control firms based on 
similar size and book-to-market ratios yields well-specified test statistics.  
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I then plot cross-sectional means of PEAD returns for each factor quintile in Section A.5 of the 
Appendix. Overall the evidence presented suggests low investor sophistication, high structural 
uncertainty and high limits of arbitrage can explain PEAD attenuation 
I note my results relate to the literature on earnings response coefficient (ERC).  A 
comprehensive review on the ERC literature is beyond this chapter however in general, factors 
that proxy improvements in the quality and reliability of earnings announcements have a 
positive correlation to 3DR. For example, high institutional ownership proxies for high quality 
of earnings as institutional investors are better at monitoring company management relative to 
individual investors (Velury and Jenkins, 2006). Jiambalvo, Rajgopal and Vekatachalam (2002) 
also argue that institutional investors are better at predicting future earnings from current 
earnings information, and better at predicting momentum in future earnings surprise. Therefore 
institutional and sophisticated investors are less likely to under-react to new information 
released at announcement. 
2.5. Explanations for PEAD – Multivariate Analysis 
In the previous section I find the alpha of PEAD tends to attenuate for firms characterized by 
high investor sophistication, low structural uncertainty and low limits of arbitrage. I now jointly 
test these explanations and conduct a multivariate analysis. 
2.5.1. Regression with Scaled Interaction Variables 
To account for multiple explanations of PEAD I employ a regression method using scaled 
interaction variables. The dependent variable is the firm-quarter PEAD following Barber and 
Lyons (1998): ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ = ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻே௡=ଶ − ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ ሻே௡=ଶ . For the adjustment-
portfolio ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  I use 5x5 size quintile and BM quintile matched portfolios and the data is 
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obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s website.33  This is consistent with Mendenhall 
(2004) and Hirshleifer et al. (2009). The firm size quintile is based on NYSE firm market 
capitalisation breakpoints calculated in the most recent June; and the firm BM quintile 
breakpoints are calculated in the most recent December34. To create the explanatory factors: 1) 
I assign a decile rank ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁𝑧,௜,௤ for each explanatory factor based on within-quarter sorting35; 
2) each factor is then scaled to between -0.5 to +0.5 (see Bhushan, 1994, Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok, 1996, Mendenhall, 2004); and 3) to formulate the independent regressor each 
explanatory factor is interacted with the scaled ES variable. The rationale for imposing on the 
independent regressors a min-max range of one unit is to allow for the meaningful 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients (Mendenhall, 2004). Specifically, the estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as the difference in PEAD between firms in the top and bottom 
factor decile. The regression model is described by the following: ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ொ௨௜௡௧௜௟௘ ∈ {ͳ,ʹ,͵,Ͷ,ͷ} ( 2.9 ) ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁𝑧,௜,௤ ∈ {ͳ,ʹ,͵, … ,ͳͲ} ( 2.10 ) 
ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ = ቆாௌ𝑖,𝑞ೂೠ𝑖𝑛೟𝑖𝑙𝑒−ଵସ − Ͳ.ͷቇ ( 2.111 ) 
 ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ = ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ቀ஽௘௖௜௟௘𝑧,𝑖,𝑞−ଵ9 − Ͳ.ͷቁ ( 2.12 ) 
 ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ = ܽ + ߚ ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ + ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ + ߝ௜,௤ ( 2.13 ) 
Where ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ is the 60-day PEAD for firm i in quarter q; ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ is the scaled measure for 
ES ranging between -0.5 to 0.5; ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ is the interaction term between 
                                                 
33 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html 
34 Following the method of Fama and French (1992). 
35 As an alternative to ranking by the previous quarter’s breakpoints within-quarter ranking is also considered a 
robust method for determining factor breakpoints (see Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Bhushan, 1994; Bartov et al., 
2000; Mendenhall, 2004). 
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ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  and the explanatory factors ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݁𝑧,௜,௤ . Scaling explanatory factors also has the 
advantage of controlling for outliers and time trends (Bhushan, 1994) and also accommodates 
for non-linearity with the dependent variable (Chan et al., 1996). ߚ is the gradient for the 
earnings surprise variable and represents the average difference in PEAD between firms in the 
top and bottom ES quintiles. It can be interpreted as the magnitude of PEAD left unexplained 
by the model (Mendenhall, 2004). ߛ𝑧 is the coefficient for the zth interaction term and can be 
interpreted as the average difference in PEAD attributable to firms being in the top vis-à-vis 
the bottom decile of the explanatory factor. ߙ is the average PEAD for firms defined by median 
characteristics across all factors and is expected to be statistically insignificant from zero.  
This regression model with the set of multiplicative explanatory factors is a common test 
specification to test financial anomalies. The left hand variable is the characterisation based 
abnormal returns measure of Barber and Lyon (1997) which has been shown to be a robust 
measure for anomalous returns; and the explanatory factors are transformed through ordinate 
ranking based on the popular within-quarter sort (for example, see Bhushan, 1994; Mendenhall, 
2004). This model produces a meaningful identification of the characteristics that explain 
financial anomalies (Chan et al., 1996; Kothari, 2001). 
2.5.1.1. Results 
While successive studies have attempted to explain PEAD, in Section 2.4 I find the anomaly 
statistically remains. Now I assess whether PEAD remains robust in a joint test that controls 
for all factors. The Fama-Macbeth regression results are in Panel B of Table 2.5 and show 
PEAD remains significant at 1.90% (significant at the 1% level). In other words, at the turn of 
the century the difference in PEAD effects between good news and bad news firms remains at 
almost 2%. The magnitude also point to economic significance; Jensen (1978) notes the 
importance of trading profitability in assessing market efficiency. The estimated coefficient of 
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ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  of 0.0190 shows that, for a set of firms with median characteristics, firms in the 
highest ES quintile exhibit a 60-day abnormal return 1.90% higher than firms in the lowest ES 
quintile. Surprisingly, after controlling for all factors my tests show only arbitrage risk and 
institutional ownership are significant; the remaining coefficients are insignificant but exhibit 
signs almost entirely consistent with the literature. Higher arbitrage risk implies traders who 
seek to profit from PEAD must bear greater uncertainty regarding the outcome of any 
individual transaction, which is consistent with arguments that trading away PEAD requires 
holding large positions on relatively few stocks. The estimated coefficient for the interaction 
term ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܣݎܾܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  is 0.0248 (significant at the 5% level) and shows that after 
controlling for other explanatory factors, the abnormal return for firms in the highest arbitrage-
risk decile is 2.48% (significant at the 1% level) higher than firms in the lowest arbitrage-risk 
decile. This aligns with Mendenhall (2004, Table 3, p.887) who shows the abnormal return for 
firms in the highest arbitrage-risk decile is 6.81% higher than firms in the lowest arbitrage-risk 
decile for the period 1991 to 2000.36 The coefficient for investor sophistication is negative at -
0.0321 (significant at the 1% level) and suggests firms with the highest level of institutional 
ownership exhibit 3.21% less PEAD then firms with the lowest institutional ownership. This 
is consistent with both Campbell et al. (2009) and Chordia et al. (2009).  
One interpretation of my result is the following: information may not always be fully 
impounded into stock price due to a portion of investors having low sophistication (and 
therefore interpret newly released accounting information poorly) and the mispricing may not 
be corrected for as trading away PEAD involves holding large positions that cannot be easily 
hedged. Assuming traders hedge their position using an index future or ETF my results suggest 
                                                 
36 For comparison, for the sample period 1991 to 2000 Mendenhall (2004) finds 60-day PEAD to be 6.98%. 
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Table 2.5: Regressions of 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response against Scaled Multiplicative Factors 
 
The table shows regression results for the specification ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ = ܽ + ߚ ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ + ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ + ߝ௜,௤ where the dependent variables are 60-day 
PEAD (PEADi,q); and 3-day response (3DRi,q). All factor deciles are scaled to between -0.5 to +0.5. The variables are earnings surprise quintile (ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); institutional 
ownership (ܫ݊ݏݐ݅௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); number of announcements released on same day (ܦ݅ݏݐݎܽܿݐ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); number of analysts issuing forecasts within the 90 days prior to the earnings 
announcement (ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); arbitrage risk (ܣݎܾܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); hedgeable 
risk (ܧݔ݌ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); stock price at the end of quarter, q 
(ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (ܶݑݎ݊௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); market 
capitalisation (ܯܿܽ݌௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); book-to-market ratio (ܤܯ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); BHAR across the past 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (ܯ݋݉௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ). Panel A shows pooled 
regressions while Panel B shows Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions where values are the mean of estimated coefficients from quarterly regressions. Period: July 1995 to 
June 2011. ***. **, * represent t-test significance level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
 
  Panel A. Pooled Regression Panel B. Fama and Macbeth Regression 
 3-day Response 60-day PEAD  3-day Response  60-day PEAD 
Intercept 0.00293 *** -0.00130 *** 0.00300 *** 2.53×10-5   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ 0.0571 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0586 *** 0.0190 *** ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܫ݊ݏݐ݅௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  0.0216 *** -0.0310 *** 0.0188 *** -0.0321 *** ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܦ݅ݏݐݎܽܿݐ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ -0.0108 *** 0.0107 *** -0.0144 *** 0.0128   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  -0.00672 *** -0.0175 *** -0.00498   -0.0111   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ 0.00487 *** 0.00525 *** -0.00489   0.00865   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܣݎܾܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  0.0242 *** 0.0261 ** 0.0297 *** 0.0248 ** ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܧݔ݌ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ 0.0149 *** -0.0200 *** 0.00811 ** -0.0154   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ -0.00238 *** -0.00233 ** -0.00954 * 0.00888   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ 0.00813 *** 0.00889 ** 0.00511   0.00765   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܶݑݎ݊௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  -0.0209 *** -0.00551 ** -0.0200 ** -0.0110   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܯܿܽ݌௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ 0.00076 *** -0.00413 ** -0.00267   0.00288   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܤܯ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  -0.0213 *** 0.00983 *** -0.0211 *** 0.0174   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܯ݋݉௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  -0.00744 *** 0.00660 *** -0.00783 ** 0.0101   
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the greater the unexplained variance with respect to the market portfolio, the greater the PEAD.  
Other than arbitrage risk and institutional ownership, the remaining explanatory variables are 
statistically insignificant, despite almost all signs of estimated coefficients showing 
consistency with the literature. For example, in the context of behavioural explanations, the 
estimated coefficient for investor distraction suggests PEAD effects during days with the most 
distractions are 1.28% higher, which aligns with Hirshleifer et al. (2009). Similarly, in the 
context of structural uncertainty explanations, the proxy for investor disagreement ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ and information opacity ܤܯ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗare positively associated with PEAD, with 
the former contributing 0.865% to PEAD effects and the latter 1.74%. High analyst following, 
another proxy for low information opacity, suggests PEAD attenuates by 1.11%. High 
turnover, a proxy for indirect trading costs, is associated with PEAD attenuating by 1.10%. 
High spreads, proxying direct transaction costs, increase PEAD by 0.888%. 
Table 2.5 also shows pooled regression results in contrast to Fama-Macbeth regressions to 
demonstrate the general over-finding of statistical significance in the estimated coefficients. 
The signs of the significant coefficients in Panel A are consistent with those in Panel B, 
however the coefficients that are insignificant in the Fama-Macbeth results increase in 
signficance in the pooled regression. In fact all variables are statistically significant. Consistent 
with Fama and French (2008) this suggests pooled regressions, relative to Fama-Macbeth 
regressions, over-find a relation between an independent and dependent variables.  
Looking at the immediate price response results (left column of Panel B in Table 2.5) the 
estimate of the ES intercept suggests the average 3DR is 5.86%. The sign for the estimated 
coefficient for institutional ownership at 0.0188 is opposite to its counterpart in the PEAD 
results and suggests firms with high institutional ownership exhibit 1.88% (significant at the 
1% level) higher 3DR. This is consistent with sophisticated investors being better at 
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synthesising earnings news and therefore less likely to under-react. The estimate of -1.44% for 
investor distraction is consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2009) that firms under-react during 
days with a large number of earnings announcements. Similarly the opposite signs between 
3DR and PEAD results for spreads and turnover support Ng et al. (2008) that cost frictions 
manifest in a rational incomplete arbitrage of PEAD related mispricing. Interestingly, the 
coefficient for arbitrage risk and hedgeable risk are both significant and positive. Potentially 
these risk factors are proxies for the riskiness of earnings (see Collins and Kothari, 1989). The 
negative estimated coefficient for BM of -2.11% is also consistent with Collis and Kothari 
(1989) who show BM is a proxy for growth opportunities and a high BM implies poor future 
growth. I note that my estimates of analyst following and firm size are insignificant, however 
their negative signs are consistent with the results in Collins, Kothari and Rayburn (1987) who 
show these factors proxy the transparency of the information environment. Finally, my 
estimated coefficient for momentum suggests 3DR is inverse to momentum effects. This 
potentially captures the level of information leakage prior to earnings announcements.  
Last, to explore why other factors lose their explanatory power when including arbitrage risk 
and institutional ownership as regression factors I consider the correlation matrix between 
arbitrage risk, institutional ownership and other factors.  Mendenhall (2004) shows that 
arbitrage risk is negatively correlated with firm size, analyst following and stock price and its 
inclusion in regression specification removes the statistical significance of other control 
factors. In Section A.6 of the Appendix I compute the correlation matrix showing, consistent 
with Mendenhall (2004), ArbRiski,q is correlated to the bid-ask spread ሺ𝜌 = Ͳ.Ͷͻሻ, turnover ሺ𝜌 = −Ͳ.ʹͺሻ, stock price ሺ𝜌 = −Ͳ.ͷʹሻ, volatility ሺ𝜌 = Ͳ.͸ͺሻ and size ሺ𝜌 = −Ͳ.Ͷͺሻ; while 
Instii,q is correlated to the bid-ask spread ሺ𝜌 = −Ͳ.ʹͳሻ, analyst following ሺ𝜌 = Ͳ.ʹͶሻ and stock 
price ሺ𝜌 = Ͳ.ʹʹሻ . This suggests arbitrage risk and institutional ownership effects can 
potentially be considered catch-all terms for these other factors. 
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2.5.2. Allowing for Time-Trends in the Explanatory Variables 
In this final section I allow for time-trends in the explanatory factors, to account for time-
varying transaction costs. While scaled multiplicative factors is a common regression 
technique, the method removes trends in the control factors and hence ignores improvements 
in market liquidity across time. Chordia et al. (2009) note transaction costs were subject to 
significant decline at the turn of the century as a result of market structural changes including 
the decimalisation of tick size, the computerisation of financial markets and rising competition 
among equities exchanges. Bhardwah and Brooks (1992) proxy trading costs by stock price 
and stock turnover while Chordia et al. (2009) argue the direct measure of bid-ask spread is a 
superior proxy for transaction costs. To account for time-varying trends I include all 3 factors 
and follow the regression specification in Hirshleifer et al. (2009): 
ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ = ߙ௤ + ߚ ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ + ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ] +௓𝑧=ଵ∑ [ߜ𝑧ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ + ߝ௜,௤ (2.14) 
Where ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ = ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ. Hence all explanations 
are unscaled. I winsorize each explanatory variable at the 1% and 99% level and use the log of 
Spreadi,q to proxy for transaction costs.   
The regression results are in Table 2.6 and show PEAD is positively associated with transaction 
costs.38 I show two sets of results: 1) the left column controls for all explanatory factors; and 
2) the right column follows Hirshleifer et al. (2009) includes additional dummy variables for 
each of the Fama-French ten industry classifications. Looking at the right column, the estimated 
                                                 
38 Unpublished results show qualitatively the same results when using Amihud (2002) illiquidity as a regression 
factor. 
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coefficient for ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ is significant at 6.49% (significant at the 1% level). This magnitude is 
substantially larger than the estimates in Table 2.5 and points to a far larger portion of PEAD 
left unexplained suggesting a linear relation between dependent and independent variables is a 
poor model assumption. The results lend support to Kothari (2001) and Chan et al. (1996) that 
scaling explanatory factors to control for non-linearity and outliers is a more suitable 
specification for explaining financial anomalies. Non-scaling also makes difficult a meaningful 
interpretation of the magnitude of estimated coefficients: with this in mind I assess only the 
sign and significance of the estimated coefficients without discussing the magnitude. The 
results show institutional ownership at -0.0379 (significant at the 5% level) has a significant 
inverse relationship with ES. While the log of bid-ask spreads is also significant at 0.006 
(significant at the 5% level). Both factors are robust for the Fama-French ten industry 
classification dummies. Unpublished plots of the quarterly mean of each control variable show 
that for the period 1995 to 2011 the bid-ask spread had noticeably declined at the turn of the 
century. This suggests, controlling for all else, PEAD may have attenuated along with 
transaction costs. The results also show some evidence that high BM “value” stocks have 
higher PEAD than low BM “glamour” stocks (a proxy for information opacity). The remaining 
coefficients, although insignificant, have signs consistent with the literature, except for 
arbitrage risk. I note unscaled arbitrage risk at -0.3519 is not significant and this inconsistency 
must be interpreted in the context that arbitrage risk is highly non-linear with respect to PEAD 
(Mendenhall, 2004). My results therefore suggests transactions costs also explain PEAD. 
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Table 2.6: Fama and MacBeth Regressions of 60-day PEAD against Non-Scaled Multiplicative Factors 
 
The table shows regression results for the specification ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ = ߙ + ߚ ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ +∑ [ߛ𝑧ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ] + ∑ [ߜ𝑧ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ௓𝑧=ଵ + ߝ௜,௤  where the dependent variables are 
60-day PEAD (PEADi,q); and 3-day response (3DRi,q). The sample period is July 1995 to June 2011. The earnings 
surprise quintile ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ is scaled to between -0.5 to +0.5. The remaining factors are not sorted into deciles and 
not scaled. The zth variables ሺܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ) across firm i and in quarter q are institutional ownership (Instii,q); 
the decile rank based on number of announcements released on same day (Distracti,q); number of analysts issuing 
forecasts within the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 
trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); 
the logarithm of average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement 
(LogSpreadi,q); stock price at the end of quarter, q (Pricei,q); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) 
measured from 271 trading days to 22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); the market 
capitalisation (Mcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across the past 40 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement (Momi,q); BHAR from the 2nd to the 61st trading day after  earnings announcement (PEADi,q); and 
BHAR from the 1st trading day before earnings announcement to the 1st  trading day after earnings  announcement 
(3DRi,q). FF10 represents Fama-French 10 industry classification dummies. ***. **, * represent t-test significance 
level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
 
Intercept -0.0075   -0.0072   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ 0.0861 *** 0.0649 ** ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ Instii,q -0.0365 ** -0.0379 ** ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ Distracti,q 0.0008   0.0005   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ Analysti,q -0.0004   -0.0003   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ Volatilityi,q 0.4086   0.5602   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ArbRiski,q -0.1445   -0.3519   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ExpRiski,q -2.3512   -2.2923   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ LogSpreadi,q 0.0092 *** 0.006 ** ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ Pricei,q 0.0001   -0.0001   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ Turni,q 0.0009   -0.0056   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ Mcapi,q 1.40×10-7   1.26×10-7   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ BMi,q 0.0064   0.0080  * ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ Momi,q 0.0035   0.0026                                                                    
Additional Control Variables  ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ   ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ 
and FF10 
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2.6. Conclusion 
In the anomalies literature PEAD has attracted numerous studies and explanations for the 
persistent under-reaction to earnings news and Fama (1998) has dubbed it the “granddaddy of 
under-reaction events” (p.286). I find that, controlling for a large set of explanatory variables, 
PEAD remains a significant anomaly at almost 2% across the 60 trading days after earnings 
announcement. This finding is both statistically and economically significant. I further find this 
under-reaction to earnings surprise is partially explained by low investor sophistication while 
the persistence of PEAD is associated with arbitrage risk and transaction costs. In other words, 
low investor sophistication causes the incomplete impounding of earnings news into the stock 
price, while the subsequent mispricing is not fully corrected for due to cost frictions and the 
arbitrage risk. Assuming traders hedge their position with the market index my results suggest 
the greater the idiosyncratic risk with respect to the market portfolio, the greater the PEAD.  
To address concerns that findings of PEAD may be subject to an over-finding bias this paper 
controls for shifts in firm risks at earnings announcement and also addresses pooled-regression 
bias by employing Fama-Macbeth test procedures. Following Fama and French (2008) I 
demonstrate PEAD alpha is statistically and economically robust irrespective of model 
specification and that PEAD varies across firm characteristics almost entirely consistent with 
findings in the literature. However, individually or jointly considered these firm characteristics 
are insufficient to fully explain PEAD. Overall this paper supports the view that PEAD remains 
“a serious challenge … [and that] it has survived a battery of tests and the many attempts to 
explain it away” (Kothari, 2001, p.196). My sample period generally has no temporal overlap 
to PEAD studies published prior to the early-2000s and therefore my results can be viewed as 
an out-of-sample test supporting the existence of the PEAD anomaly.  
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CHAPTER 3: DOES ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
ATTENUATE THE POST-EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT? 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter tests the relation between algorithmic trading (AT) and the post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD). “From a starting point of near zero in the mid-1990s” AT rose to 
73% of trading volume in U.S. equity markets by 2009 (Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld, 
2011, p.1) while over a similar sample period PEAD attenuated by more than 30% (see Section 
3.4). Many studies suggest AT is associated with lower bid-ask spreads, improved price 
efficiency and sophisticated trading, which are also factors shown to lower PEAD effects. It 
therefore follows that AT and PEAD are potentially inversely related. Further, if sophisticated 
algorithmic traders are better at extracting trading signals from earnings information, price 
discovery is expected to improve. I therefore test the conjecture that the rise in AT may have 
attenuated PEAD, and that AT is associated with improvements in price discovery around 
earnings announcements. 
My findings are summarised in the flow chart illustrated in Figure 3.1. A shaded box represents 
a statement or hypothesis consistent with my findings; a clear/non-shaded box represents a 
statement or hypothesis inconsistent with my findings. I begin my analysis by first 
documenting the attenuation of PEAD, which experienced significant structural decline in the 
early 2000s. I find the decline is concentrated among NYSE-listed firms and the attenuation 
exceeds 30%. I then present three explanations for the decline: 1) the phase-in of decimalisation 
(the reduction in minimum tick size completed in January 2001); 2) the structural improvement 
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in earnings quality in the early 2000s; and 3) the substantial increase in AT activity on the 
NYSE after May 2003. Decimalisation lowered transaction cost while a rise in earnings quality 
reduced informational uncertainty and opacity; a rise in AT is associated with declines in 
transaction costs and improvements in investor sophistication. 
To formally test the relation between AT and PEAD controls are included for decimalisation 
and shifts in earnings quality. My method uses matched-sampling test procedures which 
remove the effects of decimalisation and time-trends in earnings quality; and I test whether 
differences in PEAD across matched pairs can be explained by differences in AT. My results 
find an insignificant relation (and therefore are inconsistent with studies suggesting AT lowers 
transaction costs).  
In the second part of my analysis I suggest high investor sophistication and the use of 
sophisticated algorithms ought to improve price discovery. I suggest PEAD ought to be 
positively correlated to the proportion of price discovery left unrealised at earnings 
announcements and construct the Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) price discovery measure 
as a function of PEAD. I then test the impact of AT on the WPC measure and find price 
discovery improved by more than 12% after Autoquote was phased-in (referring to a change 
in the NYSE market microstructure completed in May 2003 that substantially increased the 
adoption of AT). My overall findings therefore suggest AT responds to earnings 
announcements not by way of attenuating PEAD effects but by improving the impounding of 
new trading signals to stock prices. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the background to this study 
and Section 3.3 the data. Section 3.4 shows the structural decline in PEAD and Section 3.5 
tests the relation between AT, PEAD and the immediate market response to earnings surprise. 
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Section 3.6 then tests the association between AT and price discovery around earnings 
announcements. Section 3.7 concludes this chapter. 
3.2. Background 
Studies generally find AT improves liquidity, lowers transaction costs39 and improves price 
discovery.  This can be explained by factors such as the associated increase in competition 
among sophisticated traders to supply liquidity and the reduction in price impact from order-
splitting. A substantial proportion of AT originates with sophisticated institutional participants 
owing to the complexities and sophistication required for implementing AT. These participants 
process large quantities of order-flow information as well as execute high volume of orders 
(see Foucault, 1999; Foucault, Roell and Sandas, 2003; Rosu, 2009). Low transaction cost and 
high investor sophistication are also explanations for reduced PEAD effects as lower frictions 
encourage mispricing to be traded away while sophisticated investors are less prone to 
behavioural bias.  
3.2.1. Algorithmic Trading 
AT is defined as the “use of mathematical models, computers and telecommunication 
networks to automate the buying and selling of financial securities” (Kirilenko and Lo, 2013, 
p.52). Sophisticated market participants employ AT to improve order execution quality and 
lower price impact. A subset of AT is high frequency trading (HFT) which is typically 
associated with low latency and the fast execution of orders so as to profit from small market 
                                                 
39  ‘Transaction cost’ can be defined as “all costs incurred in financial trading, including execution cost, 
commissions and rebates, information technology costs and other costs” (Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt and Ysusi, 
2014). However I do note a large proportion of transaction cost is “execution cost”, or what Brogaard et al. (2014) 
define as “the market-adjusted execution shortfall, the volume-weighted percentage difference between the price 
available in the market when brokers receive institutional orders and the price at which the order is executed”. 
The quoted bid-ask spread or the effective spread are, for example, measures of execution costs and often used as 
proxy for transaction costs. 
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discrepancies (Brogaard, 2010; Chlistalla, Speyer, Kaiser and Mayer, 2011). 40  Hirschey 
(2016) finds approximately 40% of trades on Nasdaq are HFT-driven. 
In theory AT can narrow or widen the bid-ask spread.41 For example, posting a resting order in 
a limit order book generates a “winner’s curse” problem as orders can quickly become stale 
once new information arrives (Foucault, 1999; Hoffman, 2009; Boehmer and Kelly, 2009). 
Informed traders employing AT can therefore quickly pick off the stale orders and thus 
liquidity providers seeking to avoid adverse selection will quote a wider spread (see Bagehot, 
1971; Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick 2003; Foucault, Roell and Sandas, 2003). 
Alternatively, liquidity providers may employ AT to effectively mitigate winners curse costs 
by swiftly cancelling stale orders; this conversely results in narrower spreads (assuming quote-
based competition among liquidity providers).  
Empirical evidence suggests higher levels of AT are associated with narrower spreads (Dutta 
and Madhavan, 1997; Bessimbinder, 2003a and 2003b; Hendershott and Riordan, 2013).42 For 
example, Hendershott and Riordan (2013) examine the largest stocks on the Deutsche Bourse 
where AT is responsible for more than half of all market and limit orders. They show AT 
activity is inversely correlated to effective and quoted spreads. Menkveld (2013) also finds 
spreads declined by as much as 50% following new HFT entrants into a new Dutch equities 
exchange. Hirschey (2016) argues algorithmic liquidity provision has lower marginal costs and 
significant discount in trading commission relative to other market participants. Finally, 
                                                 
40 Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) note AT can be partitioned into: 1) agency algorithms which intelligently split large 
orders; and 2) proprietary algorithms that scan for changes across the entire market’s order book. The former 
represents the use of AT by portfolio managers and brokers to improve execution quality and reduce price impact 
(such as implementing order-splitting algorithms) while the latter represents HFT participants which profit from 
price inefficiencies. An additional characteristic of HFTs is they generally trade with their own capital, generate 
a large amount of message traffic and turnover, and are reluctant to hold inventory overnight (Hasbrouck and Saar, 
2013). 
41 Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) argue that theoretically HFT traders can exert both positive and negative 
welfare effects as a result of competition in informational and speed advantages. 
42 The evidence is that the relationship between quote-based competition and lower execution costs is weaker for 
Nasdaq relative to NYSE stocks. One reason is preferencing agreements on Nasdaq that do not enforce price-time 
priority  (Dutta and Madhavan, 1997; Huang and Stoll; Bessimbinder, 2003a and 2003b).  
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Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) show the introduction of the Autoquote system to the 
NYSE also significantly improved spreads for large-cap stocks, but had insignificant impact 
on small-cap stocks (because AT is concentrated among large-cap stocks with high liquidity 
and high institutional participation).  
The sophistication of AT in processing high quantities of market information efficiently is 
viewed to be beneficial to investors. AT has been shown to lower liquidity providers’ 
monitoring costs; improve the management of capital and inventory constraints; reduce 
latency-sensitive execution risks as well as reduce the price impact of informed trades43 (see 
Boehmer, 2005; Javanovic and Menkveld, 2011; Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, 
Moulton and Seasholes, 2010; Hendershott and Riordan, 2013; Menkveld, 2013; Brogaard and 
Hendershott, 2013; Hoffman, 2008; and Back and Baruch, 2007). Hirschey (2016) also note 
news agencies are increasingly providing machine-readable news specifically for algorithmic 
traders and therefore it is argued AT can remove the traditional trade-off between execution 
speed and execution cost/quality (Boehmer, 2005; Engle, Ferstenberg and Russell, 2006; 
Riordan and Stockenmaier, 2011). Algorithmic traders can also swiftly (sometimes in 
milliseconds) identify and respond to new market information and then update their strategies 
accordingly (Hendershott and Riordan, 2013; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013). Given the associated 
combination of efficient and low-cost execution (Riordan and Stockenmaier, 2011) it is also 
                                                 
43 The evidence suggests that technological advancement among financial market and trading participants has 
seen AT rise sharply on a global scale (Boehmer, Fong and Wu, 2015). The ability to craft varied and 
individualised algorithms that are both selective and specific in the search for and processing of information makes 
it a desirable tool for automating the trading process. Hendershott et al. (2011) explain that the precise motivation 
underlying electronic submission of orders is dependent on the type of market participant: “there are many 
different algorithms, used by many different types of market participants. Some hedge funds and broker-dealers 
supply liquidity using algorithms, competing with designated market makers and other liquidity suppliers…For 
assets that trade on multiple venues, liquidity demanders often use smart order routers to determine where to send 
an order…Statistical arbitrage funds use computers to quickly process large amounts of information contained in 
the order flow and price moves…Last but not least, algorithms are used by institutional investors to trade large 
quantities of stock gradually over time.” (p. 2)  
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argued that trader sophistication and competitiveness increase considerably with the adoption 
of AT and the cost of not employing AT is significant. Therefore rational incentives exist for 
institutional traders to implement new AT technologies (McInish and Upson, 2012; Moallemi 
and Saglam, 2011).44 
AT mostly originates from sophisticated institutional investors. The implementation of AT is 
complex, requiring significant resources, on-going development and know-how (see Sadoghi, 
Labrecque, Sing, Shum and Jacobsen, 2010; Hendershott et al., 2011). For example, one 
dominant feature of AT is the access to remote, rather than physical, execution venues 
(Chlistalla, 2011). Monitoring and executing across multiple venues dynamically requires the 
integration of computer hardware, software and network services along with the formulation 
of AT strategies. It is therefore common for AT to originate from participants that can 
effectively combine electronic order generation and routing with intelligent decision 
processing and quantitative analysis (Kirilenko and Lo, 2013). Hence, while AT can improve 
productivity, reduce human error and make possible fundamentally different trading strategies 
beyond the abilities of human traders, implementation of AT is concentrated among 
sophisticated institutional traders (see Kirilenko and Lo, 2013 Gsell and Gomber, 2006; 
Hoffman, 2014). In some cases, execution of AT also requires regulatory/exchange approvals 
which are generally issued to well-resourced and sophisticated financial institutions (Chlistalla, 
2011). 
Lastly, algorithmic traders generally improve price efficiency. 45 AT is associated with a 
                                                 
44 I also note the critique that excessive adoption of AT by market participants can also potentially generate 
negative externalities (Gai et al, 2013). 
45 I do note some studies suggest improvements in liquidity associated with AT can periodically be illusory. For 
example, algorithmic traders’ behaviour can be opportunistic if they do not have an obligation to constantly 
maintain provision of liquidity. For example, Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2016) show for the E-mini 
S&P 500 futures during the Flash Crash of May 6th, 2010 HFTs either withdrew liquidity provision or became 
liquidity demanders. O’Hara and Easley et al. (2011) show high levels of price taking and adverse selection caused 
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reduction in average trade size but increased turnover (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009; 
Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2016) and this implies markets exhibit more price continuity in the 
sense that individual trades have less price impact (Black, 1971; Keim and Madhavan, 1996 
and 1997). Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014) show using transaction level data from 
Nasdaq that in general HFT facilitates price discovery by trading towards permanent price 
changes and away from transitory pricing errors, while Hirschey (2016) finds HFTs are more 
skilled than other market participants in anticipating short term order-flow. Hendershott and 
Riordan (2013) also find algorithmic traders’ order placements in the Deutsche Börse are a 
function of efficient liquidity demand and supply strategies. In other words, on a continual 
basis they tend to initiate more market orders when spreads are narrow but submit new limit 
orders when spreads widen, facilitating price efficiency and price discovery. 
3.2.2. PEAD, Transaction Costs and Investor Sophistication 
PEAD is one of the oldest financial anomalies and imply investors under-react to earnings news 
(Ball and Brown, 1968). The magnitude of under-reaction is positively correlated to 
standardized earnings surprise (Bernard and Thomas, 1989). Two factors that have robust 
explanatory power for reduced PEAD effects are low transaction costs and improvements in 
investor sophistication. 
Liquidity providers impose transaction costs in the form of the bid-ask spread on market 
participants as they face time-varying liquidity and asymmetric information (O’Hara, 2003). 
In the context of PEAD Ng et al., (2008) show the presence of the bid-ask spread implies both 
existence and persistence of investor under-reaction. To illustrate using a standard market 
                                                 
the withdrawal of HFT liquidity provision in the hours preceding the Flash Crash. Nevertheless Hasbrouck and 
Saar (2010) find despite fleeting liquidity by HFT and high cancellation rates of limit orders, low-latency trading 
is on average correlated with improved market quality. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson and Vega (2014) also 
show, using data from the foreign exchange market, that despite withdrawing activity prior to expected 
macroeconomic news announcements algorithmic traders re-enter the market and increase the supply of liquidity 
in the hours immediately following news release.  
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microstructure framework where one rational arbitrageur interacts with one market maker, 
assume a stock’s fundamental value increases from $50 to $55 per share (due to positive 
earnings news) and the expected transaction cost is the bid-ask spread of $2 (i.e., the pre-
announcement bid and ask are $49 and $51, respectively). The rational arbitrageur will then 
place bids with the market maker up to $53 per share; any bid orders above this price have 
negative expected return because of the $2 transaction cost. It therefore follows a cost-induced 
upper bound impedes the full impounding of earnings news to the stock price.   
Transaction costs can also explain the persistence of PEAD. Applying the same example above, 
consider firm news arriving to the arbitrageur during the post-announcement period. For 
simplicity assume 50% of the time the arbitrageur receives good news (reflecting an increase 
of $2 per share in the stock’s fundamental value) and 50% of the time the information received 
is bad news (reflecting a decrease of $2 per share). The expected value of the post-
announcement news therefore continues to be zero. With good news, the stock’s fundamental 
value rises from $55 to $57 and it is therefore profitable for the arbitrageur to trade up to $55. 
With bad news the arbitrageur refrains from trading and the stock price remains at $53. On 
average the stock price will therefore drift towards 50% × $55 + 50% × $53 = $54. It follows, 
iteratively, as more news arrives the price converges towards the fundamental value.  
Transaction cost may have a relatively small effect on equilibrium risk premiums but lower 
transaction cost enables more efficient asset allocation among heterogeneous investors and 
facilitates the sharing of risk (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 and 1988; Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996; Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam, 2001; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2001; Hasbrouck, 2009; O’Hara, 2003, 
Constantinides, 1986; Heaton and Lucas, 1996; Vayanos, 1998). Many studies argue a 
substantial decline in transaction cost therefore ought to encourage the trading away of market 
mispricing (see Jensen, 1978; Bhardwaj and Brooks, 1992; Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004; 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Tong (2014) find the general 
decline in transaction costs over the past two decades has contributed to the attenuation of 
numerous financial anomalies.  
The second factor that explains PEAD is that unsophisticated investors tend to under-react to 
earnings news. Consistent with research in behavioural economic studies show investors are 
prone to behavioural bias in the form of naive expectations of future earnings (Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989 and 1990) and conservatism (over-confidence) towards public news (private 
news) (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). 
For example, Kaniel, Liu, Saar and Titman (2012) show individual/retail traders are ‘news-
contrarian’ and hence slow down price adjustments to earnings surprise. In contrast, 
institutional participants are on average sophisticated participants (Bartov et al., 2000; 
Campbell et al., 2009) and the empirical evidence finds overall institutional investors correctly 
predict the direction of earnings surprise (Ke and Ramalingegowda, 2005; Campbell, et al., 
2009). Another proxy for increased sophistication is analyst coverage. First, analysts are 
incentivised by both career advancement and reputation to provide accurate information to both 
current as well as prospective shareholders. Second, they are informed participants due to their 
analytical ability and personal access to company managers (see Lim, 2001). Brown and Han 
(2000) also demonstrate empirically that the number of analysts following a stock is inversely 
correlated to the magnitude of PEAD. I note analysts often occupy positions in sophisticated 
investment banks (which give incentives in the form of betterremuneration, reputation and 
career advancement) (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Clement, 1999) and such institutions are 
generally major generators of AT. Hence AT may also proxy high sophistication due to its 
association with sophisticated analysts. 
67 
 
3.3. Data 
My sample data obtains for each firm-quarter earnings announcement the associated PEAD, 
level of AT activity and other firm-quarter characteristics. To compute PEAD I follow 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and use the CRSP-Compustat merged database and the I/B/E/S 
database. 46  CRSP provides daily stock price data, the Compustat data provides quarterly 
accounting filings, and I/B/E/S data contains quarterly analyst forecast and earnings 
announcement information47.  
My sample covers the period 1st July 1995 to 30th June 2011. I select only data after 1994 as it 
has shown to be robust for event studies (Hirshleifer et al., 2009; DellaVigna and Pollett, 2009). 
I select from the CRSP-Compustat merged data all firms with primary stock listing on the 
NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. Closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts, American 
Depository Receipts and foreign stocks are excluded.48 The sample data is then matched to the 
I/B/E/S dataset via a CRSP-Compustat-I/B/E/S matching procedure provided by the Wharton 
Research Data Service. Berkman and Truong (2009) show a substantial number of earnings 
announcements are made after trading hours and therefore immediate price response may only 
be impounded to stock price on the next trading day. To control for this forward-looking bias, 
all announcements made after 4:00pm are assumed to be made the following trading day.50 I 
then remove the following observations: 1) firm-quarter observations with less than $5 million 
in market capitalisation (Mendenhall, 2004); 2) firms with stock prices less than $1 before 
stock-split adjustment (Hirshleifer et al., 2009); and 3) firm-quarter observations whereby the 
                                                 
46 Obtained from the Wharton Research Data Service. 
47 I/B/E/S contains data collected every third Thursday of the calendar month from analysts giving forecasts to 
the next quarter’s corporate earnings. 
48 I select for CRSP stock codes 10 and 11. 
50 If there is a discrepancy of announcement time between Compustat and I/B/E/S I select the earlier of the two 
dates (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). 
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actual or median earnings per share forecast is higher than the stock price (Hirshleifer et al., 
2009). 
It should be noted that many studies of PEAD restrict sample selection to only NYSE- and 
AMEX-listed firms (see Bernard and Thomas, 1989 and 1990; Bhushan, 1994; Bartov et al., 
2000; and Ng et al., 2008) however I retain stocks listed on the Nasdaq (in contrast to Chapter 
2) as I use Nasdaq firms as a control group for my statistical tests. 
For data on AT I obtain the Autoquote phase-in schedule and construct proxies for AT activity. 
Each NYSE stock has a specific date for the phasing-in of Autoquote and I obtain this list from 
Hendershott’s website.51 The list includes the NYSE listing codes which I use to obtain U.S. 
intraday trade and quote data from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH).52 I use the TRTH 
data to infer AT activity at the firm-level. The data is organised by Reuters Instrument Code 
(RIC) and each RIC is associated with an equity or derivative instrument. For each NYSE-
listed common stock, I obtain from SIRCA the RIC codes, the NYSE listing codes and 
consolidated time-stamped trade and quote data. The data records every order placed at the 
inside quote which updates the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). I then apply the following 
filters:  
1. Remove irregular trades based on some technical conditions in the TRTH “qualifiers” 
data field following Boehmer, Fong and Wu (2015) (see Section C.2 in the Appendix).  
2. Require all traded price, traded volume, bid price, bid volume, ask price and ask volume 
data fields to be greater than zero.  
3. The ask price must be greater than the bid price. 
4. All intraday trade and quote observations must be between 9:35am and 3:55pm.  
                                                 
51 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hender/. 
52 Provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). 
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To compute the level of AT activity I then follow Hendershott et al. (2011) and Boehmer et al. 
(2014) and take the negative of volume divided by the total number of messages. Hence for 
each stock i and trading day t: 
ܣ ௜ܶ,௧ =  ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧ −ͳͲͲ ∗ (ܰ݋ܶݎܽ݀݁ݏ௜,௧ + ܰ݋ܳݑ݋ݐ݁௜,௧)⁄  ( 3.1 ) 
Where ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧  is the daily dollar volume, ܰ݋ܶݎܽ݀݁ݏ௜,௧ is the number of trades and ܰ݋ܳݑ݋ݐ݁௜,௧ is the number of quote updates at the NBBO.  
To measure earnings surprise (ES), following Chapter 2 I calculate ES by the standardized 
analyst forecast-error:  ܧܵ௜,௤ = ஺௖௧௨௔௟𝑖,𝑞−ெ௘ௗி௢௥௘௖௔௦௧𝑖,𝑞௉௥௜௖௘𝑖,𝑞   where for firm i in quarter q, ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ is 
earnings surprise, ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௤ is the announced earnings per share53 , ܯ݁݀ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௤  is the 
median of analyst forecasts54 and ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௤ is the price per share reported at the end of the 
quarter (I note ݍ ∈ {ͳ,ʹ, … ,͸Ͷ}).55 I also create quarterly ES quintiles ܧ ௜ܵ,௤௤௨௜௡௧௜௟௘ ∈ {ͳ,ʹ,͵,Ͷ,ͷ} 
based on break points in the previous calendar quarter and then scale the variable based on the 
following: ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ = ቆாௌ𝑖,𝑞𝑞ೠ𝑖𝑛೟𝑖𝑙𝑒−ଵସ − Ͳ.ͷቇ. In other words the scaled ES has a min-max range 
of one unit (between -0.5 and +0.5).  
I then measure PEAD by buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR): ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ = ∏ ሺͳ +ே௡ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻ − ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ ሻே௡  where for announcement date t, ݎ௜,௤,௧  is the daily stock return 
(including dividends), ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  is the daily return of a market-adjustment portfolio, and n 
represents the holding period from the nth trading day after the date of announcement to the Nth 
                                                 
53 For ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௤ I use the actual earnings data (primary earnings per share, excluding extraordinary items, adjusted 
for stock splits and dividends) from I/B/E/S. It should be noted that despite being in both Compustat and I/B/E/S 
the common practice is to take earnings data from I/B/E/S. The reason being that for some Compustat data 
earnings are restated after an announcement while in contrast I/B/E/S includes the originally stated reported 
earnings (see Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002).  
54 Using only the latest forecast for each analyst issued within the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement. 
55 Prices are adjusted for stock-splits. 
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trading day. In line with common practice I take n equal to 2 and N equal to 61. I also proxy 
the immediate market response to earnings news by the 3-days response (3DR) which is the 
BHAR from one trading day prior to earnings announcement to one trading day after (hence n 
equals -1 and N equals 1). For the market-adjustment portfolio in Section 3.4 I use the return 
on the S&P 500 index (including dividends); for the rest of this study I use a matched size and 
book-to-market portfolio.56 The distribution of BHAR is assumed to have a mean of zero 3DR 
to fully reflect announcement surprise. 
Following Chapter 2 I also include 13 factors as control variables (the construction of each 
factor is discussed in Section A.2 of the Appendix). Briefly, for firm i and quarter q the factors 
are:  
1) Instii,q the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors, proxying investor 
sophistication (Campbell et al., 2009)57;  
2) Distract_Ui,q the number of earnings announcements per trading day, proxying 
investor distraction (Hirshleifer et al., 2009);  
3) Analysti,q the number of analyst forecasts, proxying information diffusion (Brown 
and Han, 2000);  
4) Volatilityi,q the volatility of abnormal returns, proxying uncertainty (Gerard, 2012);  
5) ArbRiski,q the residual variance from the stock’s one-factor market model 
regression,58 proxying unhedgeable risk (Mendenhall, 2004);  
6) ExpRiski,q the explained variance from the stock’s market model regression, proxying 
hedgeable risk (Mendenhall, 2004);  
                                                 
56 Following Chapter 2 I use 5x5 size and BM matched portfolios and the data is obtained from Professor Kenneth 
French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.  
57 I obtain institutional ownership data from CDA Spectrum which contains Form 13F filings.  
58 The market model is the returns of the S&P 500 index (inclusive of dividends) adjusted for the risk-free rate. 
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7) Illiqi,q the Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor, proxying stock illiquidity (Sadka, 2006);  
8) Spreadi,q the average bid-ask spread at close, proxying direct transaction cost (Ng et 
al., 2008);  
9) Pricei,q the end-of-quarter stock prices, proxying trading commissions (Blume and 
Goldstein, 1992);  
10) Turni,q the average daily dollar volume of shares traded, proxying indirect trading 
costs and order processing costs (Bhushan, 1994);  
11) Mcapi,q the market capitalisation, proxying size effects (Foster, et al., 1984; Bernard 
and Thomas, 1989);  
12) BMi,q the book-to-market ratio, proxying informational opacity (Yan and Zhao, 
2011); and  
13) Momi,q the cumulative abnormal return for the 40 days prior to earnings 
announcement, proxying momentum effects (Vega, 2006). 
3.3.1. Summary Statistics  
The summary statistics are presented in Table 3.1. For the sample period 1st July 1995 to 30th 
June 2011 the number of firm-quarter observations is 130,494. Due to the inclusion of Nasdaq 
earnings announcements this is approximately double the number of observations in Chapter 
2. The mean and median of market capitalisation is $5.066 billion and $0.723 billion, 
respectively (the 25th percentile is $227 million and the 75th percentile is $2.689 billion). Mean 
of daily stock turnover is $8.71 million and the 25th and 75th percentiles are $10,000 and $7.00 
million respectively. The 25th and 75th percentiles of stock price are $11.25 and $35.37. These 
values are generally smaller compared with Chapter 2 and are consistent with the literature. 
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The summary statistics imply Nasdaq stocks tend to have on average lower liquidity, lower 
analyst coverage, higher book-to-market ratio and higher volatility. 
I also break down the summary statistics by before and after the completion of Autoquote on 
27 May 2003. Table 3.2 shows that across both good and bad news the most noticeable shift 
following Autoquote is the decline in the bid-ask spread. Average spreads for good (bad) news 
declined from 230 (254) basis points to 50 (63) basis points. This reflects the reduction in tick-
size (the NYSE reduced tick-size in 1997 from one-eighth of a dollar to one-sixteenth; and then 
a further reduction to 1 cent via decimalisation in 2001). Improvements in the Amihud (2001) 
liquidity measure accompanied the reduction in spreads. 
I note across both high and low ES quintiles PEAD attenuated. While PEAD averaged 1.78% 
(-2.81%) before May 2003, after the phase-in of Autoquote PEAD declined to 1.55% (-1.75%). 
Thus the difference between good and bad news PEAD declined by a third (from 4.59% to 
3.30%). Noticeably, the immediate earnings response as proxied by 3DR grew from 2.92% (-
2.41%) for good (bad) news before Autoquote to 4.01% (-3.78%), a rise of nearly 50% in the 
range between good and bad news (from 5.38% to 7.79%). The attenuation of PEAD and 
accentuation of 3DR is consistent with the effects of lower transaction costs and higher investor 
sophistication. It is also noticeable that these changes are accompanied by an increase in ES 
(as shown in the first row of Table 3.2) which suggests the quality of earnings information may 
have improved (potentially, earnings information became more informative or firms disclosed 
a larger proportion of news during announcement periods).  
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
The below values are computed summary statistics across NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms in the period July 1995 to June 2011. For firm i in quarter q the variables are: 
earnings surprise (ESi,q); institutional ownership (Instii,q); number of announcements released on the same day (Distract_Ui,q); number of analysts issuing forecasts within the 
90 days prior to earnings announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); 
hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); average of Amihud illiquidity measured across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Illiqi,q); average of quoted spread at closing across 
40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Spreadi,q); stock price at the end of the quarter q (Pricei,q); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 
trading days to 22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); market capitalisation (Mcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across 40 trading days prior to 
earnings announcement (Momi,q); BHAR from the 2nd to the 61st trading day after  earnings announcement (PEADi,q); and BHAR from the 1st trading day before earnings 
announcement to the 1st trading day after earnings announcement (3DRi,q). 
 
  mean std 1st 25th median 75th 99th         
        
ESi,q -0.0027 0.0811 -0.07494 -0.00054 0.000366 0.00186 0.0321 
Instii,q 0.57 0.25 0.04 0.39 0.60 0.77 0.98 
Distract_Ui,q  114.62 118.34 4 22 62 150 316 
Analysti,q 5.21 5.06 1 2 3 7 24 
Volatilityi,q 0.025 0.017 0.0065 0.014 0.021 0.032 0.086 
ArbRiski,q 0.020 0.044 0.00135 0.0055 0.011 0.023 0.127 
ExpRiski,q 0.00341 0.00625 1.44×10-6 0.00042 0.00132 0.00362 0.0312 
Illiqi,q 0.278 2.43554 2.79×10-5 0.000917 0.005616 0.039624 5.2755 
Spreadi,q 0.0109 0.016032 0.000216 0.001432 0.005167 0.014312 0.07073 
Pricei,q 25.91 19.78 1.68 11.25 21.5 35.37 92.62 
Turni,q 8.71 24.35 0.00031 0.01 0.92 7.00 447.66 
Mcapi,q 5,066 19,389 24.96 227 723 2,689 83,090 
BMi,q 0.65 0.93 0.049 0.30 0.49 0.78 3.44 
Momi,q -0.00388 0.183 -0.429 -0.0894 -0.0105 0.0688 0.537 
PEADi,q -0.00466 0.218 -0.504 -0.110 -0.0140 0.0839 0.661 
3DRi,q 0.00231 0.0835 -0.233 -0.0341 0.00068 0.0381 0.244         
        
Number of 
Observations 
130,494             
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Table 3.2: Pre- vs Post-Autoquote: Mean Values across Earnings Surprise Quintiles before and after 27 May 2003 
 
The below values are computed summary statistics across NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms in the period July 1995 to June 2011. The values are presented across ES quintiles 
for before and after 27th May 2003. For firm i in quarter q the variables are: earnings surprise (ESi,q); institutional ownership (Instii,q); number of announcements released on 
the same day (Distract_Ui,q); number of analysts issuing forecasts within the 90 days prior to earnings announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 trading 
days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); average of Amihud illiquidity measured across 40 trading days prior 
to earnings announcement (Illiqi,q); average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Spreadi,q); stock price at the end of the quarter 
q (Pricei,q); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); market capitalisation 
(Mcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Momi,q); BHAR from the 2nd to the 61st trading day after  earnings 
announcement (PEADi,q); and BHAR from the 1st trading day before earnings announcement to the 1st trading day after earnings announcement (3DRi,q). 
 
  
  
After 27th May 2003 Before 27th May 2003 
  
ES Quintile Bad News 2 3 4 Good News Bad News 2 3 4 Good News 
           
ESi,q -0.0145 -0.00017 0.00037 0.00118 0.00843 -0.03693 -0.00056 0.000587 0.001952 0.0131 
Instii,q 0.43 0.52 0.60 0.54 0.45 0.56 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.61 
Distract_Ui,q  98.60 113.13 119.82 116.61 109.90 114.19 114.04 117.35 122.27 121.21 
Analysti,q 3.50 5.20 6.20 4.84 3.56 4.20 6.20 7.43 6.41 4.78 
Volatilityi,q 0.033 0.0267 0.0245 0.0268 0.0322 0.0280 0.0195 0.0174 0.0197 0.0257 
ArbRiski,q 0.026 0.0166 0.0150 0.0192 0.0277 0.0260 0.0149 0.0113 0.0161 0.0263 
ExpRiski,q 0.0025 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.00262 0.0052 0.0036 0.003 0.0042 0.0060 
Illiqi,q 0.694 0.205 0.0392 0.141 0.578 0.509 0.089 0.046 0.103 0.348 
Spreadi,q 0.0254 0.016094 0.01066 0.0153 0.0230 0.0063 0.0029 0.0019 0.0026 0.0050 
Pricei,q 17.40 28.67 40.19 28.47 18.87 16.59 28.43 36.53 28.41 18.80 
Turni,q 0.091 0.274 0.485 0.211 0.087 0.212 0.488 0.700 0.544 0.282 
Mcapi,q 1,645 6,324 9,947 3,611 1,463 2,019 6,943 10,313 6,555 2,819 
BMi,q 0.78 0.53 0.43 0.58 0.80 0.88 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.85 
Momi,q -0.049 -0.017 0.0106 0.0126 0.018 -0.020 -0.013 0.0012 0.0069 0.0197 
PEADi,q -0.0281 -0.0141 -0.0003 0.00106 0.0178 -0.0175 -0.0098 -0.0075 -5.20×10-5 0.0155 
3DRi,q -0.0241 -0.0066 0.0061 0.0155 0.0292 -0.0378 -0.0179 0.0034 0.0198 0.0401 
            
Number of 
observations 
13,023 15,536 9,868 12,797 12,663 13,183 14,403 12,257 13,407 13,357 
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3.4. The Attenuation of PEAD 
I now demonstrate that PEAD has attenuated across time and identify three market features 
that can explain the decline: 1) the introduction of decimalisation (completed in April 2001); 
2) the phase-in of Autoquote on the NYSE (completed in May 2003); and 3) a substantial rise 
in earnings quality in the early 2000s.  
Decimalisation refers to the reduction of minimum trade tick-size on both the NYSE and the 
Nasdaq from fractional pricing to one cent. 61  Bessimbinder (2003b) finds decimalisation 
resulted in a significant improvement in liquidity via the reduction in quoted and effective 
spreads for large cap, high liquidity and NYSE stocks (however results were mixed for small 
cap, medium cap and Nasdaq stocks). Autoquote refers to the NYSE implementing the 
electronic dissemination of order-book updates (which significantly increased the advantage 
and use of AT); 62 and Hendershott et al. (2011) find Autoquote resulted in a significant decline 
in effective spreads. Boehmer (2005) states both decimalisation and Autoquote are “structural 
changes [that] could have substantial effects on relative execution costs” (p.556). 
The early 2000s also saw substantial improvements in earnings quality which Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) represents as a “sharp increase” (p.978) in the proportion of total annual 
firm-news released around earnings announcements. The authors suggest this is largely 
attributable to the increased monitoring of financial reporting by auditors, internal auditors, 
                                                 
61 NYSE stocks were phased in from 28th August 2000 to 29th January 2001; Nasdaq stocks were phased in from 
12th March 2001 to 9th April 2001.  
62The phase-in of the NYSE Autoquote began on 29th January 2003 for six large-cap stocks. Over 200 additional 
stocks were phased in over the next two months and the remaining stocks phased in on 27th May, 2003. Autoquote 
refers to the NYSE updating the limit order book in real-time and disseminating the inside quote electronically. 
This gave algorithmic traders an advantage as the improvement gave immediate feedback about the potential 
terms of trade and was unlikely to directly affect the trading behaviour of slower-reacting humans. Prior to its 
introduction NYSE specialists also manually disseminated the inside quote for the equities market. However, 
market depth declined sharply following decimalisation while tick-size narrowed. This greatly increased the 
number of order book updates and hence made excessively onerous the specialist’s role of manually managing 
the order book.  
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boards as well as the financial media, improving the detection of low-quality financial reporting.  
It is also associated with increased financial reporting quality due to “changed manager and 
auditor incentives after Enron/Sarbanes-Oxley” (p. 978). In a separate study Anilowski, Feng 
and Skinner (2007) find the early 2000s saw listed U.S. firms increasingly release 
management’s forward earnings guidance concurrently with earnings announcements. 
Studies find PEAD attenuates with lower transaction cost, lower structural uncertainty and 
higher investor sophistication (Vega, 2006; Ng et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2009) and therefore 
the above factors indicate PEAD may have attenuated; and 3DR may have grown (or 
accentuated). To formally test this hypothesis I conduct a time-dummy test and assess whether 
the returns of a PEAD-based investment strategy significantly declined after July 2003. 
Consistent with Chapter 2 I measure PEAD following Barber and Lyons (1998): ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ =∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻ଺ଵ௡=ଶ − ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ ሻ଺ଵ௡=ଶ  and for the adjustment-portfolio ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  I use the daily 
returns of the S&P 500 Index (inclusive of dividends). This follows Berkman and Koch (2015) 
and implicitly assumes traders hedge with the market portfolio. I proxy quarterly returns of the 
investment strategy ܲܧܣܦ௤  by the difference in mean ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ between the highest and 
lowest ES (which simulates taking a long position on good news and a short position on bad 
news): 
ܲܧܣܦ௤ = ቀ∑ ܤܪܣܴ𝑔,௤,௧𝑔௢௢ௗ ீሺ௤ሻ𝑔=ଵ ܩ௤⁄ ቁ − ቀ∑ ܤܪܣܴ௕,௤,௧௕௔ௗ ஻ሺ௤ሻ௕=ଵ ܤ௤⁄ ቁ ( 3.2 ) 
Where for quarter q, ܩሺ௤ሻ is the number of stocks in the highest ES quintile and ܤሺ௤ሻ is the 
number of stocks in the lowest ES quintile. Following Berkman and Koch (2015) I run the 
following regression specification: ܲܧܣܦ௤ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܶ݅݉݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ + ߚଶܣ݃݃ܮ݅ݍ௤ + ߚଷܸܫܺ௤ +ߚସܴ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ + ߝ௤ ( 3.3 ) 
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Where ܶ݅݉݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ is a time dummy variable equal to 1 for all quarters after 30th June 2003 
and zero otherwise; ܣ݃݃ܮ݅ݍ௤ is the quarterly average of the aggregate market liquidity factor 
in quarter q following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003);63 ܸܫܺ௤ is the quarterly average of the 
CBOE VIX Index and proxies for market-wide uncertainty; and ܴ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ is equal 
to 1 if the quarter is in a recession (defined by NBER) and zero otherwise.64 The specification 
therefore tests for whether average returns of a long-short PEAD strategy changed after 
controlling for general shifts in market condition as proxied by market liquidity and market 
uncertainty. A decline in PEAD suggests ߚଵ, which measures the shift in PEAD after July 2003, 
ought to be negative. And under tests where the dependent variable is quarterly 3DR, ߚଵ ought 
to be positive if earnings quality improved. 
3.4.1. Results 
I first conduct separate regressions for NYSE and non-NYSE firms as Autoquote was NYSE-
specific and Bessimbinder (2003b) finds the effects on liquidity due to decimalisation were 
substantially weaker for Nasdaq stocks. Consistent with this cross-exchange variation my 
results show a significant reduction in PEAD for NYSE but not for non-NYSE firms. In Panel 
A of Table 3.3 the right column displays the estimated coefficient for the intercept and time 
dummy to be 0.0679 and -0.0272 respectively (excluding the aggregate liquidity factor ܣ݃݃ܮ݅ݍ௤as control variable), which suggests PEAD for NYSE stocks declined from an average 
of 6.79% (significant at the 1% level) by 2.72% (significant at the 5% level). Looking at the 
estimated coefficient of the control variables, the proxy for market uncertainty ܸܫܺ௤ is -
0.00031 (insignificant at the 10% level) and suggests a rise in market uncertainty is inversely 
                                                 
63  Data on Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factors are obtained from Lubos Pastor’s website: 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research. 
64  Recession data obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER): 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. 
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correlated to PEAD. This is inconsistent with the view that structural uncertainty increases 
PEAD however I note the results must be interpreted in light of the recession dummy ܴ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊݀ݑ݉݉ݕ௤ (which also proxies for elevated uncertainty) and suggests PEAD is 2.47% 
larger in recession periods. I also note the estimated coefficient for the control variables are all 
statistically insignificant. Next, the results show that including ܣ݃݃ܮ݅ݍ௤ as a control does not 
change my main finding: the magnitude of ̂ߚଵ  remains almost unchanged, although the 
significance of ̂ߚଵ declines from the 5% to 10% level. (However in robustness tests reported in 
Sections B.1, B.2 and B.3 in the Appendix I find improved statistical significance). Further, 
the estimated coefficient of ܣ݃݃ܮ݅ݍ௤ is negative which is consistent with the expected inverse 
relationship between PEAD and liquidity (Sadka, 2006). One interpretation of these results is 
therefore that PEAD has declined but a large proportion of the attenuation remains unexplained 
by improvements in aggregate market liquidity.  
Panel B of Table 3.3 then shows results for non-NYSE listed firms and shows PEAD returns 
are 4.50% before July 2003 and declined by one-sixth after July 2003 (but are statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level); and similar to Panel A the estimated coefficients for all other  
control variables are insignificant. The sign of the estimated coefficient for ܸܫܺ௤ is 0.00038 
and suggests higher market uncertainty is correlated to higher PEAD; and the estimated 
coefficient for ܴ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤  suggests PEAD is 1.75% higher during periods of 
recession. My overall findings for NYSE and non-NYSE firms is therefore consistent with the 
literature as Autoquote is specific to NYSE stocks and Bessimbinder (2003b) shows that, 
unlike the NYSE, decimalisation was overall weak or insignificant on the improvement in 
liquidity for non-NYSE firms (other than large and high liquidity stocks). While my results 
cannot imply AT did not increase for non-NYSE stocks, the results are consistent with NYSE  
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Table 3.3: Regression of Quarterly Hedge Portfolio Returns – Autoquote Structural Break 
 
I test the change in PEAD and 3DR after 30th June 2003. The table show regression results for the following specification ܲܧܣܦ௤ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܶ݅݉݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ + ߚଶܣ݃݃ܮ݅ݍ௤ +ߚଷܸܫܺ௤ + ߚସܴ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ + ߝ௤ where for quarter q ܲܧܣܦ௤  is the difference in mean of ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ between the highest and lowest ES quintiles (and therefore proxies a 
PEAD-based strategy that takes a long position on good news and a short position on bad news). The adjustment portfolio for computing BHAR is the S&P 500 index (including 
dividends). ܶ݅݉݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ is a time dummy variable equal to 1 for all quarters after 30th June 2003 and zero otherwise; ܣ݃݃ܮ݅ݍ௤  is the quarterly average of the aggregate 
market liquidity factor in quarter q, following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); ܸܫܺ௤  is the quarterly average of the CBOE VIX Index and proxies for market-wide uncertainty; 
and ܴ݁ܿ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ is equal to 1 if the quarter is in a recession (defined by NBER) and zero otherwise. The left column also shows regression results for 3DR (i.e. the 
dependent variable is the difference in mean 3DR between the highest and lowest ES quintiles). T-statistics are computed based on Newey-West robust standard errors. ***, 
**, * represent significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, respectively. Sample period: July 1995 to June 2011. Number of observations: 64. 
 
Dependent Variable: 3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Panel A: NYSE Firms 
Intercept 0.0224 ** 0.020 ** 0.0679 *** 0.0706 *** 
TimeDummyq 0.034 *** 0.0329 *** -0.0272 ** -0.0259 * 
AggLiqq   0.106      -0.119   
VIXq 0.00168 *** 0.00193 *** -0.00031   -0.0006   
RecessionDummyq 0.00433   0.00935   0.0247 
 
0.0191        
  
   
R-Square 0.528   0.545   0.060   0.0678   
Panel B: Non-NYSE Firms 
Intercept 0.0637 *** 0.0623 *** 0.0450 ** 0.0417 ** 
TimeDummyq 0.0117 *** 0.0111 *** -0.00748   -0.00907   
AggLiqq   0.0591      0.147   
VIXq 0.00056 ** 0.00071 ** 0.00038   0.00074   
RecessionDummyq 0.0030   0.00581   0.0175   0.0244        
  
   
R-Square 0.208   0.224   0.029   0.044   
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firms having stronger attenuation as vis-à-vis to non-NYSE firms because of the additional 
structural change embedded in Autoquote. 
To examine the robustness of my results I also conduct four robustness tests (in Sections B.1, 
B.2 and B.3 in the Appendix I discuss in detail the test specifications and results). First, I assess 
time-varying PEAD in a factor-based asset pricing model and test whether the estimated alpha 
significantly changed after July 2003 based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The 
results (Section B.1) show PEAD significantly attenuated by 2.47% (significant at the 1% 
level). Second, I show using Fama-Macbeth regressions that quarterly PEAD, as proxied by 
the estimated coefficient to the scaled earnings surprise variable, almost halved (Section B.2). 
The estimated coefficients are computed following a multivariate procedure (with Fama-
Macbeth regressions) outlined in Section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2. Third, given my findings in 
Chapter 2 that arbitrage risk and institutional ownership are robust explanatory variables for 
PEAD, I show across portfolios sorted by arbitrage risk and institutional ownership the cross-
sectional means of PEAD have declined. For 25 portfolios based on 5×5 arbitrage risk quintile 
and institutional ownership quintile, PEAD declined in 17 portfolios while the remaining eight 
are mostly portfolios with low institutional ownership or high arbitrage risk, which proxy for 
small firms. Finally, I also test for an unknown structural break in time-varying PEAD. 
Following Andrews (1993) the test maximizes the F-statistic across a set of Chow tests and 
consistently finds July 2003 as the structural break. I also visually represent this decline in 
PEAD across time in Figure B.1 of the Appendix. 
3.4.2. The Rise in Earnings Quality 
As discussed above, the early 2000s also experienced a structural increase in earnings quality 
which potentially increased 3DR. I therefore replace the dependent variable in Equation 3.3 
with 3DR (which proxies for the immediate response to ES). The results are in the left column 
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of Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.3. For NYSE stocks, controlling for other factors, 3DR 
increased 3.40% (significant at the 1% level) from 2.24% (significant at the 1% level). In other 
words, the magnitude of earnings response to ES increased substantially after June 2003. The 
R-squared exceeds 50% suggesting a large proportion of the variation of 3DR is explained by 
the model. The opposite signs of the estimated coefficients for ܶ݅݉݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௤ between the 
PEAD and 3DR results are consistent with lower transaction cost and higher investor 
sophistication attenuating PEAD and also suggest the level of under-reaction to ES has declined. 
For example, the estimated coefficient of ܣ݃݃ܮ݅ݍ௤  is positive (although insignificant), 
consistent with the predictions of Ng et al. (2008) that lower transaction cost improves price 
response to ES. ܸܫܺ௤ at 0.00193 is significant (at the 1% level) suggesting that a significant 
proportion of 3DR can also be explained by expectations of higher market uncertainty: which 
is consistent with Cready and Gurun (2010) who find strong correlation between firm-level ES 
and aggregate market returns. The authors note “earnings information directly impacts 
aggregate market return…specifically…this impact moves market values in a direction 
opposite earnings surprise” (p.330). The authors find positive ES (i.e., good news) tends to 
increase market discount factor; while negative ES (i.e., bad news) tends to reduce market 
discount factor.  
Looking at the non-NYSE results I note the intercept, which is interpreted as the average 3DR 
before July 2003, is 6.37% and approximately three times larger than NYSE stocks. This 
suggests returns for non-NYSE stocks are more dependent on earnings information. But similar 
to NYSE results the time dummy is positive and significant, showing 3DR increased by 1.11% 
(significant at the 1% level) after July 2003. The estimated coefficient of VIX is also positive 
and significant.  
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I note PEAD for non-NYSE stocks experienced insignificant decline while 3DR saw a 
significant increase. This is consistent with the general rise in earnings quality but a weak 
improvement in liquidity (from decimalisation). Further I note the increase in 3DR is 
approximately 1½ times that of the decline in PEAD for both NYSE and non-NYSE (in other 
word total BHAR across the 63 trading days covering 3DR and PEAD has risen). This cannot 
be explained by the decline in transaction costs but is consistent with Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) who argue the proportion of information firms release at earnings information has 
substantially increased. My overall results therefore suggest 3DR has accentuated while PEAD 
has attenauted and the explanations are a reduction in transaction cost and/or a rise in AT and/or 
a rise in earnings quality. 
3.5. Algorithmic Trading and PEAD 
I now control for decimalisation and the rise in earnings quality. My hypothesis is that if AT 
attenuates PEAD then, controlling for these two factors, firms with higher AT should exhibit 
smaller PEAD because AT improves market liquidity and is less prone to under-reaction. To 
control for decimalisation I exclude all firm-quarter observations before July 2001 and to 
control for earnings quality I employ a matched sampling procedure and assess whether 
variations in PEAD across matched pairs can be explained by differences in AT. My results 
show very weak evidence of AT attenuating PEAD and overall I do not find an inverse relation 
between AT and PEAD. I also test the relation between AT and 3DR and find strong evidence 
in favour of AT accentuating 3DR. 
3.5.1. Controlling for Decimalisation 
To remove the effects of decimalisation I constrain my test period and assess the change in 
PEAD across two samples: one representing pre-Autoquote period and the other representing 
post-Autoquote period. To construct my sample data: 1) I filter only NYSE-listed firms and 
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for each firm I select earnings announcements within 14 months before and after the firm’s 
date of Autoquote phase-in. I therefore only consider announcements between 1st October 
2001 and 27th September 2004, which does not overlap with decimalisation or with quarters 
subject to economic recession.68 2) Following Bessimbinder (2003b) all firms that were de-
listed or had a change in ticker sign are removed. I also exclude firms with share prices below 
$5 and above $150 as of 31st March 2001. 3) I remove all firm-quarter observations where the 
date of earnings announcement is within 65 trading days before or after the firm’s date of 
Autoquote phase-in. This filters out observations where the associated PEAD overlaps with 
the firm’s date of Autoquote phase-in and also addresses concerns about endogeneity between 
variations in earnings information immediately after Autoquote. 4) All firm-quarter earnings 
announcements before the respective firms’ date of Autoquote phase-in are assigned the 
dummy variable ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤ equal to 1 and all remaining announcements are assigned ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤  equal to 0. Implicitly I am therefore assuming the Autoquote phase-in 
schedule is a valid dummy variable for testing the effects of AT.69 I then run the below  
 
 
                                                 
68 The U.S. economy was subject to recession in the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 2001 (from NBER-based recession 
indicators). 
69 For this I rely on the findings in Hendershott et al. (2011) who demonstrate that the date of Autoquote 
implementation can be considered a valid instrument to test the market impact of AT. A concern is that its 
staggered introduction could potentially bias regression estimates if the time-dummy variable is correlated to the 
error term of the dependent variable. However Hendershott et al. (2011) argue the Autoquote rollout schedule was 
fixed months in advance and “it seems highly unlikely that the phase-in schedule could be correlated with the 
idiosyncratic liquidity months in the future” (p.15). This argument also applies to the correlation between future 
earnings surprise and the Autoquote schedule. I also note ES is a function of actual earnings, analyst forecast and 
stock price. It is highly unlikely the phase-in schedule correlates to the shifts in the macro economy or affects the 
decision of firm managers; nor the process by which analysts produce forecasts or forecast error. Staggered 
scheduling of Autoquote, however, has the potential to cause biased estimates if firms are strategic in terms of 
periods they choose to make announcements (Anilowski, Feng and Skinner, 2007).  Bad news tends to be 
announced later in the quarter relative to good news (Anilowski, Feng and Skinner, 2007) and as the Autoquote 
schedule is a staggered phase-in across the first two quarters of 2003 there is potentially an issue of endogeneity 
between news and the Autoquote schedule. I avoid this concern by testing good news and bad news separately in 
my matched-sampling method. 
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regression specification following Hirshleifer et al. (2009): ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ =  ߙ  
+ ߚଵܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ 
+ ߚଶ[ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤]  
+ ∑ [ߜ𝑧ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ   
 +  ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ + ߝ௜,௤  ( 3.4 ) 
Where ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ represent control factors. ߚଵ  can be interpreted as the average 
PEAD after Autoquote has been phased in; and ߚଶ can be interpreted as the change in PEAD 
between pre-Autoquote to post-Autoquote. ߙ represents any remaining portion of PEAD left 
unexplained. I also follow Mendenhall (2004) and remove the top and bottom 1% outliers for 
each control factor. The regression control factors are institutional ownership (Instii,q); investor 
distraction (Distracti,q);  
analyst coverage (Analysti,q); volatility (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk 
(ExpRiski,q); stock price (Pricei,q); turnover (Turni,q); market capitalisation (Mcapi,q); book-to-
market ratio (BMi,q); and momentum (Momi,q). Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by clustering across both firm and date of earnings 
announcement following Thompson (2011). 
For robustness I also augment the above test to adjust for a firm’s relative improvement in AT. 
This is because a relatively large improvement in AT is expected to exert stronger downward 
pressure on PEAD. To do so I consider whether a relatively higher (lower) increase in AT 
attenuates PEAD relatively more (less). The test involves creating two more test samples: one 
with firms characterised by low improvements in AT (LowATChange) and the other by high 
improvements in AT (HighATChange). For the HighATChange sample I expect a significant 
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and positive estimate of ߚଶ and for the LowATChange sample I expect a smaller or insignificant 
estimate of ߚଶ. I include control variables to account for other explanations for cross-sample 
variations.  
To classify firms into HighATChange or LowATChange I employ the measure for AT by 
Hendershott et al. (2011) where, for each firm (as identified by its unique PERMNO identifier) 
I compute the improvement in AT activity based on the following ratio:  
ܣܶܥℎܴܽ݊݃݁ܽݐ݅݋௜ = ܯ ∑ [ܣܶ݌ݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௡௉௢௦௧஺ொ]ே௡=ଵ ܰ ∑ [ܣܶ݌ݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௠௉௥௘஺ொ]ெ௠=ଵ⁄  ( 3.5 ) 
Where for firm i, N is the number of earnings announcements in the post-Autoquote sample 
and M is the number of earnings announcements in the pre-Autoquote sample. Hence ܣܶܥℎܴܽ݊݃݁ܽݐ݅݋௜ is the improvement in AT relative to pre-Autoquote levels averaged across 
the number of earnings announcements. AT activity per earnings announcement is defined by 
the following:  
ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤ = ଵே ∑ ܣ ௜ܶ,௧−௡ே௡  ( 3.6 ) 
Where again t is the date of earnings announcement. In other words ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤ is the average 
daily AT activity from 41 trading days to 2 trading days prior to the earnings announcement. 
To exclude firms that in general have very little AT activity I remove firm-quarter observations 
with zero turnover or zero updates (at the inside quote) for more than 10 of the 40 trading days. 
Firms are then ranked by ܣܶܥℎܴܽ݊݃݁ܽݐ݅݋௜: those above the 50th percentile are assigned to the 
HighATChange sample and those below the 50th percentile are assigned to the LowATChange 
sample. 
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3.5.1.1. Results  
The results show that despite an overall low level of PEAD for the specific sample period there 
is significant variation in PEAD across firms with high improvement in AT in contrast to low 
improvement in AT. Noticeably, high AT improvement corresponds to significant PEAD 
attenuation. I first discuss the full sample results in Panel A of Table 3.4 which shows, without 
adjusting for control factors, post-Autoquote PEAD significantly declined. The left column 
shows on average PEAD declined by 2.54% (significant at the 5% level) to 1.54% (significant 
at the 10% level) in the 14 months after Autoquote. However including control factors the 
decline is not significant. The estimated coefficient of 0.00974 (insignificant at the 10% level) 
for ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤ and -0.0043 (insignificant at the 10%) for ܧܵ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ suggest 
PEAD declined by 0.97% following Autoquote to -0.43%. The results therefore shows, after 
controls, Autoquote had an insignificant effect on PEAD. Further, including control variables, 
the estimated intercept loses its significance indicating the proportion of PEAD that cannot be 
accounted for by earnings surprise is explained by the other regression variables. I note this 
finding that PEAD was not a significant market anomaly between October 2001 and September 
2004 is consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2009) who observes that PEAD effects were 
especially small for this sample period. 
I then assess whether there are cross-sectional differences between firms subject to high AT 
improvement as vis-à-vis low AT improvement. Estimating Equation 3.4, but separately for 
LowATChange and HighATChange samples, the left column of panel B shows on average 
PEAD for high improvement in AT declined by 4.71% (significant at the 1% level) to -0.767% 
(insignificant at the 10% level)l and the right column shows, controlling for other factors, this 
decline is statistically significant. Again, the intercept loses its significance after the inclusion 
of the control variables which suggests for firms subject to high improvements in AT PEAD  
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Table 3.4: The Effects of AT on PEAD 
 
The table show the effects of Autoquote on PEAD for NYSE-listed firms based on the regression specification: ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ =  ߙ + ߚଵܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ + ߚଶ[ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤]  + ∑ [ߜ𝑧ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ   +  ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ + ߝ௜,௤ where ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤  is equal to 1 for all observations before 
the date of Autoquote phase-in, and equal to 0 otherwise. The control factors ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ𝑧,௜,௤௡௢௡−௦௖௔௟௘ௗ  are: institutional 
ownership (Instii,q); investor distraction (Distracti,q); analyst coverage (Analysti,q); volatility (Volatilityi,q); 
arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); stock price (Pricei,q); turnover (Turni,q); market 
capitalisation (Mcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); and momentum (Momi,q). The top and bottom 1% outliers 
for each control factor are removed. Panel A shows the regression results for the entire sample. Panel B and Panel 
C then classify sample observations into a HighATChange sample and a LowATChange sample respectively. The 
classification is based on the level of improvement in AT and each firm is assigned an ܣܶܥℎܴܽ݊݃݁ܽݐ݅݋௜  
representing the average improvement in its level of AT relative to pre-Autoquote AT levels. Firms are then 
ranked by ܣܶܥℎܴܽ݊݃݁ܽݐ݅݋௜  and those above the 50th percentile are assigned to the HighATChange sample; while 
those below the 50th percentile are assigned to the LowATChange sample. The sample period is 1st October 2001 
and 27th September 2004. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by clustering 
across both firm and date of earnings announcement following Thompson (2011). ***, **, * represent significance 
level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
   Including Control Factors 
Intercept 0.00902 *** 0.0029  ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  0.0154 * -0.0043  ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤   0.0254 ** 0.0097  
Panel B: HighATChange (High Improvement in AT) 
   Including Control Factors 
Intercept 0.0086 ***   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  -0.0077   -0.0844   ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤  0.0471 *** 0.0470 ** 
Panel C: LowAtChange (Low Improvement in AT) 
   Including Control Factors      
Intercept 0.0198 *** -0.0690  ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ  0.0297 ** 0.1143  ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤  -0.0103   -0.0378   
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was completely removed after the phase-in of Autoquote. In contrast, Panel C shows firms with 
low improvement in AT experienced insignificant change following the phase-in of Autoquote. 
The signs of the estimated coefficient for ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ∗ ܦݑ݉݉ݕܲݎ݁ܣܳ௜,௤ indicate that, unlike 
firms with high improvements, AT may have in fact increased PEAD. Hence while Panel A 
results show the overall market experienced low levels of PEAD, my findings suggest in the 
cross-section firms with high improvements in AT are associated with attenuated PEAD. 
3.5.2. Controlling for Earnings Quality 
In addition to controlling for decimalisation I now also adjust for changes in earnings quality. 
Studies show factors that reduce structural uncertainty or alleviate informational opacity tend 
to attenuate PEAD (see Sadka, 2006; Vega, 2006; Han and Brown, 2011) and one determinant 
of uncertainty and opacity is the quality of earnings information. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
show the quality of earnings information increased substantially in the early 2000s due to 
changes in corporate disclosure standards and firm management issuing forward earnings 
guidance during announcements. Hence this general upward trend in earnings quality may also 
explain the structural decline in PEAD. To control for both decimalisation and earnings quality 
I employ a matched-sample procedure and assess whether the difference in PEAD across 
matched pairs can be explained by differences in AT. Further, I conjecture that given AT is 
associated with sophisticated investors, who on average are likely better at extracting signals 
from market information, AT is potentially concentrated among firms expected to release 
relatively higher quality information. 
My test method follows Davies and Kim (2009) and matches without replacement via a one-
to-one nearest neighbour matching criteria. My matching procedure is as follows: 1) I take all 
NYSE-listed firms and filter for earnings announcements between the 1st January 2004 and 31st 
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December 2007. This removes any overlap with decimalisation, the phase-in of Autoquote or 
the 2008 economic recession. 2) I retain only observations in the top or bottom ES quintiles 
(i.e., ES quintile equal to 1 or 5). 3) I match a firm-quarter earnings announcement by random 
selection70 with another firm-quarter observation (without replacement) by minimising the 
matching error (defined as the linear combination of the absolute size and price ratios): 
|ܯܿܽ݌௨ ܯܿܽ݌௩⁄ − ͳ| + |ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௨ ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௩⁄ − ͳ|  ( 3.7 ) 
Where u and v identify the matched observations, Mcap is market capitalisation, and Price is 
the stock price. To control for time-trends in earnings quality I only match firms if the earnings 
announcement dates share the same calendar year. This also controls for time trends in other 
factors such as the level of AT and size of spreads. 4) Fourth, I conduct the matching procedure 
separately for good news and bad news and hence only match observations if they are assigned 
the same ES quintile. 5) Fifth, for each matched pair the observation with the higher ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௧ is assigned to a HighAT bin while the remainder is assigned to a LowAT bin. 
Matched pairs with equal levels of AT are removed. 6) Finally, for every firm-quarter 
observation I also match to an earnings announcement in the pre-Autoquote period.71 The 
matching criterion minimises the earnings surprise ratio: |ܧܵ௨ ܧܵ௩⁄ − ͳ|  and I impose the 
restriction that matched pairs must be of the same market capitalisation quintile.72 If a firm-
quarter ES is equal to zero I assign it a value of 0.0001. Hence each post-Autoquote matched 
pair also has a corresponding pre-Autoquote matched pair.  
                                                 
70 I randomise through ranking firms alphabetically. 
71 I choose the pre-Autoquote period 1st July 1995 to 31st December 2002. My results do not qualitatively change 
if I choose the period 1st July 1995 to 31st December 2000. 
72 Matching with or without replacement does not alter my main findings. Market capitalisation breakpoints are 
selected based on the sorting of NYSE firms in the most recent calendar month of July. 
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A set of results which would be consistent with AT attenuating PEAD are summarised in Table 
3.5 and the underlying intuition is the following. First, if relatively high levels of AT attenuate 
PEAD I expect PEAD to vary across LowAT and HighAT bins given, ceteris paribus, high AT 
should exert greater downward pressure on PEAD. Second, AT increased substantially after 
Autoquote and I therefore expect PEAD in the post-Autoquote period to attenuate (after 
controlling for decimalisation and earnings quality) given AT is associated with improved 
liquidity. My matched sampling procedure therefore aims to test the difference in PEAD across 
high/low AT bins and pre/post Autoquote samples. To illustrate my argument, the top row of 
Panel A in Table 3.5 shows, for good news firms, post-Autoquote PEAD is expected to be 
positive in both HighAT and LowAT bins but the difference is expected to be negative:  
 Ͳ < ܧ[ܦ݂݅ ௜݂,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ௉ா஺஽ ] 
= ͳ/ܲ ∑ [ܤܪܣܴ௜,௣,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ு௜𝑔ℎ஺் − ܤܪܣܴ௜,௣,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ௅௢௪஺் ]௉௣=ଵ  ( 3.8 ) 
Where in the post-Autoquote period ܧ[ܦ݂݅ ௜݂,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ] is the expected difference in mean 
across matched pairs; and p indexes the number of matched pairs. The second row in Table 3.5 
shows pre-Autoquote PEAD is also expected to be positive. Finally, the third row shows the 
expected difference in PEAD between post-Autoquote and pre-Autoquote firms. Again, given 
the positive relation between PEAD and transaction cost ceteris paribus PEAD is expected to 
decline after Autoquote, and this attenuation is expected to be larger for firms with high AT. 
Panel B also shows the expected sign for computed PEAD for firms announcing bad news. 
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Table 3.5: Expected Signs for PEAD 
 
The table shows the expected signs for computed statistics of PEAD that is consistent with AT attenuating PEAD. 
For each matched pair the observation with the higher AT (measured by ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௧) is assigned to a HighAT 
bin while the other is assigned to a LowAT bin. It is expected that higher levels of AT exert a greater downward 
pressure on PEAD. The right column states the expected sign for the PEAD of HighAT firms minus the PEAD of 
LowAT firms. The 3rd row for each panel states the expected sign for the PEAD of post-Autoquote firms minus 
the PEAD of pre-Autoquote firms. Panel A shows the expected signs for firms announcing good news; and Panel 
B shows the expected sign for firms announcing bad news. 
 
Panel A: Good News 
 HighAT LowAT HighAT minus LowAT 
    
Post-Autoquote Positive Positive Negative 
Pre-Autoquote Positive Positive  
     
Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote Negative Negative or zero  Negative 
Panel B: Bad News 
 HighAT LowAT HighAT minus LowAT 
    
Post-Autoquote Negative Negative Positive 
Pre-Autoquote Negative Negative  
     
Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote Positive Positive or zero Positive 
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3.5.2.1. Results  
The matched sampling results across NYSE firms are presented in Table 3.6. Overall, the 
findings are inconsistent with higher AT attenuating PEAD (after controlling for both 
decimalisation and shifts in earnings quality). I first discuss the results for good news (Panel 
A). If AT lowers transaction costs and therefore attenuates PEAD my first hypothesis is that 
on average PEAD for high AT firms ought to be smaller than PEAD for low AT firms. In other 
words, following Equation 3.8 the average ܦ݂݅ ௜݂,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ௉ா஺஽  should be negative. Looking at 
the top row of Table 3.6 the mean PEAD for HighAT and LowAT bins are both positive and 
significant with HighAT at 1.68% (significant at the 1% level) and LowAT at 0.97% (significant 
at the 1% level). This suggests investors under-react to good news irrespective of the level of 
AT. However, average PEAD for HighAT firms is higher than for LowAT firms which is 
inconsistent with higher levels of AT attenuating PEAD. To test whether this difference in 
PEAD is statistically significant I conduct a Wilcoxon signed rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945; 
Woolson, 1998)77 and find the difference of 0.70% is insignificant at the 10% level. In other 
words, there is no significant difference in attnation across high AT and low AT samples. 
Similarly, looking at the top row of Panel B for bad news, the results suggest higher AT does 
not attenuate PEAD. HighAT firms have an average PEAD of -2.94% (significant at the 1% 
level) and LowAT firms have an average of -1.35% (significant at the 1% level). This difference 
in mean of 1.6% (significant at the 1% level) suggests that rather than attenuating PEAD, higher 
AT is potentially accentuating PEAD.  
                                                 
77 This follows Davies and Kim (2009) who find that for the above class of matched sampling procedures the 
Wilcoxon test is superior to a two-sample t-test. 
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I note one critique of my matched sampling procedure is that firms in the HighAT and LowAT 
buckets may vary across ES and this could bias my results (for example, LowAT firms may 
systematically have lower ES compared with HighAT firms). As a remedy I use the PEAD of 
pre-Autoquote period matched samples as a control (shown in the second row of Panel A and 
Panel B). The third row in Panel A and Panel B show that after this adjustment is made the 
results nevertheless are inconsistent with high AT attenuating PEAD. For good news, HighAT 
firms exhibit an increase of PEAD by 1.69% (significant at the 5% level) while LowAT firms 
see a decline of 2.74% (significant at the 1% level). This suggests firms with relatively low AT 
experienced more PEAD attenuation. Looking at bad news, both HighAT and LowAT firms 
experienced attenuation in PEAD from pre- to post-Autoquote (as shown in the third row of 
Panel B). HighAT saw an attenuation of 2.00% while LowAT saw an attenuation of 1.21%. I 
test the difference between the two and the difference of 0.78% is however insignificant. 
Therefore, while there are some initial evidence that Autoquote attenuated PEAD for firms 
announcing bad news, the test results show the difference is insignificant across high and low 
AT firms. 
I now discuss robustness tests. First, I exclude matched pairs with a relatively small difference 
in AT activity by sorting matched pairs by the difference in ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௧ and removing pairs 
in the smallest 25th percentile. The results are shown in the right column of Panel A of Table 
3.7 and find the difference in PEAD across high and low AT continues to be insignificant. The 
average difference in PEAD between HighAT and LowAT firms are, for good news at 0.713% 
(insignificant at the 10% level), and bad news at -0.514% (insignificant at the 10% level).78  
                                                 
78 I note my tests do not impose a caliper/distance restriction on my matched sampling. This is because Davies 
and Kim (2009) argue that for sufficiently large samples matching without restriction produce more efficient test 
statistics. For robustness, in unreported results I find removing poor matches with large matching errors does not 
change my main findings. 
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Table 3.6: Matched Sampling and Difference-in-Difference Tests for PEAD across AT 
 
The table shows matched sampling test results of PEAD for NYSE-listed firms. Post-Autoquote firm-quarter 
observations are matched by price and market capitalisation via a one-to-one nearest neighbour matching (without 
replacement) and matched pairs must both belong to the same calendar year. The matching procedure is conducted 
separately for good news and bad news (i.e., ES quintile rank of 1 and 5). For each matched pair the observation 
with the higher AT (as measured by ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௧) is assigned to a HighAT bin while the other is assigned to a 
LowAT bin. Matched pairs with equal levels of AT are removed. Every firm-quarter observation in the post-
Autoquote period is also matched by ES and size quintile to an earnings announcement in the pre-Autoquote 
period. The right column shows the difference in PEAD of HighAT firms minus the PEAD of LowAT firms; and 
the 3rd row for each panel shows the difference in PEAD of post-Autoquote firms minus the PEAD of pre-
Autoquote firms. Post-Autoquote sample period is from 1st January 2004 to 31st December 2007. Pre-Autoquote 
sample period is from 1st July 1995 to 31st December 2002. ***, **, * represent 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 significance level 
for t-statistic respectively. ###, ##, # represent 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 significance level for Wilcoxon signed rank statistic 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Good News 
 HighAT  LowAT  HighAT minus LowAT 
        
Post-Autoquote 0.0168 *** 0.0097 *** 0.007  
Pre- Autoquote -0.0001  0.0371 ***    
        
Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote 0.0169 ## -0.0274 ### 0.0442 ### 
Panel B: Bad News 
 HighAT  LowAT  HighAT minus LowAT 
        
Post- Autoquote -0.0294 *** -0.0135 *** -0.016 ### 
Pre- Autoquote -0.0494 *** -0.0256 ***    
        
Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote 0.02 # 0.0121 # 0.0078   
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The results also remain poor after controlling for pre-Autoquote PEAD; for good news PEAD 
accentuated by 2.35% (significant at the 5% level) and for bad news the difference of 1.18% is 
insignificant at the 10% level.  
As an additional robustness test which controls for earnings quality I also match by size, price 
and total BHAR across the 63 days announcement period (from one trading day before earnings 
announcement to 61 trading days after). This BHAR measure proxies for the total amount of 
unexpected news that is released at earnings announcement. Again the results suggest an 
insignificant relation with AT. Panel B of Table 3.7 shows HighAT firms have accentuated 
PEAD with the average difference in PEAD between HighAT and LowAT firms for good news 
at 0.105% (significant at the 10% level) and bad news at -0.687% (significant at the 1% level). 
Controlling for pre-Autoquote PEAD, good news PEAD saw accentuation by 3.55% 
(significant at the 5% level) and for bad news PEAD attenuated by 3.11% (significant at the 1% 
level). Hence, only bad news show some consistency with high AT attenuating PEAD. 
Finally I restrict the matched sampling procedure only to NYSE firms that are components of 
the S&P 500. This ensures the matched pairs have significant levels of AT activity. The results 
continue to show an insignificant relation with AT. Panel C of Table 3.7 shows HighAT firms 
have accentuated PEAD with the average difference in PEAD between HighAT and LowAT 
firms for good news at 0.121% (insignificant at the 10% level) and bad news at -0.233% 
(insignificant at the 10% level). Controlling for pre-Autoquote, good news PEAD accentuated 
by 2.27% (significant at the 10% level) and bad news PEAD accentuated by 1.71 % (significant 
at the 10% level). 
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Table 3.7: Matched Sampling Tests – Robustness Tests 
 
The table shows matched sampling test results of 3DR and PEAD for NYSE-listed firms. Post-Autoquote firm-
quarter observations are matched via a one-to-one nearest neighbour matching (without replacement) and matched 
pairs must both belong to the same calendar year. The matching procedure is conducted separately for good news 
and bad news. For each matched pair the observation with the higher AT (as measured by ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௧ ) is 
assigned to a HighAT bin while the other is assigned to a LowAT bin. Matched pairs with equal levels of AT are 
removed. Every firm-quarter observation in the post-Autoquote period is also matched by ES and size quintile to 
an earnings announcement in the pre-Autoquote period. Each panel shows the difference in PEAD of HighAT 
firms minus the PEAD of LowAT firms; and the difference in PEAD of post-Autoquote firms minus the PEAD of 
pre-Autoquote firms. Panel A shows results for firm-quarter observations matched by price and market 
capitalisation; the 25% of matched pairs with the smallest difference in AT activity are removed. Panel B shows 
results for matched firm-quarter observation matched by market capitalisation, price and the BHAR measured 
from 1 trading day prior to earnings announcement to 61 trading days after. Panel C shows results where the 
matching procedure is only implemented for stocks of the S&P 500 index that are listed on the NYSE (firm-
quarter observations are matched by price and market capitalisation). Post-Autoquote sample period is from 1st 
January 2004 to 31st December 2007. Pre-Autoquote sample period is from 1st July 1995 to 31st December 2002. 
###, ##, # represent 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 significance level for Wilcoxon signed rank statistic respectively. 
 
    3 Day Response PEAD   
    Mean 
Wilcox SR 
Test Mean 
Wilcox SR 
Test 
Panel A: HighAT minus LowAT (removing low differences in AT) 
Good 
News Post-Autoquote  0.0115 ## 0.00713  
 Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote 0.00692 # 0.0235 ## 
       
Bad News Post-Autoquote  -0.0100 ## 
-
0.00514  
 Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote -0.011 ## 0.0118  
Panel B: HighAT minus LowAT (matched by Size, Price and 63-day BHAR) 
Good 
News Post-Autoquote  0.00134 # 0.00105 # 
 Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote 0.00157 # 0.0355 ## 
       
Bad News Post-Autoquote  -0.00932 # 
-
0.00687 ### 
 Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote -0.00798 # 0.0311 ### 
Panel C: HighAT minus LowAT (Only NYSE components of S&P 500) 
Good 
News Post-Autoquote  0.00934 # 0.0121  
 Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote 0.00236  0.0227 # 
       
Bad News Post-Autoquote  -0.0135 # 
-
0.00233  
  Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote -0.0234 ## -0.0171 # 
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3.5.3. Algorithmic Trading and Earnings Response 
If AT has no relation to the attenuation of PEAD does it still affect returns around earnings 
announcements? In addition to lowering transaction costs, AT is associated with sophisticated 
algorithms; and news agencies increasingly provide machine-readable announcement 
information specifically for algorithmic traders (Hirschey, 2013). Further, the findings by Ball 
and Shivakumar (2008) suggest the shift in earnings quality is in part due to regulatory changes 
and if sophisticated algorithmic traders have a superior understanding of the regulatory 
environment – such as disclosure rules 79  – they may prefer dealing in stocks with more 
informative announcements. If sophisticated traders are better at analysing market news and 
extracting trading signals they presumably prefer to deal in stocks which release higher quality 
information.80 I therefore conjecture if AT proxies for investor sophistication firms which are 
expected to release high quality information attract relatively more AT.  
To test this hypothesis I examine whether AT is positively correlated to 3DR. If there is no 
relation between AT and earnings quality, these variations across AT should have insignificant 
explanatory power on the variation of 3DR. On the other hand, if the level of AT is associated 
with the preference for higher earnings quality then on average higher AT should be positively 
correlated to higher 3DR. Using the same matched pairs selected in Section 3.5.2 I test the 
difference in the pair’s 3DR across LowAT and HighAT bins; and across pre- and post-
Autoquote samples. A set of results which are consistent with AT accentuating 3DR are 
                                                 
79  Ball and Shivakumar (2008) write “one explanation for the sharp increase is an increased relative 
informativeness of earnings…it could arise from changes in accounting standards such as Statement of Financial 
Accounting (SFAS) 142 and SFAS 144, which set new rules for the impairment of intangible and tangible long-
term assets, effective 2002, or from the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s increased emphasis on “fair value” 
accounting generally. It could [also] be due to changes in managers’ and auditors’ incentives, in response to the 
Enron era scandals or the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002…these events most likely increased the 
expected legal and political costs of being discovered to have engaged in low-quality reporting.” (p.993). 
80 Investors sophisticated in extracting signals from public information, such as earnings news, can be highly 
informed traders (Vega, 2004). 
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summarised in Table 3.8 and show that the signs of the expected difference in 3DR across 
HighAT and LowAT firms are opposite to that for the PEAD analysis. The top row for Panel A 
of Table 3.8 shows that for good news, post-Autoquote 3DR is expected to be positive for both 
HighAT and LowAT bins and the difference in mean is expected to be positive:  
Ͳ > ܧ[ܦ݂݅ ௣݂,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ଷ஽ோ ] = ͳ/ ∑ [͵ܦܴ௨,௣,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ு௜𝑔ℎ஺் − ͵ܦܴ௩,௣,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ௅௢௪஺் ]௉௣=ଵ ( 3.9 ) 
This is because if AT traders prefer firms that release more information, market response to 
earnings news should be on average larger for HighAT than LowAT firms. The second row 
shows pre-Autoquote 3DR is expected to be positive and, like Table 3.5, this row represents 
matched firms that control for variation in ES across HighAT and LowAT bins. Finally, if AT 
is associated with the sophisticated analysis of earnings information then 3DR is expected to 
increase relatively more under high AT after controlling for ES. Hence the third row shows the 
expected difference in 3DR between post-Autoquote and pre-Autoquote firms ought to be 
positive for the HighAT bin. Panel B shows the expected signs for bad news firms. 
3.5.3.1. Results  
Table 3.9 presents the results and my findings show a significant and positive relation between 
AT and 3DR (after controlling for both decimalisation and shifts in earnings quality). Panel A 
shows good news firms with HighAT have an average 3DR of 3.91% (significant at the 1% 
level) and LowAT firms 3.53% (significant at the 1% level). The difference in mean of 0.38% 
is significant at the 10% level and suggests high AT firms are associated with a larger earnings 
response. I note the changes in 3DR from pre- to post-Autoquote are also positive for both high 
and low AT firms, with the change larger for HighAT firms at 0.28% (but insignificant at the 
 
99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8: Expected Sign of 3DR 
 
The table shows the expected signs for computed statistics of 3DRthat is conssieth with AT accentuating 3DR. 
For each matched pair the observation with the higher AT (measured by ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௧) is assigned to a HighAT 
bin while the other is assigned to a LowAT bin. It is expected that higher levels of AT exert a greater upward 
pressure on 3DR. The right column states the expected sign for the 3DR of HighAT firms minus the 3DR of 
LowAT firms. The 3rd row for each panel states the expected sign for the 3DR of post-Autoquote firms minus the 
3DR of pre-Autoquote firms. Panel A shows the expected sign for firms announcing good news; and Panel B 
shows the expected sign for firms announcing bad news. 
 
Panel A: Good News 
 HighAT LowAT HighAT minus LowAT 
    
Post-Autoquote Positive Positive Positive 
Pre-Autoquote Positive Positive  
     
Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote Positive Positive or zero Positive 
Panel B: Bad News 
 HighAT LowAT HighAT minus LowAT 
    
Post-Autoquote Negative Negative Negative 
Pre-Autoquote Negative Negative  
     
Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote Negative Negative or zero Negative 
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10% level). I find a similarly consistent result for bad news (Panel B of Table 3.9): HighAT 
firms have a larger 3DR of -3.79% (significant at the 1% level) and LowAT firms have -3.75% 
(significant at the 1% level); though small the difference in mean of 0.03% is significant at the 
10% level. I also again note the change in 3DR from pre- to post-Autoquote is consistent with 
high AT accentuating 3DR and is larger for HighAT firms at -0.63% (but insignificant at the 
10% level) versus -0.33% for LowAT firms. Finally, for robustness I conduct a two-sample 
pooled t-test between ܦ݂݅ ௜݂,ீ௢௢ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧ ଷ஽ோ  and ܦ݂݅ ௜݂,஻௔ௗ ே௘௪௦,௉௢௦௧  ଷ஽ோ and find the difference of 
0.42% to be significant at the 1% level.  
In Table 3.7 I present robustness test results. The left column of Panel A shows, after removing 
matched pairs with a relatively small differences in AT, the results increase in significance. For 
good news, HighAT 3DR increased by 1.15% (significant at the 5% level) and bad news 
declined by 1.00% (significant at the 5% level). After controlling for pre-Autoquote 3DR the 
results remain consistent: for good news 3DR accentuated by 0.692% (significant at the 10% 
level) and for bad news 3DR accentuated by 1.11% (significant at the 5% level). 
Matching by size, price and 63-days BHAR the results in Panel B show HighAT firms again 
saw accentuated earnings response with the average difference in 3DR between HighAT and 
LowAT for good news accentuating by 0.134% (significant at the 10% level) and bad news 
accentuating by -0.932% (significant at the 10% level). Controlling for pre-Autoquote 3DR, 
good news accentuated by 0.157% (significant at the 10% level) and bad news accentuated by 
-0.798% (significant at the 10% level).  
Finally, matching only NYSE firms that are components of the S&P 500 index, the results in 
Panel C show HighAT firms have accentuated 3DR with the average difference for good news 
at 0.934% (significant at the 10% level) and bad news at -1.35% (significant at the 10% level). 
Controlling for pre-Autoquote 3DR: good news accentuated by 0.236% (but insignificant at 
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the 10% level) and bad news accentuated by 2.34% (significant at the 5% level). Hence my 
overall results suggest a positive relation between AT and accentuated 3DR. I also note in 
unpublished results that the BHAR across the 63 days announcement period81 is overall higher 
for HighAT firms. This is consistent for HighAT firms announcing disproportionately more 
news than LowAT firms.  
3.6. Algorithmic Trading and Price Discovery 
I now examine whether AT is associated with improved price discovery. The association 
between high AT and high 3DR may suggest algorithmic traders are skilled in predicting 
abnormal returns at earnings announcement, however it is reasonable to expect such anticipated 
mispricing to be traded/arbitraged away immediately. My findings may also suggest 
algorithmic traders are more efficient in responding to ES, however this implies AT reduces 
investor under-reaction which is inconsistent with my results that AT does not attenuate PEAD. 
One potential explanation that is consistent with my overall findings is that high earnings 
quality can produce new or higher quality trading signals. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue 
larger 3DR is attributable to higher earnings quality and it follows that an increase in the quality 
of earnings information gives rise to more opportunities for sophisticated traders to improve 
the quality of their trading signals. A specific example which can accentuate 3DR but may not 
attenuate PEAD is if earnings information aids algorithmic traders in extracting improved 
signals for forecasting earnings momentum (see Bernard and Thomas, 1989).82 I therefore 
conjecture if algorithmic traders prefer trading in stocks with high earnings quality they are 
expected to contribute to price discovery for this set of firms. My explanation also reconciles 
the findings by Hendershott et al. (2011) and Ball and Shivakumar (2008) whereby the former  
                                                 
81 From one trading day before earnings announcement to 61 trading days after. 
82 Earnigns momemtum refers to the autocorrelation of quarterly firm ES. 
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Table 3.9: Matched sampling and difference-in-difference tests for 3DR across AT 
 
The table shows matched sampling test results of 3DR for NYSE-listed firms. Post-Autoquote firm-quarter 
observations are matched by price and market capitalisation via a one-to-one nearest neighbour matching (without 
replacement) and matched pairs must both belong to the same calendar year. The matching procedure is conducted 
separately for good news and bad news (i.e., ES quintile rank of 1 and 5). For each matched pair the observation 
with the higher AT (as measured by ܣܶܲݎ݋ݔݕ௜,௤,௧) is assigned to a HighAT bin while the other is assigned to a 
LowAT bin. Matched pairs with equal levels of AT are removed. Every firm-quarter observation in the post-
Autoquote period is also matched by ES and size quintile to an earnings announcement in the pre-Autoquote 
period. The right column shows the difference in 3DR of HighAT firms minus the 3DR of LowAT firms; and the 
3rd row for each panel shows the difference in 3DR of post-Autoquote firms minus the 3DR of pre-Autoquote 
firms. Post-Autoquote sample period is from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2007. Pre-Autoquote sample period 
is from 1 July 1995 to 31 December 2002. ***, **, * represent 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 significance level for t-statistic 
respectively. ###, ##, # represent 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 significance level for Wilcoxon signed rank statistic respectively. 
 
Panel A: Good News 
 HighAT  LowAT  High AT minus Low AT 
        
Post-Autoquote 0.0391 *** 0.0353 *** 0.0038 # 
Pre- Autoquote 0.0363 *** 0.034 ***    
        
Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote 0.0028  0.0013  0.002 ### 
Panel B: Bad News 
 HighAT  LowAT  High AT minus Low AT 
        
Post- Autoquote -0.0379 *** -0.0375 *** -0.0003 ### 
Pre- Autoquote -0.0316 *** -0.0342 ***    
        
Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote -0.0063   -0.0033   -0.0022   
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show large-cap stocks are subject to the most improvement in price discovery by AT while the 
latter show large-cap firms exhibit the highest earnings quality. I now test whether AT 
improves price discovery around earnings announcements and whether the improvement is 
concentrated among large-cap firms. My method assumes 3DR realised during the earnings 
period is a function of a price discovery process, where PEAD represents the portion of price 
discovery still to be realised. To quantify the level of price discovery around announcements85 
I use the Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) measure:  
ܹܲܥ௤ ∑ [͵ܦܴ௜,௤ ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤⁄ ቆ|ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤| ∑ |ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤|ூ௜=ଵ⁄ ቇ]ூ௜=ଵ  ( 3.10 ) 
Where for firm i, in quarter q, ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤ represents the BHAR from one trading day 
prior to earnings announcement to 61 trading days after. ܹܲܥ௤  is therefore a weighted-
average of the proportion of returns realised across the first three trading days relative to the 
whole 63 days announcement period. To test whether price discovery improves with AT I 
assess the change in ܹܲܥ௤ for the NYSE around the time of the Autoquote-phase in. To 
control for shifts in earnings quality I match each NYSE-listed stock to a Nasdaq-listed stock 
(given Autoquote is NYSE-specific). My use of Nasdaq firms is motivated by Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2008) finding that the general rise in earnings quality was not affected by the 
sample composition of listed firms and that earnings quality increased irrespective of firm 
characteristics, book-to-market ratio, firm leverage or industry classification.  
For my matching procedure I follow Bessimbinder (2003b) and separate my sample across 
size. 86  Given NYSE firms are in general larger than Nasdaq firms I control for size by 
implementing the following: 1) I exclude stocks that have changed ticker symbol and exclude 
                                                 
85 This price discovery measure has been employed in Barclay and Warner (1993), Cao et al. (2000), Huang (2002), 
and Barclay and Hendershott (2003 and 2008). 
86 This matched pair method was used to study the effects of decimalisation between NYSE and Nasdaq stocks in 
Bessimbinder (2003b). 
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all stocks with share prices below $5 and higher than $150 as of 31st March 2001. 2) For each 
calendar quarter I create three matched groups of Large, Medium and Small. 2a) For the Large 
group I sort, within-quarter, Nasdaq firms by market capitalisation and select the largest 100 
firms. I then match to a NYSE firm within the same calendar quarter (matched without 
replacement) by minimising the following matching error: 
|ܯܿܽ݌௨ே஺ௌ஽஺ொ ܯܿܽ݌௩ே௒ௌா⁄ − ͳ| + |ܧܵ௨ே஺ௌ஽஺ொ ܧܵ௩ே௒ௌா⁄ − ͳ|  ( 3.11 ) 
Where u and v identify the matched observations, Mcap is market capitalisation and ES is 
earnings surprise. Hence firms are matched by size and unexpected earnings news. If a firm-
quarter ES is equal to zero I assign it a value of 0.0001.87 2b) For the Small group, for each 
quarter I randomly select 100 firms from the smallest NYSE quintile and then match to a 
Nasdaq firm within the same quarter (matched without replacement) using the matching error 
of Equation 3.11. 2c) For the Medium group, for each quarter I exclude the largest 100 NYSE 
firms as well as all NYSE firms in the smallest quintile. I then randomly select a firm in the 
remaining sample and match to a Nasdaq firm from the same quarter (matched without 
replacement) by the matching error of Equation 3.11). 3) I then assign all matched pairs 
between 1st July 2002 and 30th June 2003 to the pre-Autoquote sample and all matched pairs 
between 1st October 2003 and 30th September 2004 to the post-Autoquote sample. 4) Finally, I 
sort into quintile, within each quarter, the matched pairs based on the market capitalisation of 
the NYSE stock. Therefore for both pre- and post-Autoquote samples I have 20 groups across 
4 calendar quarters (with 5 size quintiles in each quarter). The WPC is then computed for each 
                                                 
87 I note in Bessimbinder (2003b) the matching criterion is for size only but I have included the second matching 
criterion of earnings surprise. This is because I cannot rely on large-sample properties due to my relatively small 
sample size.   
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group following Equation 3.10 and statistical inference is made based on two-sample pooled t-
tests, following Bessimbinder, 2003b). 
A set of findings which will be consistent with AT improving price discovery is presented in 
Table 3.10 and the underlying intuition is that I expect ܹܲܥ௤  to increase for large NYSE firms 
following Autoquote, controlling for the WPC of Nasdaq firms. Hence the left column of the 
first row in Table 3.12 shows, for large NYSE firms, that the expected difference in WPC 
between pre- and post-Autoquote ought to be positive: 
Ͳ > ܧ[ܦ݂݅ ே݂௒ௌா ௐ௉஼ ] = ܹܲܥ௤,ே௒ௌா௉௢௦௧஺௨௧௢௤௨௢௧௘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − ܹܲܥ௤,ே௒ௌா ௉௥௘஺௨௧௢௤௨௢௧௘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ( 3.12 ) 
Where ܧ[ܦ݂݅ ே݂௒ௌா ௐ௉஼ ] is the expected difference between the mean of ܹܲܥ௤ in the pre- and 
post-Autoquote sample for NYSE firms. The middle column shows that in contrast the 
difference for Nasdaq firms is expected to be either positive or zero. This is because the rise in 
earnings quality may potentially increase price discovery for Nasdaq firms; however Nasdaq 
was not subject to a structural increase in AT. Finally the right column shows that the expected 
sign of the difference in WPC across the two exchanges ought to be positive: Ͳ >ܧ[ܦ݂݂݅݅݊ܦ݂݅ ௤݂,𝑔] = ܹܲܥ௤,𝑔 ே௒ௌா̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − ܹܲܥ௤,𝑔 ே௔௦ௗ௔௤̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  where q is for calendar quarter and g 
represents the within-calendar quintiles. Hence, controlling for changes in price discovery of 
large Nasdaq firms, large NYSE firms are expected to have improved price discovery. I note 
this difference in WPC could be either positive or insignificant for Medium and Small firms 
(second and third row of Table 3.10 respectively) given Hendershott et al. (2011) find 
Autoquote improved liquidity and price discovery overwhelmingly for large-cap stocks; and 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) find high earnings quality is concentrated among the largest firms. 
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Table 3.10: Expected Sign of Change in Price Discovery 
 
The table shows the expected signs for computed statistics of WPC (that is consistent with AT improving price 
discovery. WPC is a proxy for price discovery around earnings announcements and for firm i, in quarter q, ܹܲܥ௤ = ∑ [͵ܦܴ௤,௜ ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤⁄ ቆ|ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤| ∑ |ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤|ூ௜=ଵ⁄ ቇ]ூ௜=ଵ  and the measure 
represents a weighted-average of the proportion of returns realised across the first three trading days relative to 
the whole 63 day announcement period. To assess WPC across both NYSE and Nasdaq each NYSE firm is 
matched to a Nasdaq firm. For each calendar quarter three matched groups are created: Large, Medium and Small. 
The right column shows the expected difference in NYSE WPC minus Nasdaq WPC; and the left column shows 
the expected difference in post-Autoquote WPC minus pre-Autoquote WPC. Post-Autoquote sample period is 
from 1st October 2003 to 30st September 2004. Pre-Autoquote sample period is from 1st July 2002 to 30th June 
2003.  
 
  Post-Autoquote WPC minus Pre-Autoquote WPC 
NYSE minus 
Nasdaq 
 NYSE  Nasdaq    
     
Large Positive Positive or zero Positive 
Medium Positive or zero Positive or zero  Positive or zero 
Small Positive or zero Positive or zero  Positive or zero 
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3.6.1. Results  
Consistent with my conjecture, I find for large NYSE stocks price discovery improved; mid-
size stocks have insignificant change, and small stocks experienced an improvement due to 
significant deterioration in price discovery for Nasdaq stocks. Looking at the first row of Panel 
A in Table 3.11, price discovery for the Large sample on average increased by 9.00% 
(significant at the 1% level) after Autoquote was phased in. In contrast, the control group 
(Nasdaq firms) experienced a decline of 3.42% (insignificant at the 10% level). This suggests 
that a structural increase in AT improves price discovery. Computing the difference in WPC 
across the two exchanges price discovery increased by 12.4% (significant at the 1% level) 
following the phase-in of Autoquote. This suggests the results are robust for shifts in earnings 
quality. 
Now looking at Medium firms (second row of Panel A), price discovery saw insignificant 
change. For NYSE firms, WPC decreased by 2.16% (insignificant at the 10% level) after 
Autoquote phased-in compared to an increase of 2.93% (insignificant at the 10% level) for the 
control group. The change in WPC across the two exchanges is -5.09% (insignificant at the 10% 
level). Finally, for the Low sample the difference in WPC across NYSE and Nasdaq is 
significant and positive at 14.5%. This suggests price discovery also increased for small-caps. 
However, looking at the results this is mostly attributable to a decline in price discovery of 
Nasdaq stocks which saw a deterioration of 9.31% (significant at the 1% level). The change 
for NYSE stocks was also insignificant at 5.20% (insignificant at the 10% level).  
For robustness I then repeat the above matching procedure but match by size and price 
(following Davies and Kim, 2009). The results are shown in Panel B of Table 3.11 and 
reinforce my main findings. The results for the Large sample remain unchanged, with price 
discovery increasing 9.19% (significant at the 1% level) for NYSE stocks and decreasing by  
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Table 3.11: Difference in Difference – Autoquote 
 
The table shows the results for computed statistics of WPC (for both NYSE and Nasdaq firms). WPC is a proxy 
for price discovery around earnings announcements and for firm i, in quarter q, ܹܲܥ௤ =∑ [͵ܦܴ௜,௤ ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤⁄ ቆ|ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤| ∑ |ܤܪܣܴ[−ͳ,͸ͳ]௜,௤|ூ௜=ଵ⁄ ቇ]ூ௜=ଵ  and the measure represents a 
weighted-average of the proportion of returns realised across the first three trading days relative to the whole 63 
day announcement period. To assess WPC across both NYSE and Nasdaq each NYSE firm is matched to a Nasdaq 
firm. For each calendar quarter three matched groups are created: Large, Medium and Small. For the Large group 
Nasdaq firms are sorted, within-quarter, by market capitalisation. The largest 100 firms are then matched to NYSE 
firms within the same calendar quarter (via one-to-one matching without replacement). If a firm-quarter ES is 
equal to zero it is assigned a value of 0.0001. For the Small group, for each quarter 100 firms are randomly selected 
from the smallest NYSE quintile and then matched to a Nasdaq firm within the same quarter (one-to-one matching 
without replacement). For the Medium group, for each quarter the largest 100 NYSE firms and smallest NYSE 
quintile are excluded. A firm is then randomly selected in the remaining sample and matched to a Nasdaq firm 
from the same quarter (one-to-one matching without replacement). The right column shows the expected 
difference in NYSE WPC minus Nasdaq WPC; and the left column shows the expected difference in post-
Autoquote WPC minus pre-Autoquote WPC. Panel A shows results for firms matched by market capitalisation 
and earnings surprise. Panel B shows results for firms matched by market capitalisation and price. Panel C 
implements an alternative matching procedure where, for each quarter, NYSE firms are sorted alphabetically and 
every 10th stock is selected and matched (without replacement) to a Nasdaq firm by market capitalisation and 
earnings surprise. To compute standard errors, within each quarter the matched pairs are sorted into quintiles 
based on the market capitalisation of the NYSE stock. Hence the pre-Autoquote and post-Autoquote samples have 
20 groups across 4 calendar quarters (with 5 size quintiles in each quarter). The WPC is then computed for each 
group and statistical inferences are based on two-sample pooled t-tests. Post-Autoquote sample period is from 1st 
October 2003 to 30th September 2004. Pre-Autoquote sample period is from 1st July 2002 to 30th June 2003. ***, 
**, * represent 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 significance level for t-statistic respectively. 
 
  
  
 
 
Post-Autoquote WPC minus Pre-Autoquote WPC 
 
NYSE minus Nasdaq 
 
Panel A: Matched only by Market Cap and Surprise 
  NYSE firms  Nasdaq firms     
         
Large  0.09 *** -0.0342  0.124 *** 
Medium  -0.0216  0.0293  -0.0509  
Small  0.052  -0.0931 *** 0.145 *** 
Panel B: Matched only by Market Cap and Price 
  NYSE firms  Nasdaq firms     
         
Large  0.0919 *** -0.0358  0.128 *** 
Medium  -0.0317  0.0220  -0.0538  
Small  0.0281  -0.0381  0.0662  
Panel C: O’Hara and Ye (2011) Matching Procedure 
  NYSE firms  Nasdaq firms     
         
NYSE-matched firms   0.0836 ** -0.0605   0.144 *** 
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3.58% (insignificant at the 10% level) for the control group. The difference in WPC is therefore 
12.8% (significant at the 1% level). The results for the Medium sample are also essentially 
unchanged with price discovery decreasing by 3.17% (insignificant at the 10% level) for NYSE 
stocks and increasing by 2.20% (insignificant at the 10% level) for the control group. The 
difference in WPC is -5.38% (insignificant at the 10% level). Last, for the Small sample I note 
that the deterioration of price discovery at -3.81% (insignificant at the 10% level) in the control 
group is no longer significant. The change in price discovery for NYSE firms remains largely 
unchanged at 2.81% (insignificant at the 10% level) and the difference in WPC across the two 
exchanges is also now insignificant at 6.62% (insignificant at the 10% level). Hence, my overall 
finding shows a structural increase in AT improves price discovery for large-cap NYSE stocks 
while having insignificant effects on the remaining sizes.  
Finally, to rule out my results are driven by outliers or biased firm composition I conduct an 
alternative matching procedure following O’Hara and Ye (2011). I again match, for each 
calendar quarter, NYSE-listed stocks to Nasdaq-listed stocks by the following: 1) I exclude 
stocks that have changed ticker symbol and exclude all stocks with share prices below $5 and 
above $150 as of 31st March 2001. 2) I then, for each quarter, sort NYSE firms by name 
alphabetically and select every 10th stock and match (without replacement) to the Nasdaq 
sample by minimising the following matching error: 
|ܯܿܽ݌௨ே஺ௌ஽஺ொ ܯܿܽ݌௩ே௒ௌா⁄ − ͳ| + |ܧܵ௨ே஺ௌ஽஺ொ ܧܵ௩ே௒ௌா⁄ − ͳ| ( 3.13 ) 
I sort based on NYSE firms given NYSE firms are in general larger than Nasdaq firms. 3) I 
then assign all matched pairs between 1st July 2002 and 30th June 2003 to the pre-Autoquote 
sample and assign all matched pairs between 1st October 2003 and 30th September 2004 to the 
post-Autoquote sample. 4) To compute standard errors I again sort into quintile, within each 
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quarter, the matched pairs based on the market capitalisation of NYSE stock.90 WPC is then 
computed for each group following Equation 3.10.91 The results are in Panel C of Table 3.11 
and show price discovery for NYSE firms improved by 8.36% (significant at the 5% level) 
while control firms saw an insignificant decline of 6.05% (insignificant at the 10% level). 
Overall the difference in WPC across the two exchanges suggests large firms subject to 
Autoquote experienced a 14.4% (significant at the 1% level) improvement in price discovery 
compared with the control group. 
3.7. Conclusion 
Overall my findings show AT may not be associated with improved liquidity around 
announcement periods but AT nevertheless improves price discovery. While this is inconsistent 
with the general view that AT improves liquidity it does align with studies finding AT 
contributes to price efficiency.  
My analysis begins by testing for a structural decline in PEAD and my results show declines 
are concentrated among NYSE-listed firms (and attenuation exceeds 30% from 1995 to 2011). 
The structural break is located around the early 2000s which corresponds to the structural 
increase in AT for NYSE firms (as a result of Autoquote). However I argue PEAD attenuation 
may also be attributed to decimalisation and an upward trend in earnings quality. I then 
formally test the relation between AT and PEAD but remove the bias associated with 
decimalisation and earnings quality. To control for decimalisation I assess the effects of AT by 
restricting my sample test period and instrumenting the phase-in schedule of Autoquote. To 
control for the variation in earnings quality I then employ matched sampling techniques to 
                                                 
90 Therefore for both the pre- and post-Autoquote samples I have 20 groups consisting of 4 calendar quarters with 
5 size quintiles in each quarter. 
91 Following Bessimbinder (2003b), statistical inferences are computed from two-sample pooled t-tests. 
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bucket-paired stocks in high and low AT bins. I then examine whether high AT firms have 
significantly lower PEAD relative to low AT firms. My findings show the rise in AT and 
decline in PEAD are not statistically related. 
To test the conjecture that AT contributes to price discovery I then consider whether AT is 
associated with a larger response to earnings news. Proxying earnings response by 3DR I find 
AT is concentrated among stocks that exhibit relatively high 3DR. I suggest this is because 
algorithmic traders prefer to trade stocks that have high quality trading signals and therefore 
AT is potentially concentrated among firms that release disproportionally more information at 
announcements. This also implies AT is concentrated among firms with high earnings quality. 
I then test the conjecture that AT improves price discovery for firms associated with high 
earnings quality and find price discovery as proxied by Weighted Price Contribution (WPC) 
improved by more than 12% after Autoquote was phased in. Overall my study therefore 
suggests AT responds to earnings announcement not by way of attenuating PEAD effects but 
by improving the impounding of trading signals to stock prices. 
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CHAPTER 4: DOES ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
IMPROVE LIQUIDITY AFTER ADJUSTMENT 
FOR ORDER-SPLITTING? 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter tests whether AT significantly improves market liquidity once an adjustment is 
made for the potential under-estimation of effective spreads. While AT has been shown to 
improve market liquidity – the commonly-cited Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) 
shows high AT significantly reduces effective spread – recent studies argue the benefits of AT 
are over-estimated (see Gai, Yao and Ye, 2013; Kim and Murphy, 2013; Lyle and Naughton, 
2016). One particular critique is that AT encourages order-splitting and large orders are 
therefore increasingly camouflaged into sequences of small transactions (see Kim and Murphy, 
2013; Easley, Prado and O’Hara, 2014). Kim and Murphy (2013) argue this causes effective 
spread to be under-estimated but can be corrected for by treating sequences of consecutive buy 
or sell orders as a single transaction.  
I apply an adjustment to order-book data following Kim and Murphy (2013) and revisit the 
study by Hendershott et al. (2011) on the relation between AT and liquidity measures. 
Hendershott et al. (2011) find improvements in liquidity are associated with the phasing-in of 
Autoquote 92  and I follow the study by using the Autoquote phase-in schedule as an 
instrumental variable for testing the effects of a structural increase in AT on liquidity measures. 
                                                 
92 Referring to the NYSE implementing the electronic real-time dissemination of updates for the inside quote 
which significantly increased the benefits of adopting AT and increased AT order flow. Autoquote was phased in 
between 29th January 2003 and 27th of May, 2003 
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After applying the adjustment my findings show AT contributes significantly less to market 
quality than previously documented. Effective spreads do not decline significantly and tests on 
the components of effective spreads suggest the level of revenue generated from liquidity 
provision is completely offset by losses due to adverse selection. My results are consistent with 
studies showing order-splitting causes under-estimation of price impact. Consistent with 
Hendershott et al. (2011) I do find the phase-in of Autoquote is associated with overall lower 
adverse selection but higher realised spreads and this aligns with algorithmic traders being 
opportunistic, taking advantage of their speed to mitigate price impact while imposing higher 
adverse selection costs on slower traders. 
To adjust for bias in the measure of effective spreads I follow Kim and Murphy (2013) and 
collapse consecutive sequences of buy and sell orders. However, while previous methods 
collapse consecutive sequences irrespective of the time interval between orders I only collapse 
“fast” trades and therefore treat clusters of orders traded in a short time interval as a single 
transaction.  
To begin my analysis I apply the method of Hendershott et al. (2011) but without adjustment 
to order-splitting and show consistent findings with previous published results. I find an 
improvement in AT is associated with a significant decline in effective spreads and that the 
improvement in liquidity is concentrated among large market capitalisation stocks. However I 
show Hendershott et al.’s (2011) main findings are only significant for relatively fast trades. I 
also separate effective spreads into constituent components of adverse selection and realised 
spreads and find, consistent with Hendershott et al. (2011), that adverse selection decline 
significantly more than increases in realised spreads and therefore improvements in liquidity 
are attributable to a relative decline in adverse selection. 
114 
 
I then show after adjustment for order-splitting, shifts in effective spreads are insignificant. For 
each stock I collapse eligible trades that are among the 5% fastest of all trades into a single 
transaction – typically this means for the largest (smallest) firms two consecutive trades are 
collapsed together only if the time interval between trades is less than 20 seconds (2.88 
minutes).93 I find that although high AT continues to be associated with a decline in adverse 
selection costs and an increase in realised spreads, the estimated coefficients indicate a smaller 
reduction in adverse selection compared to results from uncollapsed trades. Further, the 
reduction in adverse selection is completely offset by increases in realised spreads, and changes 
in effective spreads are insignificant.  
My results also provide empirical evidence on the implications of transacting against fast and 
slow traders. I find that with high AT 1) fast (slow) trades are associated with a smaller (larger) 
decline in adverse selection, and 2) fast (slow) trades are associated with a smaller (larger) 
increase in realised spreads. Hence, although higher AT corresponds with lower overall adverse 
selection, fast liquidity providers are relatively better at avoiding adverse selection from slow 
traders. And although higher AT corresponds with overall higher realised spreads, slow traders 
generate relatively higher revenues for liquidity providers employing AT. Hence with higher 
levels of AT, the cost of liquidity (relative to fast traders) increases for slow traders.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the background to this study; 
Section 4.3 presents the data; Section 4.4 introduces the method for the analysis of uncollapsed 
data; Section 4.5 presents empirical results across different trading speeds; Section 4.6 presents 
empirical results after trades are collapsed; Section 4.7 concludes this chapter. 
                                                 
93 While Kim and Murphy (2013) shows the adjustment to order-splitting via collapsing trade sequences reduces 
estimation bias of liquidity measures, the assumption (implicitly relied upon in this chapter) that collapsed trades 
reasonably proxy actual pre-split large orders remains untested. 
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4.2. Background 
AT now plays a dominant role in securities exchange order-flow. From a starting point of near 
zero in the mid-1990s, AT has risen so that in 2009 it accounts for 73% of the trading volume 
in U.S. equity markets (Hendershott et al., 2011, p.1). Carrion (2013) notes that market 
structure developments such as decimalisation, Reg NMS and automated electronic order 
books have encouraged AT.94 There is further high competition among brokers, investment 
banks and exchanges to promote low latency order matching systems, co-location 
infrastructure and direct market access (DMA) services to support AT (see Jain, 2005; 
Boehmer, 2005; Hendershott and Riordan, 2011; Gai et al., 2013; and Hasbrouck and Saar, 
2013; O’Hara, 2015). 
However AT also enables high-frequency arbitrage which generates a “winner’s curse” cost 
upon slow traders. This form of high-frequency trading (HFT) is a subset of AT and refers to 
proprietary algorithms that scan for changes across the entire market’s order book and then 
quickly execute orders to profit from price inefficiencies (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013).95 Studies 
find that AT tends to provide liquidity when liquidity is expensive and removes liquidity when 
liquidity is cheap (Hendershott and Riordan, 2014). However the empirical evidence also 
shows that fast traders can quickly transition from liquidity-making to liquidity-taking 
strategies and liquidity provision can therefore occasionally be illusory (Brogaard, Hendershott 
and Riordan, 2014). Gai et al. (2013) show the fastest of all orders provide a “trivial 
                                                 
94 Decimalisation refers to the reduction in minimum tick-size adopted by US exchanges in the early 2000s. Reg 
NMS refers to the Regulation National Market System of 2007 which encouraged market fragmentation and 
competition among technologically sophisticated brokers, exchanges and alternative trading venues. 
95 HFT is a subset of AT. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) notes AT can be partitioned into: 1) agency algorithms 
which intelligently split large orders, and 2) proprietary algorithms that scan for changes across the entire market’s 
order book. The former represents the use of AT by portfolio managers and brokers to improve execution quality 
and reduce price impact (such as implementing order-splitting algorithms) while the latter represents HFT 
participants which profit from price inefficiencies. An additional characteristic of HFTs is they generally trade 
with their own capital, generate a large amount of message traffic and turnover and are reluctant to hold inventory 
overnight (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013). 
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contribution” (p.26) to liquidity and price efficiency and find that technological improvements 
in 2010 on Nasdaq increased the speed of trading from microseconds to nanoseconds but are 
associated with insignificant improvement in liquidity (despite a large rise in message traffic). 
The authors argue greater speed merely shifts a greater portion of liquidity costs from fast to 
slow traders and “trading speed above some threshold should be a zero-sum game”. Lyle and 
Naughton (2016) observe that after controlling for the improved quality of market monitoring 
by liquidity providers, high AT is associated with an increase in spreads for the period 2002 to 
2007. The authors argue AT plays a role in lowering a liquidity provider’s monitoring costs, 
however this component of AT is subject to diminishing returns. Lyle and Naughton (2016) 
therefore claim their results explain why, despite the increase in AT, spreads on the US equity 
market have not significantly declined since 2007. 
A debate continues as to whether the benefits of AT are overstated. Some studies show traders 
employing liquidity provision strategies using AT are opportunistic and can quickly withdraw 
liquidity followed by swift insertion of liquidity-taking orders, creating fleeting and unreliable 
liquidity (Cvitanic and Kirilenko, 2010; Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun, 2016; Easley, 
Prado and O’Hara, 2012). In this sense fast traders are unlike the traditional NYSE specialists 
who are subject to the Price Continuity Rule and stand ready and able to provide bid-ask quotes 
throughout the trading day (Panayides, 2007). Regulators have also raised concerns of potential 
market destabilisation by high-frequency trading (HFT) liquidity provision. In particular, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairwoman Mary Shapiro raised the issue of whether 
“the most sophisticated and active trading firms that ordinarily act as liquidity providers be 
allowed to suddenly become aggressive liquidity takers during a price move in a way that 
exacerbates the price move.”96 Regulatory proposals to combat fleeting liquidity have included 
                                                 
96 “Strengthening Our Equity Market Structure” by Mary L. Schapiro, Speech at the Economic Club of New York, 
September 7, 2010. 
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imposing a minimum time-in-force on AT liquidity provision97 and fees for high rates of order 
cancellation.98 
Kim and Murphy (2013) contribute to this debate by considering whether measures of liquidity 
have been subject to estimation bias because of AT-facilitated order-splitting. They find it is 
increasingly common to see large sequences of consecutive buy or sell orders in high-frequency 
order-book data, and the size of the individual orders is inversely related to the length of the 
sequences.99 Institutional traders also increasingly attempt to obtain better price execution by 
splitting large orders into smaller and smaller transactions to reduce price impact and mitigate 
against detection by the rest of the market (see Bertsimas and Lo, 1998).100 The authors argue 
this autocorrelation in trade data, as well as the loss in size-variation, causes estimates of a 
large order’s effective spreads to be biased downwards and therefore AT may not be associated 
with improved liquidity. In other words, the true price impact of a single small trade is now 
correlated to the cumulative price impact of many other small trades; and the variation in 
transaction costs with respect to size is difficult to quantify if there are few large orders being 
transacted. Empirical market microstructure models that relate price changes to individual trade 
size, negate this cumulative effect of smaller orders (see Glosten and Harris, 1988) and 
                                                 
97 European Commission Public Consultation: Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 
February, 2011, p.7. 
98 Recommendations Regarding Regulatory Responses to the Market Events of May 6, 2010: Summary Report of 
the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, p.11. 
99 Kim and Murphy (2013) considered the S&P500 Exchange Traded Fund SPY from 1997 to 2009 and found 
that the average string of consecutive buy or sell orders increased from two to twelve; the average size of 
individual trades decreased from 5,600 shares in to 400 shares; the standard deviation of individual trade size 
declined from 22,000 shares to 5,100 shares; and the average time between trades decreased from 67.5 seconds to 
0.1 seconds. In other words, small buy orders are more often immediately followed by small buy orders, and small 
sell orders are more often immediately followed by small sell orders. 
100 Hendershott et al. (2011) writes “before AT took hold, a pension fund management who wanted to buy 30,000 
shares of IBM might hire a broker-dealer to search for a counter party to execute…Alternatively, (he) might have 
hired a NYSE floor broker to go stand at the IBM post and quietly “work the order”…Now virtually every large 
broker-dealer offers a suite of algorithms to its institutional customers to help them execute orders…Algorithms 
typically determine the timing, price, quantity and routing orders, dynamically monitoring market conditions 
across different securities and trading venues, reducing market impact by optimally and sometimes randomly 
breaking large orders into smaller pieces” (p. 2). 
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therefore the splitting of large orders can be indistinguishable from small orders (Kim and 
Murphy, 2013). Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, larger order imbalance generates higher adverse-
selection costs (see Kyle, 1985) and forces market-makers to deviate from their optimal 
inventory position (Stoll, 1978). This additional inventory risk causes market-makers to widen 
their quoted spreads and hence charge more for liquidity (Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, 
Moulton and Seasholes, 2010).  
Last, anticipatory trades by AT can increase price impact. Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan 
(2014) show HFTs compete aggressively to profit from short-run price changes via liquidity-
taking orders while Foucault, Hombert and Rosu (2016) argue speed, news anticipation and 
order-flow anticipation are defining traits of HFT’s aggressive liquidity-taking. Electronic 
algorithms employed in anticipation of order-splitting (Easley, Prado and O’Hara, 2012) and 
aggressive HFT orders trading in response to order imbalance, account for more than a quarter 
of overall market turnover (Brogaard et al., 2014). Traders increasingly employ the same 
technological advantages of AT to detect and trade in the same direction as the order flow 
subject to order-splitting101 and therefore small trades conditioned on order-splitting are more 
likely to attract aggressive HFT orders. 
4.3. Data 
My sample period is from 1st January 2003 to 31st July 2003 and my sample data utilise trade-
tick data, quarterly corporate disclosures and the Autoquote phase-in schedule. For comparison, 
Hendershott et al.’s (2011) sample period is from 1st December 2002 to 31st July 2003. I note I 
was unable to obtain pre-2003 data however I will show my summary statistics in Table 4.1 
                                                 
101 To protect traders from being picked off by ultra fast algorithms the Wall Street Journal reports one trading 
venue is slowing down the speed of orders (http://www.wsj.com/articles/iexs-next-challenge-delivering-on-its-
promises-1466330401, accessed 9th, October 2016). 
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resemble that of Hendershott et al. (2011). I also note I use an alternative source of intraday 
trade and quote data compared to Hendershott et al. (2011) who use Trades and Quotes (TAQ) 
data, a dataset which provides historical tick by tick data for all securities listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and Nasdaq National Market System (NMS). However I note both my data and TAQ 
show all order-book changes at the inside quote and therefore the choice of dataset should not 
affect my result. 
I obtain U.S. intraday trade and quote data from Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH).102 
The TRTH data are organised by Reuters Instrument Code (RIC) and each RIC is associated 
with an equity or derivative instrument. For each NYSE-listed common stock, I obtain from 
SIRCA the RIC codes, the NYSE listing codes and consolidated time-stamped trade and quote 
data. The data therefore records every order placed at the inside quote as represented by the 
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). I then apply the following filters: 1) I remove irregular 
trades based on some technical conditions in the TRTH “qualifiers” data field following 
Boehmer, Fong and Wu (2015) (see Section C.2 in the Appendix) ; 2) I require all traded price, 
traded volume, bid price, bid volume, ask price and ask volume data fields to be greater than 
zero; 3) the ask price must be greater than the bid price; 4) all intraday trade and quote 
observations must be between 9:35am and 3.55pm. I obtain market capitalisation data from 
Compustat,103 based on quarterly accounting filings and match to the TRTH data based on the 
NYSE listing code.  Finally, each stock has a unique date for the phasing-in of Autoquote and 
I obtain this list from Hendershott’s website.104 The list includes the NYSE listing codes which 
I use to match to TRTH data. 
                                                 
102 Provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). 
103 The data is provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
104 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hender/. 
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To arrive at my final sample data the following stocks are removed: 1) stocks with a closing 
share price below $5 or above $1000 on the first day of trading in January 2003; 2) any newly 
listed stock in the sample period or any stock which changed listing symbols; 3) stocks with 
less than 100 trading days of data; 4) stocks which have less than 21 trades on any trading day. 
My sample contains 913 eligible stocks compared with 1082 in Hendershott et al. (2011). 
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics across market capitalisation sorted into quintiles. 
Following Hendershott et al. (2011) I winsorize all variables in this study at the 0.05% and 
99.95% level. Detailed description and construction of the variables are discussed in Section 
C.1 of the Appendix. The values are consistent with the summary statistics in Hendershott et 
al. (2011, p.17). The measures of liquidity I consider throughout this study are effective spreads, 
adverse selection and realised spreads. Effective spreads is the difference between the traded 
price by a liquidity taker and the bid-ask midpoint price at the time of the transaction; it 
represents the cost borne for immediate liquidity. Adverse selection is the degree by which the 
midpoint price moves against the liquidity provider’s position five minutes after a trade; it 
proxies the gross losses borne by the liquidity provider to the liquidity taker. And realised 
spreads is the degree to which the bid-ask midpoint price moves in favour of the liquidity 
provider after a trade; it assumes the liquidity provider can on average close out a trade in five 
minutes at the midpoint and therefore proxies the gross revenues generated by liquidity 
provision. Section 4.4.1 discusses these measures in more detail. Looking at Table 4.1, 
effective and realised spreads all decrease with respect to firm size and adverse selection also 
decrease with respect to firm size. For example, the effective spread is 3.37 basis points for 
firms in the largest quintile and 9.61 basis points for firms in the smallest quintile. Adverse 
selection at the five minute level averages 2.08 basis points for the largest quintile and 5.78 
basis points for the smallest. Realised spreads at the five minute level average 1.29 basis points 
121 
 
for the largest quintile and 3.84 for the smallest quintile. These measures are computed without 
collapsing trade sequences. My values closely resemble the summary statistics of Hendershott 
et al. (2011, Table 1, p.17) for the largest quintiles (which are the focus of Hendershott et al.’s 
(2011) main findings) while my values for the smallest quintile tend to be smaller. In 
Hendershott et al. (2011) the mean effective spreads, adverse selection and realised spreads are 
3.63 (14.50), 2.42 (10.16) and 1.21 (4.34) basis points respectively for the largest (smallest) 
quintiles.  
One substantial difference between my data and Hendershott et al.’s (2011) is the number of 
order book messages. I show the average number of order book messages at the inside quote 
increases with respect to firm size (from 823 messages per common stock per day for the 
smallest quintile to 5,476 messages per common stock per day for the largest). Hendershott et 
al. (2011) use data from the NYSE System Order Data which contains all order submissions, 
cancellations and trade reports handled by the NYSE’s SuperDOT system. They show that by 
excluding orders from exchanges specialists, floor brokers and manual entries, the number of 
messages for the largest (smallest) quintile firm is approximately 50,000 (4,400) messages per 
common stock per day. This variable however does not influence my results and consistent 
with Hendershott et al. (2011) I do not use this variable in my tests. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics by Size Quintile 
 
This table presents summary statistics on daily data from the period 1st January 2003 to 31st July 2003. Mean values are based on 913 NYSE-listed stocks sorted into market 
capitalisation quintiles where 1 is the smallest firms and 5 is the largest firms. Quintile break points are computed based on market capitalisation at the end of June 2003. For 
each stock j and day t: qspreadj,t is the turnover-weighted quoted half-spread (bps), espreadj,t is the turnover-weighted effective half-spread (bps), rspreadj,t is the turnover-
weighted realised half-spread (bps) at 5 minutes, adv_selectionj,t is the turnover-weighted adverse selection half-spread (bps) at 5 minutes, messagesj,t is the number of order 
book changes (/day), turnoverj,t is the share turnover ($million), volatilityj,t is the daily price range standardized by the daily close price (%), pricej,t is the daily closing price 
($), market_capj,t is the number of shares outstanding times price as of June 2003 ($billion), trade_countj,t is the number of trades, trade_sizej,t is the mean trade size ($1,000), 
volumej,t is the number of shares transacted (1,000s). All variables are 99.9% winsorized. 
 
 1 (smallest cap) 2 3 4 5 (largest cap) 
Variables mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev 
           
qspreadj,t          13.51           12.94             9.06           10.40             5.17             7.03             4.38             5.89             4.42             8.40  
espreadj,t            9.61             9.28             6.59             7.73             4.05             5.36             3.39             4.14             3.37             5.81  
adv_selectionj,t            5.78             9.11             4.70             7.83             2.88             4.25             2.26             3.74             2.08             4.57  
rspreadj,t            3.84             9.37             1.89             5.92             1.18             4.13             1.13             3.74             1.29             4.94  
messagesj,t        823        637     1,437        951     2,228     1,272     3,357     1,895     5,476     3,456  
turnoverj,t            1.28             3.51             3.24             5.77             8.00           12.94           18.26           24.25           62.00           86.06  
volatilityj,t            2.50             1.96             2.75             2.17             2.59             1.87             2.55             1.75             2.66             1.82  
pricej,t          19.39           11.95           22.15           12.68           31.09           33.10           30.53           17.15           33.10           18.74  
market_capj,t           0.36             0.27             0.75             0.47             1.76             1.85             3.63             2.75           22.56           40.08  
trade_countj,t        130        173       296        255        518       364       868       579    1,606    1,166 
trade_sizej,t            8.92           18.12           10.25           46.67           14.59           36.62           18.39           21.98           30.38           62.31  
volumej,t        537    1,135       598    3,741       603    1,554       748    1,529    1,163    3,543            
      
Number of Observations 23,373 25,836 27,275 26,383 28,845 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics Before and After Autoquote 
 
This table presents summary statistics on daily data for before and after the phase-in of Autoquote. The sample period is 1st January 2003 to 31st July 2003. Mean values are 
based on 913 NYSE-listed stocks sorted into market capitalisation quintiles where 1 is the smallest firms and 5 is the largest firms. Quintile break points are computed based 
on market capitalisation at the end of June 2003. For each stock j and day t: qspreadj,t is the turnover-weighted quoted half-spread (bps), espreadj,t is the turnover-weighted 
effective half-spread (bps), rspreadj,t is the turnover-weighted realised half-spread (bps) at 5 minutes, adv_selectionj,t is the turnover-weighted adverse selection half-spread 
(bps) at 5 minutes, messagesj,t is the number of order book changes (/day), turnoverj,t is the share turnover ($million), volatilityj,t is the daily price range standardized by the 
daily close price (%), pricej,t is the daily closing price ($), market_capj,t is the number of shares outstanding times price as of June 2003 ($billion), trade_countj,t is the number 
of trades, trade_sizej,t is the mean trade size ($1,000), volumej,t is the number of shares transacted (1,000s). t-stat refers to two-sample pooled t-test. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level respectively. All variables are 99.9% winsorized. 
 
   1(smallest cap) 2 3 4  5 (largest cap)  
 Variables   Before   After  t-stat  Before   After  t- stat  Before   After  t- stat  Before   After  t- stat  Before   After  t- stat 
                    
qspreadj,t  13.46 13.6   9.62 8.17 *** 5.49 4.68 *** 4.86 3.64 *** 5.41 3.28 *** 
espreadj,t  9.81 9.29 *** 7.17 5.66 *** 4.3 3.67 *** 3.73 2.86 *** 4.05 2.59 *** 
adv_selectionj,t  6.42 4.76 *** 5.39 3.6 *** 3.39 2.1 *** 2.68 1.61 *** 2.68 1.49 *** 
rspreadj,t  3.4 4.54 *** 1.79 2.06 *** 0.92 1.57 *** 1.05 1.26 *** 1.38 1.19 *** 
messagesj,t  738 959   1,235 1,759 *** 1,916 2,715 *** 2,905 4,054 *** 4,097 7,055 *** 
turnoverj,t  1.11 1.54 *** 2.77 3.99 *** 7.11 9.39 *** 17.33 19.69 *** 46.31 79.96 *** 
volatilityj,t  2.48 2.52   2.84 2.61 *** 2.67 2.46 *** 2.65 2.4 *** 2.77 2.54 *** 
pricej,t  18.48 20.84 *** 21.1 23.84 *** 29.71 33.25 *** 29.71 31.8 *** 30.74 35.79 *** 
market_capj,t 0.34 0.39 *** 0.7 0.82 *** 1.62 1.98 *** 3.49 3.86 *** 25.96 30.12 *** 
trade_countj,t  119 148 *** 269 339 *** 491 560 *** 835 920 *** 1,340 1,910 *** 
trade_sizej,t  8.41 9.74 *** 10.2 10.31   13.68 16.03 *** 17.72 19.42 *** 27.37 33.82 *** 
volumej,t  524 557 ** 645 523 ** 607 598   745 753   1,142 1,187   
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Table 4.2 contains average values of summary data for before and after the Autoquote phase-
in. The results are shown across market capitalisation quintiles and the pooled two-sample t-
test supports the view by Kim and Murphy (2013) that higher AT is associated with improved 
liquidity measures (when unadjusted for order-splitting), increased order traffic and higher 
turnover. There is noticeable variation between pre- and post-Autoquote figures. For example, 
for the largest firms (where Hendershott et al. (2011) observed the biggest improvements in 
liquidity) average effective and realised spreads declined by 36% (from 4.05bps to 2.59bps) 
and 14% (from 1.38 to 1.19 basis points) respectively after the phasing-in of Autoquote (both 
declines are significant at the 1% level). Adverse selection declined the most, by 48% (from 
2.68 to 1.49 basis points) and the decline is significant at the 1% level. As expected, these 
declines are less pronounced for smaller firms. The number of order book messages and trades 
increased for all size quintiles. The largest firms saw the average number of order book 
messages increase by 72%, from 4,097 per day to 7,055, while the average number of trades 
per day rose 43%, from 1,340 to 1,910. For the smallest firms the average number of order 
book messages increased by 29% and the average number of trades per day increased by 26%. 
Across all size quintiles turnover also increased but trade size remained more or less constant. 
For example, the largest firms saw annualised turnover almost doubled from an average of $46 
million to $80 million while average trade size increased just 4% from 1,142 shares to 1,188 
shares. Hence, although turnover is growing trade size has not. 
4.3.1. Autoquote 
Autoquote refers to the event in 2003 in which the NYSE began updating the limit order book 
in real-time and disseminating the inside quote electronically. This gave algorithmic traders an 
advantage as Autoquote gives immediate feedback about the potential terms of trade but was 
unlikely to directly affect the trading behaviour of slower-reacting humans. Prior to its 
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introduction NYSE specialists manually disseminated the inside quote for the equities market. 
However after the introduction of decimalisation tick-size narrowed and this greatly increased 
the number of order book updates and made excessively onerous the specialist’s role of 
manually managing the order book. Further, NYSE specialists were required to manage an 
additional “liquidity quote” in order to efficiently transact with investors who wanted to match 
for significant size (typically at least 15,000 shares). Autoquote alleviated some of the burdens 
for specialists and added new capability and efficiency for both liquidity demanders and 
suppliers and its phase-in is considered an exogenous event by Hendershott et al. (2011).  
The Autoquote phase-in schedule provided by Hendershott’s website shows the first stage of 
Autoquote phase-in began on 29th January 2003 for six large-cap stocks. Over the next two 
months, over 200 additional stocks across all size quintiles were then gradually phased in. The 
remaining stocks were phased in on 27th May, 2003. Hendershott et al. (2011) argue Autoquote 
affects liquidity only via its impact on AT and therefore the dates of Autoquote phase-in 
constitute a valid dummy-variable instrument to test the relation between liquidity and AT. 
They also note the Autoquote phase-in schedule was fixed months in advance and therefore “it 
seems highly unlikely that the phase-in schedule could be correlated to idiosyncratic liquidity 
months into the future” (p.15). 
4.4. Method 
4.4.1. Test Method of Hendershott et al. (2011) 
There are many theoretical frameworks for measuring liquidity (see Glosten and Milgrom 1985; 
Kyle 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). I follow Glosten (1987) and Hendershott et al. (2011) 
and measure market liquidity by a stock’s effective spread which represent the immediate cost 
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borne by the liquidity taker with respect to the midpoint price. For the ݊௧ℎtransaction in stock ݆: 
 ݁ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝,௡ = ݍ௝,௧ሺ݌௝,௡ − ௝݉,௧ሻ/ ௝݉,௡ ( 4.1 ) 
Where ݁ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝,௡ is effective spread, ݌௝,௡ is traded price, ݍ௝,௡ is buyer-seller indicator (i.e. 
+1 for a buy and -1 for a sell) and ௝݉,௡ is the bid-ask midpoint. To compute ݍ௝,௡ I follow the 
trade classification algorithm of Lee and Ready (1991) and use contemporaneous quotes to 
sign trades (see Bessimbinder, 2003). I classify a transaction as a buy if the traded price is 
above the midpoint of the bid-ask quote, and a sell otherwise. For trades with the price equal 
to the midpoint I classify a transaction as a buy if the most recent price change was positive 
and as a sell if the most recent price change was negative. 
I further break down effective spread into adverse selection and realised spread:  
ܽ݀ݒ_ݏ݈݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௝,௡ = ݍ௝,௡ሺ ௝݉,௡+ହ௠௜௡௨௧௘ − ௝݉,௡ሻ/ ௝݉,௡ ( 4.2 ) 
ݎݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝,௡ = ݍ௝,௡ሺ݌௝,௡ − ௝݉,௡+ହ௠௜௡௨௧௘௦ሻ/ ௝݉,௡ ( 4.3 ) 
Where ܽ݀ݒ_ݏ݈݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௝,௡ is adverse selection, ݎݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝,௡ is realized spread, and ௝݉,௡+ହ௠௜௡௨௧௘ 
is the bid-ask midpoint five minutes after the ݊௧ℎ transaction. Following Hendershott et al. 
(2011), I interpret ܽ݀ݒ_ݏ݈݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௝,௡ as the gross losses incurred by liquidity providers due to 
price impact and ݎݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝,௡  as liquidity providers’ estimated revenue. The three variables 
have the following relation: 
 ݁ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝,௡ = ܽ݀ݒ_ݏ݈݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௝,௡ + ݎݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௝,௡ ( 4.4 ) 
127 
 
Hence I implicitly assume liquidity providers can close their positions at the quoted midpoint 
after five minutes. 
To test the relation between liquidity and AT, I apply the model in Hendershott et al. (2011). 
The dependent variables are either the daily turnover-weighted measures of effective spreads, 
adverse selection or realised spreads. The independent variable is the Autoquote dummy 
variable. To remain consistent with Hendershott et al. (2011) my dependent variables are 
divided by two and therefore represent half-spreads. I control for day and firm fixed effects 
and test the following specification:  
ܮ௝,௧ = ߙ௝ + ߛ௧ + ߚଵܣܳ௝,௧ + ߛଵݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ + ߛଶݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଷݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ 
+ߛସ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧ + ߝ௝,௧ ( 4.5 ) 
Where ܮ௝,௧ is the daily turnover-weighted liquidity measure, ߙ௝ represents firm fixed effects, ߛ௧ represents day dummy variables for day t, and ܣܳ௝,௧ is the Hendershott et al. (2011) dummy 
variable equal to +1 for periods with Autoquote phased-in and zero otherwise. I also include 
the following control variables: share turnover, tick size, the log of market capitalisation and 
volatility based on daily price range standardized by the daily stock price ሺ ௝ܲ,௧ு௜𝑔ℎ − ௝ܲ,௧௅௢௪ሻ/ ௝ܲ,௧  
(see Parkinson, 1980). The estimated standard errors are robust to general cross-sectional and 
time-series heteroscedasticity and within-group autocorrelation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
4.4.1.1. Results 
Regression results to Equation 4.5 are presented in Table 4.3 and are consistent with estimates 
reported in Hendershott et al. (2011, Table III, p.20). Effective spreads declined significantly 
following Autoquote and the reduction in adverse selection exceeded the increase in realised 
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spreads. Panel A shows market capitalisation-weighted effective spreads declined by 9.72 basis 
points (significant at the 1% level) after stocks were subject to Autoquote. Further, with the 
exception of turnover, the sign and magnitude of the control variables’ coefficients are 
consistent with Hendershott et al. (2011) and suggest high effective spreads are associated with 
high volatility, high tick-size and low market capitalisation. An estimated coefficient of 
volatility at 0.139 (significant at the 1% level) suggests a 1% increase in the daily high-low 
price range increases effective spreads by 0.139 basis points. An estimated coefficient of 
relative tick-size at 1.07 (significant at the 1% level) suggests a 100 basis point increase in 
relative tick-size increases effective spreads by 1.07 basis points. An estimated coefficient of 
the log of market capitalisation at -1.29 (significant at the 1% level) suggests a 1% increase in 
market capitalisation decreases effective spreads by 1.29 basis points.  
My coefficient estimate for turnover is inconsistent to the findings in Hendershott et al. (2011) 
and suggests on average higher turnover is associated with higher spreads. However the 
magnitude of 0.000147 is very small and suggests on average for every $100 million increase 
in daily turnover effective spreads increase by 1.47 basis points. Given the mean of daily 
turnover for firms in the largest quintile is $62 million, the effect of the variable is therefore 
small. In contrast to all other control variables, the coefficient for turnover is also not robust 
across size quintiles. 
Panel B shows the regression results across market capitalisation quintiles. Consistent with 
Hendershott et al. (2011) the largest and second largest quintiles exhibit significant decline in 
effective spreads post-Autoquote of 14.8 and 16.4 basis points respectively. The smallest firms 
experienced an increase in effective spreads of 60.42 basis points. 
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Table 4.3: Regression Results following Hendershott et al. (2011) 
 
The table regresses measures of liquidity on the Hendershott et al. (2011) Autoquote dummy variable. Sample period is from 1st January 2003 to 31st July 2003. The specification 
is: ܮ௝,௧ = ߙ௝ + ߛ௧ + ߚଵܣܳ௝,௧ + ߛଵݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ + ߛଶݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଷݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛସ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧ + ߝ݆,ݐ where the dependent variable ܮ௝,௧  is measures of daily turnover- 
weighted liquidity in basis points: 1) half quoted-spreads; 2) half effective spreads; 3) half adverse selection; and 4) half realised spreads, ߙ௝ represents firm fixed effects, ߛ௧ 
represents day dummy variables and ܣܳ௝,௧ is a dummy variable equal to +1 for periods with Autoquote phased-in and zero otherwise. The remaining factors are control variables: 
share turnover, volatility, tick size and the log of market capitalisation. Panel A shows market capitalisation-weighted results. Panel B presents results across quintiles based on 
market capitalisation. Break points are computed using market capitalisation at the end of June 2003. Panel C presents results across quintiles based on the time interval (TI) 
between trades. For each stock the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th break points are computed based on TI in the sample period. Standard errors are robust to general cross-sectional 
and time-series heteroscedasticity and within-group autocorrelation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
           
Panel A: Market Capitalisation Weighted 
 ܣܳ௝,௧  ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧  ݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧  ݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧  ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧  
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)       
 -0.0972 *** 0.000147 *** 0.139 *** 1.070 *** -1.29 *** 
Panel B: Quintile by Market Capitalisation 
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)       
1 (smallest) 0.604 *** -0.0462 *** 1.164 *** 1.517 *** 0.837   
2 -0.183   0.006   0.808 *** -0.113 *** -8.992 *** 
3 -0.035   -0.002   0.272 *** 0.232 *** -4.948 *** 
4 -0.164 *** -0.001   0.288 *** 0.171 *** -4.233 *** 
5 (largest) -0.148 ** 0.000472   0.176 *** 0.382 *** -2.259 *** 
Panel C: Quintile sorted by Time Between Trades 
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)       
1 (fastest) -0.088 *** 0.000234 ** 0.188 *** 2.157 *** -1.703 *** 
2 -0.223 *** -0.0029 *** 0.418 *** 0.182 *** -3.311 *** 
3 -0.330 *** -0.0205 *** 0.634 *** 2.659 *** 0.392 ** 
4 -0.122   -0.0473 *** 1.020 *** 1.340 *** -2.606 *** 
5 (slowest) 0.693 *** -0.1697 ** 0.563 *** -0.053 *** -6.933 *** 
Dependent Variable: quoted spreads (bps)       
1 (fastest) -0.234 *** 0.000 *** 0.337 *** 2.921 *** -2.220 *** 
2 -0.263 *** -1×10-8 *** 0.746 *** 0.074   -4.604 *** 
3 -0.257 *** -3×10-8 *** 1.309 *** 3.123 *** -0.287 * 
4 -0.147   -9×10-8 *** 1.800 *** 1.726 *** -4.591 *** 
5 (slowest) 2.890 *** -6.7×10-7 *** 1.562 *** 0.161 *** -16.514 *** 
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Panel C: (Continued) 
 ܣܳ௝,௧  ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧  ݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧  ݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧  ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧  
 
Dependent Variable: adverse selection (bps)       
1 (fastest) -0.228 *** 0.000983 *** 0.307 *** 3.039 *** -0.869 *** 
2 -0.643 *** 0.00160   0.605 *** 0.632 *** -1.533 *** 
3 -0.922 *** -0.020 *** 0.965 *** 1.971 *** 0.783 *** 
4 -1.173 *** -0.029 ** 1.390 *** 0.907 *** -0.870 ** 
5 (slowest) -1.068 *** -0.102   0.885 *** -0.155 *** -4.773 *** 
Dependent Variable: realised spreads (bps)       
1 (fastest) 0.140 *** -0.00075 *** -0.117 *** -0.877 *** -0.843 *** 
2 0.435 *** -0.00465 *** -0.191 *** -0.436 *** -1.765 *** 
3 0.595 *** -3.5×10-5   -0.339 *** 0.691 *** -0.370   
4 1.055 *** -0.018   -0.382 *** 0.429 *** -1.789 *** 
5 (slowest) 1.760 *** -0.069   -0.322 ** 0.101 *** -2.190 *** 
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Hendershott et al. (2011)note AT are less common in small stocks and this may serve as a 
partial explanation. The sign of the Autoquote Dummy is also negative for all quintiles except 
the smallest firms. 
Estimated coefficient for turnover is insignificant for all other quintiles except the smallest 
quintile; estimated coefficients for volatility are positive and significant for all quintiles and 
range between 0.176 and 1.164; estimated coefficients for tick size are positive and significant 
for all quintiles except for the second smallest quintile, and range between -0.11 and 1.52; 
estimated coefficients for the log of market capitalisation are negative and significant for all 
quintiles except the smallest quintile and range between -8.99 and 0.83. Again, other than 
turnover, my results are consistent with Hendershott et al. (2011, Table II, p.20) who show 
market capitalization-weighted estimated coefficients of -1.01 (insignificant at the 5% level), 
0.69 (significant at the 1% level), 0.73 (significant at the 1% level) and -1.30 (significant at the 
1% level) for turnover, volatility, tick size and the log of market capitalisation respectively. 
In Section C.3 of the Appendix I also show results for adverse selection and realised spreads 
across size quintiles. Estimated coefficients of ܣܳ௝,௧ for adverse selection range between -0.51 
basis points for the largest firms and -1.00 for the smallest firms (all significant at the 1% level). 
Estimated coefficients of ܣܳ௝,௧ for realised spreads range between 0.36 basis points for the 
largest firms and 1.60 for the smallest firms (all significant at the 1% level). In other words 
overall asymmetric information declined after Autoquote and realised spreads increased after 
Autoquote. My results for the three largest quintiles resemble those in Hendershott et al. (2011), 
however results for the two smallest quintiles diverge as they are found to be insignificant in 
Hendershott et al. (2011) but significant in mine. 
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Overall my estimates suggest a smaller reduction in effective spreads than in Hendershott et al. 
(2011). Estimated coefficients for the largest and second largest quintiles are -0.09 and -0.22 
respectively, compared to -0.18 and -0.32 respectively in Hendershott et al. (2011). I attribute 
a portion of this to excluding data for the entire month of December 2002108 as the effective 
spread was near its highest in December 2002 for Hendershott et al.’s (2011) sample test 
period109.  
4.5. Fast vs Slow Trades 
I now discuss whether the improvement in liquidity as found in Hendershott et al. (2011) is 
more attributable to fast or slow trades.  Kim and Murphy (2013) argue fast trades rather than 
slow trades are better proxies for speed-sensitive algorithms, which trade upon order book 
changes. The underlying intuition is that the combination of AT speed advantage and the 
incentive to trade on new information quickly imply traders employing AT are more likely to 
react swiftly to order book imbalance. It is argued this speed advantage imposes higher adverse 
selection costs on slower traders while algorithmic traders themselves are better positioned to 
avoid adverse selection (Biais, Foucault and Moinas, 2011). Further, because HFTs generate 
high turnover and are a substantial source of liquidity provision their cost base is lowered by 
large exchange fee rebates and therefore HFTs potentially quote tighter spreads (Carrion, 2013). 
I consider these arguments by testing the model specification in Hendershott et al. (2011) on 
fast and slow trades.  
I take the time interval (TI) between two consecutive trades as the metric for trading speed. 
This is computed by taking, for each stock, a trade’s timestamp minus the timestamp of the 
                                                 
108 I was unable to obtain complete NYSE trade and quote data for pre-2003 period. 
109 See Figure 2 in Hendershott, et al. (2011, p.9). 
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immediate previous trade. TI is only measured if both trades are computed on the same day 
and therefore, across all stocks, the first trade of each day is removed. For each stock I further 
assign trades into a TI quintile. A high quintile proxies slow trades and a low quintile proxies 
fast trades. The break points are computed based on each stock’s TI computed across the entire 
sample period. To account for the large variation in TI across firms I compute break-points 
within-firm rather than at the aggregated level.  
I present summary statistics on firm TI in Table 4.4 and show the median TI for the largest 
firms is 0.125 minutes (7.53 seconds) before Autoquote and 0.109 minutes (6.53 seconds) after 
Autoquote. The median TI for the smallest firms is 2.08 minutes (125 seconds) before 
Autoquote and 1.76 minutes (106 seconds) after Autoquote. Even the fastest trades are subject 
to large variance across stocks. For example for large firms the TI at the 1st percentile is 0.0003 
minutes (0.02 seconds) before Autoquote and 0.0002 minutes (0.01 seconds) after Autoquote, 
while for small firms the TI is 0.018 minutes (1.08 seconds) before Autoquote and 0.014 
minutes (0.85) seconds after Autoquote. This suggests the speed of AT is potentially firm-
specific (for example, the speed of order insertion and cancellation can depend on a stock’s 
correlation to activity in equities indices, commodity prices, futures or listed ETFs).  
4.5.1. Results 
 
I re-test Equation 4.5 but on the cross-section of trading speed quintiles. My results show 
improvements in liquidity are concentrated among faster trades, but the fastest trades contribute 
relatively less improvement to liquidity. I also show adverse selection declined the least for the 
fastest trades while realised spreads increased the most for the slowest trades. This supports 
findings that higher AT is effective in reducing adverse selection costs but also  
134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4. Summary Statistic of Time Between Trades by Size Quintile 
 
The table shows the mean and percentile breakpoints of time interval (TIj,n) between two trades (minutes) for before and after Autoquote. TIj,n is computed by taking, for each 
stock j, the nth trade’s timestamp minus the timestamp of the immediate previous trade. TIj,n is computed only if both trades occurred on the same day. Values are computed 
based on 913 NYSE-listed stocks sorted into market capitalisation quintiles where 1 is the smallest firms and 5 is the largest firms. The sample period is 1st January 2003 to 
31st July 2003. 
 
 1 (smallest cap) 2 3 4 5 (largest cap) 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
           
Mean of TIj,n          4.877           3.819           1.574           1.285           0.866           0.752           0.486           0.427           0.261           0.234  
               
1st           0.018           0.014           0.017           0.009           0.007           0.007           0.001           0.006  0.00003 0.00002 
5th           0.037           0.030           0.024           0.022           0.019           0.021           0.018           0.015           0.017           0.014  
25th           0.460           0.388           0.177           0.135           0.106           0.085           0.070           0.057           0.046           0.041  
median          2.083           1.760           0.723           0.613           0.414           0.355           0.230           0.197           0.125           0.109  
75th           5.967           4.866           2.006           1.656           1.109           0.976           0.637           0.562           0.336           0.301  
95th         18.413         14.024           5.888           4.807           3.234           2.821           1.792           1.586           0.942           0.859  
99th         33.094         24.067         10.435           8.338           5.605           4.903           3.179           2.821           1.662           1.529  
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suggests the fastest trades are not associated with the greatest reduction in adverse selection 
costs. My results are consistent with liquidity providers generating higher revenues from the 
slowest traders.  
Results in Panel C of Table 4.3 show the decline in effective spreads is concentrated in the 
three fastest TI quintiles. The fastest trades experienced a decline in spreads by 8.8 basis points 
(significant at the 1% level); the second and third quintile experienced larger declines of 22.3 
(significant at the 1% level) and 33.0 (significant at the 1% level) basis points respectively. 
These results are evidence the fastest trades are not associated with the most improvement in 
liquidity. The fourth quintile shows insignificant change and the fifth quintile show a 
significant increase in spreads. These results suggest slower trades did not experience an 
improvement in liquidity. The sign of the coefficient for turnover is positive for the fastest 
trades but is increasingly negative for slower trades. This suggests, ceteris paribus, during days 
with high turnover the fastest trades are not associated with improvement in liquidity. The signs 
of the coefficients for volatility, tick-size and size remain largely unchanged with my findings 
in Section 4.4. 
Adverse-selection significantly declined across all speed quintiles and tended to decline further 
for slower trades. The fastest trades declined by 22.8 basis points (significant at the 1% level) 
and the slowest trades declined by 106.8 basis points (significant at the 1% level). This suggests 
algorithmic traders are better at avoiding adverse selection from slow traders. Realised spreads 
significantly increased across all quintiles, and tended to increase more for slower trades. The 
fastest trades increased by 14.0 basis points (significant at the 1% level) and the slowest trades 
by 176.0 basis points (significant at the 1% level).  This suggests slow traders pay relatively 
more for liquidity after the Autoquote phase-in. A higher realised spread potentially suggests 
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liquidity providers are better at anticipating mispricing and interpreting signals from order-
book imbalance. 
My finding of a simultaneous reduction in adverse selection and increase in realised spreads is 
consistent with the results in Hendershott et al. (2011). Lower adverse selection cost is 
consistent with theories that AT gives rise to more efficient quoting and a reduction in the 
probability of liquidity providers being “picked off” by slow quotes. This reduction is 
concentrated among fast trades which are more associated with AT. Hendershott et al. (2011) 
attribute the higher realised spreads to a one-off competitive advantage enjoyed by algorithmic 
traders as a result of the Autoquote phase-in and this advantage ought to decline as new entrants 
introduce competing algorithms. I show this advantage is highest when transacting against slow 
trades. The dual finding that slower trades have less price impact and pay more for liquidity 
also suggests such behaviour is more likely uninformed liquidity trades or random noise trades 
(see Kyle, 1985; Easley, Engle, O’Hara and Wu, 2008).  
Last, irrespective of trade speed, the estimated coefficient for volatility is positive with respect 
to adverse selection and negative with respect to realised spreads. In other words, during 
periods of high volatility market-makers in aggregate are subject to greater adverse selection 
costs and generate less market-making revenue. This provides empirical evidence for why 
liquidity provision may be fleeting during high volatility and suggests switching from liquidity 
provision to liquidity taking strategies can be potentially more profitable in such periods. 
4.6. Collapsing Trade Sequences 
I now discuss my method of collapsing trade sequences. Kim and Murphy (2013) argue high-
frequency order book data have high instances of order-splitting and exhibit serial correlation 
in returns. They argue collapsing sequences of consecutive buy or sell trades into one 
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transaction corrects for a downward bias in the estimation of effective spreads and show 
intraday returns more closely resemble a white noise distribution (a standard assumption in 
market microstructure models). I follow their adjustment method. 
Let s index the s-th string of consecutive buys or sells in the series of trades n. I then define the 
price and volume of a post-adjustment trade (KM trade) by: 
௦ܸ = ∑ ௡ܸ௡∈௦  ( 4.6 ) 
݌௦ = ∑ ௏𝑛௣𝑛௏ೞ௡∈௦  ( 4.7 ) 
Where ௡ܸ is the size of an individual trade at time n, ௦ܸ is the total size within a sequence of 
consecutive buy or sell trades, ݌௡ is the price of an individual trade and ݌௦ is the average price 
paid within a sequence of consecutive buy or sell trades. The timestamp of a KM trade is equal 
to the timestamp of the last individual trade in the sequence. Hence a sequence can be 
constituted by trades at different prices. This is reasonable given a trader who is fragmenting 
his orders will potentially execute small orders at multiple price levels in the limit order book 
(Kim and Murphy, 2013). 
Further, I only collapse a trade if its TI is less than an upper bound. This is to exclude collapsed 
trades containing long periods of market idleness. Kim and Murphy (2013) did not impose an 
upper bound as their object of study is the highly liquid and active S&P500 exchange traded 
fund (SPY). I impose a TI upper-bound at the 5th percentile level of each stock and Table C.2 
in Section C.4 of the Appendix presents the summary statistics.110 For the largest quintile at 
                                                 
110 In Tables C.4 and C.5 of Section C.4 in the Appendix I also show results at the 25th percentile as well as not 
imposing an upper bound on TI at all. The results show as the upper bound is relaxed Autoquote is associated 
with insignificant improvements in liquidity. However at the 1st percentile unreported results show Autoquote 
remains significantly associated with improved liquidity. 
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the 5th percentile (last row in Table C.2) the median ranked firm has an upper bound TI of 0.055 
minutes (3.32 seconds). In other words, for half of all large firms a trade is eligible to be 
collapsed only if its TI is less than 3.32 seconds. In comparison, the first row of Table C.2 
shows the median ranked firm for the smallest quintile has an upper bound of 0.333 minutes 
(20 seconds). Table C.2 also shows 95% of large firms have a TI upper bound of less than 20 
seconds (hence for 95% of large firms a trade is eligible to be collapsed only if the associated 
TI is less than 20 seconds) and in comparison 95% of small firms have a TI upper bound of 
less than 2.876 minutes. I note it is reasonable for large firms to have smaller TI upper bounds 
as the expected execution cost of order-splitting is inversely related to market liquidity 
(Bertsimas and Lo, 1998).  
4.6.1. Results 
It is argued that the increasingly common practice of splitting orders causes the measure for 
effective spreads to be biased downwards and this can be corrected for by collapsing sequences 
of consecutive buy or sell orders. Table 4.5 presents regression results following the method 
by Hendershott et al. (2011) but collapsing trade sequences at the 5th percentile of each stock’s 
TI. The results in Panel A show that the estimated change in market capitalisation-weighted 
effective spreads following the Autoquote phase-in is close to zero, declining merely -1.09 
basis points (insignificant at the 10% level). This is in comparison to the significant decline of 
9.72 basis points for uncollapsed trade data (see Panel A of Table 4.3) and suggests higher AT 
is not associated with an improvement in liquidity once trade sequences are collapsed. The 
coefficients of the control variables also remain unchanged and continue to suggest high 
effective spreads are associated with high volatility, high tick-size and low market 
capitalisation. This suggests collapsing trade sequences is uncorrelated to these control 
variables. The estimated coefficient of volatility at 0.140 (significant at the 1% level) suggests 
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a 1% increase in the daily high-low price range increases effective spreads by 0.14 basis points. 
The estimated coefficient of tick-size at 1.099 (significant at the 1% level) suggests a 100 basis 
point increase in relative tick-size increases effective spreads by 1.10 basis points. The 
estimated coefficient of the log of market capitalisation is -1.223 (significant at the 1% level) 
and suggests a 1% increase in market capitalisation decreases effective spreads by 1.223 basis 
points. Again, high turnover is associated with a significant increase in effective spread, 
however the magnitude of 0.000138 is very small and suggests on average for every $100 
million increase in daily turnover effective spreads will increase by only 1.38 basis points. The 
results for turnover are not robust across size quintiles. 
Panel B shows the change in effective spreads is insignificant across all size quintiles except 
for the smallest firms (which exhibit a significant increase in effective spreads of 126.97 basis 
points). The largest firms have an estimated coefficient corresponding to an increase in 
effective spreads of 2.66 basis points (insignificant at the 10% level) and the second quintile 
shows an average decline of 5.07 basis points but insignificant at the 10% level. This is in 
contrast to the results for uncollapsed trade data which show a significant decline of 14.8 and 
16.4 basis points for the largest and second largest quintiles respectively (see Panel B in Table 
4.3). Hence high AT is no longer associated with high liquidity after trades are collapsed. Again, 
across size quintiles high volatility, high tick size and low market capitalisation are overall 
positively correlated to higher effective spreads. Estimated coefficients for turnover are 
significant for the smallest quintile and insignificant for all other quintiles; estimated 
coefficients for volatility are positive and significant for all quintiles ranging between 0.171 to 
1.139; estimated coefficients for tick size are positive and significant for all quintiles except 
the second smallest quintile and range between -0.113 to 1.547; estimated coefficients for the 
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log of market capitalisation are negative and significant for all quintiles except the smallest 
quintile and range between -9.036 to 1.544. 
Panel C shows the finding of insignificant change in liquidity also applies to fast trades. The 
fastest quintile indicates a decline in effective spreads by 0.98 basis points (insignificant at the 
10% level) and the second fastest quintile shows an average reduction of 6.12 basis points 
(insignificant at the 10% level). In other words the fastest trades are no longer associated with 
improvement in market liquidity after Autoquote is phased-in. Only the 3rd quintile, with an 
estimated decline of 25.04 basis points, remains significant. The estimated coefficient for the 
slowest two quintiles are positive suggesting liquidity deteriorated for slow traders. I also note 
that looking at the estimated coefficients for turnover, the positive coefficient for the fastest 
trades suggest, ceteris paribus, during days with higher turnover the fastest trades are not 
associated with improvement in liquidity. In contrast, slower trades are associated with 
improved liquidity for days with high turnover. This suggest potentially only fast traders are 
shifting from liquidity provision to liquidity-taking strategies when markets are experiencing 
high turnover.  
To help explain my finding of insignificant change in liquidity I also note the two opposing 
forces acting on effective spreads whereby adverse selection costs are almost entirely offset by 
gains in realised spreads. Panel C shows liquidity providers impose higher realised spreads on 
slow traders while faster liquidity takers are associated with a smaller reduction in adverse 
selection costs. In the cross-section, adverse selection significantly declined across all speed 
quintiles, monotonically decreasing as trade speeds slowed. The estimated decline ranges
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Table 4.5: Regression Results After Collapsing Trade Sequences (at the 5th Percentile of TI) 
 
The table regresses measures of liquidity on the Hendershott et al. (2011) Autoquote dummy variable. The liquidity measure is computed by collapsing sequences of consecutive 
buy or sell orders into a single transaction. For each stock trades are only collapsed if the time interval between consecutive trades is less than the 5th percentile. Sample period 
is from 1st January 2003 to 31st July 2003. The specification is: ܮ௝,௧ = ߙ௝ + ߛ௧ + ߚଵܣܳ௝,௧ + ߛଵݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ + ߛଶݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଷݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛସ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧  + ߝ݆,ݐ where the 
dependent variable ܮ௝,௧ is measures of daily turnover-weighted liquidity in basis points: 1) half effective spreads; 2) half adverse selection; and 3) half realised spreads, ߙ௝ 
represents firm fixed effects, ߛ௧ represents day dummy variables and ܣܳ௝,௧ is a dummy variable equal to +1 for periods with Autoquote phased-in and zero otherwise. The 
remaining factors are control variables: share turnover, volatility, tick size and the log of market capitalisation. Panel A shows market capitalisation-weighted results. Panel B 
results are quintile-specific based on market capitalisation. Panel C results are quintile-specific based on time interval between trades. Standard errors are robust to general 
cross-sectional and time-series heteroscedasticity and within-group autocorrelation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Market Capitalisation Weighted 
 ܣܳ௝,௧ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ ݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ ݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧       
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)       
 -0.0109   0.000138 ***   0.140   ***    1.099   ***  - 1.223   ***  
Panel B: Quintile by Market Capitalisation 
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)   
 
 
  
1 (smallest)   1.2697  *** -  0.045   **     1.139    ***     1.547    ***     1.544    ***   
2 - 0.2067       0.006          0.809    ***   - 0.113    ***   - 9.036    ***   
3   0.1286    -  0.002          0.293    ***     0.200    ***   - 5.260    ***   
4 - 0.0507    -  0.001          0.289    ***     0.213    ***   - 4.169    ***   
5 (largest)   0.0266       0.000          0.171    ***     0.378    ***   - 2.121    ***   
Panel C: Quintile sorted by Time Between Trades 
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)   
 
 
  
1 (fastest) - 0.0098        0.000    *     0.191    ***     2.185    ***   - 1.580    ***   
2 - 0.0612    -  0.003    ***     0.402    ***     0.258    ***   - 3.142    ***   
3 - 0.2504  *** -  0.021    ***     0.625    ***     2.682    ***     0.449    ***   
4   0.0735    -  0.046    ***     1.013    ***     1.319    ***   - 2.564    ***   
5 (slowest)   1.8529  *** -  0.171    **     0.611    ***   - 0.063    ***   - 6.962    ***   
Dependent Variable: adverse selection (bps)       
1 (fastest) - 0.1646  ***     0.001    ***     0.308    ***     2.909    ***   - 0.794    ***   
2 - 0.4235  ***     0.001          0.617    ***     0.603    ***   - 1.498    ***   
3 - 0.7212  *** -  0.020    ***     0.967    ***     1.984    ***     0.934    ***   
4 - 0.7692  *** -  0.024    *     1.408    ***     0.867    ***   - 0.869    **   
5 (slowest) - 0.8450  ** -  0.098          0.934    ***   - 0.160    ***   - 5.111    ***   
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Panel C: (Continued) 
 ܣܳ௝,௧ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ ݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ ݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧ 
 
Dependent Variable: realised spreads (bps)       
1 (fastest)   0.1557  *** -  0.001    ***   - 0.116    ***   - 0.720    ***   - 0.794    ***   
2   0.3872  *** -  0.004    ***   - 0.210    ***   - 0.341    ***   - 1.646    ***   
3   0.4794  *** -  0.001        - 0.351    ***     0.700    ***   - 0.468    **   
4   0.8460  *** -  0.022    *   - 0.406    ***     0.450    ***   - 1.748    ***   
5 (slowest)   2.6915  *** -  0.074        - 0.325    **     0.096    ***   - 1.870    **   
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from 16.46 basis points (for the fastest trades) to 84.50 basis points (for the slowest trades). 
This suggests liquidity providers are better at avoiding adverse selection costs when trades are 
slower. However, compared to uncollapsed results (see Panel C in Table 4.3) estimates are 
biased downwards for all quintiles, supporting the findings of Kim and Murphy (2013). 
Estimated coefficients for collapsed (uncollapsed) trades are -0.1646 (-0.228), -0.423 (-0.643), 
-0.721 (-0.922), -0.769 (-1.173) and -0.845 (-1.068). Across TI quintiles, realised spreads also 
significantly increased across all quintiles, with a larger increase for slower trades. This 
suggests liquidity is more expensive for slower traders. The estimated increase ranges from 
15.57 basis points (for the fastest trades) to 269.15 basis points (for the slowest trades). 
Estimated coefficients for collapsed (uncollapsed) trades are 0.1567 (0.140), 0.387 (0.435), 
0.479 (0.595), 0.846 (1.055) and 2.6915 (1.760). There is no discernible bias in estimated 
realised spreads compared to the uncollapsed results (see Panel C in Table 4.3). 
Overall, my results show that despite consistent findings with Hendershott et al. (2011) on the 
sign of adverse selection and realised spreads the estimated change in effective spreads is 
insignificant once trades are collapsed. This finding is robust across large firms and fast trades. 
4.7. Conclusion 
After an adjustment is made for order-splitting I find high AT as proxied by the phase-in of 
Autoquote is associated with insignificant change in effective spreads. This suggests the 
benefits of AT may be over-estimated.  This is in contrast to the findings in Hendershott et al. 
(2011) which associate high AT with improvements in liquidity but is consistent with Kim and 
Murphy (2013) who argue measures of effective spreads may be biased downwards if order-
splitting is unaccounted for.  
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To adjust for order-splitting I collapse consecutive buy or sell orders into one transaction. I 
only collapse trades that fall among the fastest five percent of all trades – this typically means 
for the largest (smallest) firms two consecutive trades are collapsed together only if the time 
interval between the trades is less than 20 seconds (2.88 minutes). My results show the new 
estimates of adverse selection costs are higher across all speed quintiles (relative to unadjusted 
results), and increases in realised spreads essentially offset the decline of adverse selection. 
This means liquidity on average has not improved despite an overall reduction in adverse 
selection. 
My results are therefore consistent with the view that trading speeds potentially contribute less 
to market quality than previously thought and instead contribute to the shifting of liquidity 
costs from fast to slow traders (Lyle and Naughton, 2016; Gai, Yao and Ye, 2013). Hendershott 
et al. (2011) show, consistent with the advantage of additional speed, high AT is associated 
with less adverse selection “winner’s curse” costs and an increase in the competitiveness of a 
liquidity provider’s algorithm. My findings confirm this view, however across trading speeds 
I show liquidity providers are relatively better at avoiding adverse selection from slow traders 
but at the same time generate relatively higher revenues from slow traders. In other words 
slower traders incur relatively greater costs as trading speeds increase. Hence, despite similar 
results to Hendershott et al. (2011) regarding the effects of high AT on adverse selection costs 
and realised spreads, I present an overall different perspective in that effective spreads do not 
significantly change with high AT but rather shift the burden of liquidity costs from fast to 
slow traders. 
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CHAPTER 5: AVENUES FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1  Avenues for Future Research 
In this concluding chapter I briefly discuss potential avenues for future research. In the context 
of PEAD research this thesis argues sophisticated participants do not trade away mispricing 
associated with PEAD due to unhedgeable idiosyncratic risk and transaction costs. This 
suggests frictions specific to practicing traders substantially influence trading behaviour and 
investment decisions. An avenue of further research is therefore analysing the trader’s 
investment process and identifying whether, and to what degree, specific frictions affect the 
presence of financial anomalies; in the context of PEAD potential future research includes 
examining how anomaly effects are influenced by the taxation burdens of institutional and 
sophisticated traders, inventory constraints of algorithmic traders, short sales constraints and 
agency frictions between fund managers and fund investors. 
With respect to the study of AT, one specific avenue for future research is extracting insights 
from exchange order-book data that distinguish algorithmic traders and high frequency traders 
from other traders. Such data can be used to validate the findings of this thesis and also expand 
on the relation between AT and PEAD; and provide more direct evidence on whether order-
splitting biases empirical measures of liquidity. 
In relation to Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I note my proxies for AT are broad measures that rely 
heavily on both Autoquote and the AT measure by Hendershott et al. (2011). Obtaining 
exchange order-book data will aid in the classification of AT in terms of both quantity and 
146 
 
quality. For example, as a general rule AT in the form of HFT originates substantially more 
order traffic than AT in the form of non-HFT activity. Hasbrouck and Saar (2010) classify the 
former as agency algorithms (AA) and the latter as proprietary algorithms (PA) and argue AA 
is a major originator of order-splitting but PA submits substantially more orders and 
cancellations. Generally, AA orders are also slower than PA orders. My classification of AT 
however does not differentiate between these two types of algorithms and the AT proxy by 
Hendershott et al. (2011) likely over-represents HFT activity (given the measure is positively 
associated with the number of order and trade messages). Hence, interpreted conservatively, 
my findings may be more a study on the relation between HFT and PEAD rather than between 
AT and PEAD. The degree by which high frequency traders are disproportionately represented 
in my AT measure is unexplored but HFTs generally are disinclined to hold overnight positions. 
Therefore one critique of my thesis is that my results are potentially over-weighting participants 
trading away intra-day inefficiencies while PEAD is a function of both intra-day and inter-day 
stock price movements. Further research which can classify and qualify AT is therefore 
desirable. 
While my findings suggest AT may not reduce transaction costs I have not considered other 
facets of AT with respect to earnings announcements. For example, a critical area in academic 
and public policy debate extends to understanding the influence algorithmic traders have on 
market volatility and systemic risk. Earnings announcements are periods of uncertainty and 
one research avenue to address is whether the risk of illusory liquidity increases or decreases 
with AT, and under what circumstances. And does AT dampen or exacerbate volatility around 
earnings announcements and earnings surprises? For example, Chaboud et al., (2014) show AT 
often withdrawal liquidity provision during marcro news events but quickly replnish liquidity 
post-event. Hendershott et al. (2011) also note that the use of Autoquote as an instrument to 
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proxy a large increase in AT may be biased towards capturing the effects of limit orders rather 
than market orders submitted by AT (one reason is the speed advantage of Autoquote enables 
AT liquidity providers to more swiftly cancel stale limit orders and therefore incentivises 
greater liquidity provision). While Autoquote may also incentivise liquidity-taking strategies I 
do not assess liquidity makers vis-à-vis liquidity takers. The literature however suggests market 
instability is often dual functions of the withdrawal of liquidity provision and the potential 
volatility-amplification effects of swift liquidity taking. 
The proliferation of AT in the U.S. equities market is also inextricably linked to market 
fragmentation (in 2009 the exchanges NYSE and Nasdaq represented only 27.9% and 22.7% 
of total market turnover for their listed stocks (Foucault, 2012)). The U.S. equities market is 
unique in terms of having a high number of trading venues and each trading venue and ECN 
have specific trading rules and fee arrangement (some venues incentivise AT to post aggressive 
orders more so than others). I do not take into account the effects of AT on PEAD with respect 
to this multiplicity of trading venues, but generally speaking the more venues trading a security 
the more arbitrage and mispricing opportunities. Further, a debate exists as to whether 
algorithmic traders only trade on trade and quote information provided by these trading venues 
or do they also incorporate public information that has yet to be impounded into prices into 
their investment decision. One specific claim that I make is that AT potentially improves price 
discovery by extracting signals that predict earnings momentum (i.e. the autocorrelation of 
announcement news). The PEAD anomaly relates to many areas of these concerns and future 
research on the relation between AT and the attenuation of market anomalies have the potential 
to shed light on these questions.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
This thesis, through three essays, assesses the relation between one of the most recent 
developments in financial markets with one of the oldest and most-studied financial anomalies. 
The first essay (Chapter 2) considers whether PEAD persists at the turn of the century by testing 
PEAD against a range of previously documented explanatory factors. The chapter addresses 
the extent anomalous PEAD effects remain unexplained and, given the relatively new test 
sample period, serves as an out-of-sample examination. My results show a portion of the PEAD 
anomaly is associated with low investor sophistication, high arbitrage risk and high transaction 
costs. One explanation for PEAD is therefore that investors with low sophistication 
systematically under-react to earnings surprises and sophisticated traders cannot arbitrage fully 
the mispricing due to trading risks (such as the high idiosyncratic risk that must be borne by 
undiversified or only partially diversified investors) and high transaction costs. My analysis 
augments standard event study methods to control for risk-mismeasurement bias as traditional 
event study models generally assume a constant firm beta (which produces model estimates 
unconditional to earnings surprise). Conditional on earnings surprise, I find average 60-day 
PEAD effects remains statistically and economically significant at approximately 4%; and my 
results show that after jointly controlling for other explanations PEAD nevertheless remains 
statistically significant at just under 2%.  
In the second essay (Chapter 3) I conjecture algorithmic traders ought to attenuate PEAD 
effects given studies suggest AT is associated with lower bid-ask spreads, improved price 
efficiency and sophisticated trading. It therefore follows that AT and PEAD are potentially 
inversely related. I also argue if sophisticated algorithmic traders are better at extracting trading 
signals from earnings information then price discovery around earnings announcements should 
improve. I begin my analysis by first documenting the attenuation of PEAD starting in the early 
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2000s and find the decline is concentrated among NYSE-listed firms. I then present three 
explanations for the decline: 1) the phase-in of decimalisation; 2) the structural improvement 
in earnings quality in the early 2000s; and 3) the substantial increase in AT activity on the 
NYSE after May 2003. I then implement matched sampling test procedures to control for 
decimalisation and shifts in earnings quality and test whether a difference in PEAD across 
matched pairs can be explained by differences in AT; however my results show an insignificant 
relation. In the second part of my analysis I construct a proxy for price discovery as a function 
of PEAD and show price discovery significantly improves.  I argue AT contributes to price 
discovery as a result of sophisticated investors extracting trading signals from earnings 
information. 
In the third and final essay (Chapter 4) I assess whether AT significantly improves market 
liquidity once an adjustment is made for the potential under-estimation of effective spreads. 
One aspect of AT is that it encourages order-splitting and large orders are now camouflaged 
into sequences of small orders which may cause effective spreads to be under-estimated. I treat 
sequences of consecutive buy or sell orders as a single transaction and revisit the study by 
Hendershott et al. (2011) on the relation between AT and liquidity measures (the study finds 
improvements in liquidity are associated with the phasing-in of Autoquote); I find AT 
contributes substantially less to market quality than previously documented and effective 
spreads do not decline significantly. My results are consistent with studies demonstrating that 
order-splitting may cause the under-estimation of price impact and also demonstrates that fast 
liquidity providers are relatively better at avoiding adverse selection from slow traders (and the 
costs of liquidity are relatively higher for slow traders). This suggests algorithmic traders are 
opportunistic, taking advantage of their speed to mitigate price impact while imposing higher 
adverse selection costs on slower traders.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1. PEAD and the Probability of Informed Trading 
I follow Easley, Prado and O’Hara (2012) and compute the volume-synchronised probability 
of informed trading (VPIN) as a proxy for the probability of informed trading. This method is 
advanced by Easley et al. (2012) over the original PIN estimation method (Easley, Kiefer, 
O’Hara and Paperman, 1996) because of technical difficulties in implementing maximum 
likelihood estimation over large quantities of trade and quote data (such as data generated by 
high-frequency trading). Briefly, VPIN can be defined by the following111: 
ܸܲܫܰ = ∑ |௏𝑛𝑆−௏𝑛𝐵|𝑁𝑛=భ ௡௏  (A.1) ௡ܸ஻ = ∑ ?ܸ?௕ሺ௡ሻ𝑧=௕ሺ௡−ଵሻ+ଵ ܼ ቀ௉𝑧−௉𝑧−భ𝜎∆ು ቁ (A.2) ௡ܸௌ = ܸ − ௡ܸ஻  (A.3) 
Where for the zth trade in the nth bucket, ?ܸ? is the volume traded, ܼሺ∙ሻ represents the cumulative 
normal distribution and ∆ܲ = ?ܲ? −  ?ܲ?−ଵ is price change between the two successive trades. 
The intuition is that the probability of informed trading can be computed based on traded 
volume classification in probabilistic terms. Following Equation A.1 I compute, for each firm’s 
earnings announcement, the average daily VPIN across the 40 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement. Below in Table A.1 I show results based on N = 50. Following Easley et al. 
(2012) I impose the constraint that, for each firm i and each trading day t, each of the 50 buckets 
have equal traded volume; any excess volume per trade is assigned to the next sequential bucket.  
My results in Table A.1 that, with the exception of small cap firms, PEAD decreases with 
respect to VPIN. For example, across large firms estimated PEAD is 4.67% (significant at the 
                                                 
111 A full discussion of the details to the method is found in Easley et al. (2012). 
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5% level) for low VPIN and declines to 1.49% (significant at the 5% level) for high VPIN. 
Hence, consistent with Vega (2004), a higher probability of informed trading reduces 
uncertainties surrounding ES and therefore attenuates PEAD. For robustness in unpublished 
results I also implement N = 200 and the results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
 
 
 
Table A.1: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across VPIN Portfolios 
 
I test for the difference of estimated alphas between good and bad news across each tercile group for VPIN. 
Rankings of low, mid, and high are based on quarterly within-quarter sort at the 33rd and 67th percentile. Following 
Fama and Macbeth (1973) I run quarterly regressions for the top and bottom ES quintiles within each tercile. I 
then take the difference in estimated alpha between the top and bottom quintiles and test whether the mean is 
significantly different from zero. The factors are market capitalisation (Mcapi,q) and the volume-synchronised 
probability of informed trading (VPINi,q). Number of firm-quarter observations: 54,159. 
 
    Good News minus Bad News 
Mcapi,q  VPINi,q 3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
low  
low 0.0732 *** 0.0630 *** 
mid 0.0731 *** 0.0187   
high 0.1121 *** 0.0914 * 
mid 
low 0.0554 *** 0.0369 ** 
mid 0.0681 *** 0.0162   
high 0.0704 *** 0.0179   
high 
low 0.0471 *** 0.0467 ** 
mid 0.0509 *** 0.0120   
high 0.0560 *** 0.0149 ** 
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A.2. Variable Construction 
 
A.2.1. Description of Explanatory Variables 
The variable name and descriptions are outlined below in Table A.2. Variables are calculated 
based on each stock i and quarter q. 
Table A.2: Description of Explanatory Variables 
 
The table shows the description and data source of the explanatory variables. The variables are institutional 
ownership (Instii,q); number of announcements released on same day (Distract_Ui,q); number of analysts issuing 
forecasts within the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 
trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); 
average of Amihud illiquidity measured across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Illiqi,q); average 
of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Spreadi,q); stock price at the 
end of quarter, q (Pricei,q); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 22 
trading days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); market capitalisation (Mcapi,q); book-to-market ratio 
(BMi,q); BHAR across the past 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Momi,q). BHAR are calculated 
using 5x5 size quintile and BM quintile matched portfolios. Data source refers to datasets obtained from the 
Wharton Research Data Service except FF which refers to the Fama-French factors obtained from Professor 
Kenneth French’s website. 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
Instii,q  Fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions filing Form for the 
quarter prior to the earnings announcement (% multiplied by 0.01).  
CDA 
Spectrum  
Distracti,q  Number of earnings announcements for each trading day.  I/B/E/S  
Analysti,q  Number of analysts reporting quarterly earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S in 
the 90 days prior to earnings announcement. Only the most recent forecast 
per unique analyst is kept.  
I/B/E/S  
Volatilityi,q  Standard deviation of daily abnormal returns across 40 days prior to 
earnings announcement.   
CRSP, FF  
ArbRiski,q Residual variance from market model regression (using returns from the 
S&P 500 index (dividends included)) estimated over 48 months ending 1 
month prior to earnings announcement.  
CRSP  
ExpRiski,q  Explained variance from market model regression (using returns from the 
S&P 500 index (dividends included)) estimated over 48 months ending 1 
month prior to earnings announcement. 
CRSP 
Spreadi,q  The average of bid-ask spread at close across past 40 trading days prior 
to earnings announcement (% multiplied by 0.01). 
CRSP 
Illiquidityi,q  Illiquidity measure following Amihud (2002). The average of absolute 
value of daily return divided by the daily dollar share turnover. Measured 
across the 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement. 
CRSP 
Pricei,q  Stock price at the end of the announcement quarter (adjusted for stock 
splits)  
Compustat 
Turn,q  Average daily share turnover between 271 and 22 trading days prior to 
earnings announcement ($million). 
CRSP 
Mcapi,q  Number of shares outstanding multiplied by price as measured in the most 
recent June ($million).  
Compustat  
BMi,q  Book-to-market ratio as measured in the most recent December.  Compustat 
Momi,q  BHAR across the 40 days prior to earnings announcement.  CRSP, FF 
   
171 
 
A.2.2. Investor Sophistication (Instii,q) 
Investor sophistication is proxied by the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions. To 
calculate percentage of institutional ownership I follow Campbell et al. (2009) and obtain a 
firm’s quarterly 13F filings.112 The 13F filing is required by all institutions in the US with 
greater than $100 million of securities under discretionary management regardless of whether 
they are regulated by the SEC. All holdings greater than 10 000 shares or larger than $200,000 
are disclosed. For each firm-CUSIP and date I sum up the shares held by all institutions to 
arrive at the total institutional ownership by the end of quarter. I obtain for each firm-quarter 
the total institutional ownership from the 13F filings and divide by the firm market 
capitalization calculated from the CRSP-Compustat merged database by multiplying the total 
shares outstanding with the stock price (both adjusted for stock splits). I follow Campbell et al. 
(2009) and remove any firm-quarter observation where the level of institutional ownership as 
a percentage of shares outstanding is greater than 100%. 
A.2.3. Analyst Following (Analysti,q)  
When dealing with analyst forecast data, I note that analysts may release multiple forecasts for 
quarterly earnings and therefore I exclusively select the latest forecast for each analyst per firm-
quarter per firm from I/B/E/S. I remove any forecasts more than 90 calendar days old. 
A.2.4. Arbitrage Risk (ArbRiski,q) and Hedgeable Risk (ExpRiski,q ) 
Arbitrage risk is defined as the idiosyncratic portion of a stock’s volatility that arbitrageurs 
cannot diversify away by holding offsetting positions in index funds. The implicit assumption 
is that arbitrageurs hold large, but few, positions at any one time and therefore are not 
diversified investors. 
                                                 
112 Obtained from WRDS. 
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Arbitrage risk is computed by the method of Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) which runs a 
regression, per firm-quarter observation, of risk-free rate adjusted return on the risk-free rate 
adjusted return of the S&P 500. The residual variance of the regression proxies arbitrage risk 
while the explained variables proxy the hedgeable risk. My regression is estimated over 48 
months and ends 1 month prior to the earnings announcement for each firm-quarter 
observation.  
A.2.5. Illiquidity (Illiquidityi,q) and Transaction Cost (Spreadi,q) 
The illiquidity measure follows Amihud (2002) and is calculated by taking the daily absolute 
return multiplied by 1 million divided by the daily turnover. For proxy for transaction cost I 
follow Vega (2006) and take the average of the closing spread from 41 trading days to 2 trading 
days before earnings announcements.  
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A.3. Literature Review of Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
The literature show analysts forecasts can both under- and over-react (Debondt and Thaler, 
1990; Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992). Analysts are subject to selection bias as they tend to 
cover firms that have higher voluntary disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 2013), less 
informational opacity (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2004); fewer business segments; and 
lower complexity (Bhushan, 1989; Clement, 1999). Second, the number of analysts following 
is also correlated with firm size while forecast informativeness is negatively correlated with 
the cost of information processing (Frankel, Kothari and Weber, 2006). The quality of analyst 
forecasts varies too. For example, prestigious brokerage houses with more resources tend to 
attract higher skilled employees (Hong and Kubik, 2003) and therefore analysts from 
prestigious institutions tend to issue more accurate forecasts (Stickel, 1992; Clement, 1999). 
Analyst experience is also correlated with smaller forecast error (Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 
1997 and 2003; Clement, 1999). 
Firms are known to conduct earnings management to influence analyst forecast error 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). Analyst forecasts and firm earnings are also correlated as 
analysts potentially exert pressure on managers to meet forecast expectations; or management 
may restrict access if analysts do not cooperate. Optimistic forecasts generate more clientele in 
the short term while more accurate forecasts generate higher reputation over the long run. 
Jackson (2005) shows analysts optimise across these conflicting interests. Hong and Kubick 
(2003) show brokerage houses reward optimistic analysts and are less likely to issue 
downgrades on securities that are held by their clients or have underwriting arrangements 
(Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 2000; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999). 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) argue analysts under-react to negative earnings but over-react to 
positive news; and hence analysts are overall positively biased (Lys and Sohn, 1990; Brown, 
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1993). I note analysts also issue forecasts in the context of career advancement and 
trade/commission generation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Laster, Bennet and Geoum, 1996, 
Jackson 2005).  
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A.4. Cross-Section of PEAD Across Factor Quintiles 
 
This section shows a list of tables that serve as robustness tests to Table 2.4. I group my 
observations into 5x5 ES quintile by factor quintile portfolios and take the average of quarterly 
PEAD for each of the 25 portfolios. I compute the mean rather than estimate alpha returns 
across factor quintiles for each ES quintile given univariate test statistic on BHAR are well 
specified (Barber and Lyon, 1997)113. All results remain consistent with Table 2.4. For ease of 
reading I also plot cross-sectional means of PEAD returns for each factor quintile in Section 
A.5 of the Appendix. Overall the evidence suggests weaker PEAD effects for firms 
characterized by low investor sophistication, high structural uncertainty, and high limits of 
arbitrage.  
                                                 
113 Barber and Lyon (1997) empirically demonstrate that common methods for calculating abnormal stock returns 
are mis-specified and that correcting buy-and-hold returns by matching sample firms to control firms based on 
similar size and book-to-market ratios yields well-specified test statistics.  
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Table A.3: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Instii,q. 
 
Each table represents PEAD across quintile factor groups. I compute PEAD as the difference between the mean of BHAR in the top ES quintile minus the mean of the BHAR 
for the worst ES quintile. BHAR is constructed by adjusting returns by 5x5 size quintile and BM quintile portfolio. ES breakpoints are computed in the previous quarter. Factor 
quintile breakpoints are computed based on within-quarter sort. The results below represent the average of the quarterly means. The variables are earnings surprise (ESi,q); 
institutional ownership (Instii,q); number of announcements released on same day (Distract_Ui,q); number of analysts issuing forecasts within the 90 days prior to the earnings 
announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); 
average of Amihud illiquidity measured across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Illiqi,q); average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to 
earnings announcement (Spreadi,q); stock price at the end of quarter, q (Price); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 22 trading 
days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); market capitalisation (Mcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across the past 40 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement (Momi,q). Period: July 1995 to June 2011. ***, **, * represent t-test significance level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Instii,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -  0.026   ***  -  0.042   ***          
2 -  0.013   ***  -  0.014   ***      
3    0.003   **  -  0.009   *      
4    0.012   ***  -  0.005          
5    0.026   ***     0.013   *  0.052   ***  0.052   ***  
2 
1 -  0.029   ***  -  0.021   **      
2 -  0.013   ***  -  0.004          
3    0.002   *  -  0.004          
4    0.014   ***     0.007          
5    0.031   ***     0.020   ***  0.060   ***  0.042   ***  
3 
1 -  0.029   ***  -  0.009            
2 -  0.016   ***  -  0.000          
3    0.001      -  0.001          
4    0.018   ***     0.006          
5    0.039   ***     0.022   ***  0.068   ***  0.031   ***  
4 
1 -  0.035   ***  -  0.007          
2 -  0.020   ***  -  0.007          
3    0.001      -  0.004          
4    0.019   ***     0.001          
5    0.034   ***     0.021   ***  0.069   ***  0.028   ***  
177 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Instii,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
5 
1 -  0.032   ***     0.001          
2 -  0.017   ***  -  0.009   *      
3    0.004   ***  -  0.004          
4    0.022   ***     0.003          
5    0.037   ***     0.005      0.069   ***  0.004      
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Table A.4: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Distract_Ui,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Distract_Ui,q 
ES 
Quintile 
Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -  0.034   ***  -  0.030   ***          
2 -  0.017   ***  -  0.008           
3    0.003   **  -  0.008   *       
4    0.020   ***     0.001           
5    0.038   ***     0.005      0.072   ***  0.035   ***  
2 
1 -  0.032   ***  -  0.017   *      
2 -  0.013   ***  -  0.005          
3    0.004   ***  -  0.007          
4    0.018   ***  -  0.000          
5    0.035   ***     0.015   ***  0.066   ***  0.032   ***  
3 
1 -  0.029   ***  -  0.004            
2 -  0.016   ***  -  0.011   **      
3    0.003   ***  -  0.004          
4    0.018   ***     0.003          
5    0.032   ***     0.022   ***  0.061   ***  0.024   **  
4 
1 -  0.028   ***  -  0.012   *      
2 -  0.015   ***  -  0.002          
3    0.001         0.001          
4    0.015   ***     0.007   *      
5    0.033   ***     0.023   ***  0.061   ***  0.038   ***  
5 
1 -  0.029   ***  -  0.018   ***      
2 -  0.016   ***  -  0.005          
3    0.001      -  0.002          
4    0.016   ***     0.007          
5    0.030   ***     0.013   ***  0.060   ***  0.032   ***  
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Table A.5: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Analysti,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Analysti,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.029   ***  -     0.030   ***          
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.008           
3       0.003   **  -     0.006          
4       0.015   ***  -     0.004          
5       0.034   ***        0.022   ***  0.062   ***  0.052   ***  
2 
1 -     0.034   ***  -     0.031   ***      
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.013   *      
3       0.001      -     0.006          
4       0.020   ***        0.001          
5       0.036   ***        0.009   *  0.072   ***  0.040   ***  
3 
1 -     0.032   ***  -     0.010            
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.003          
3       0.001      -     0.004          
4       0.017   ***        0.005          
5       0.036   ***        0.022   ***  0.068   ***  0.031   **  
4 
1 -     0.035   ***  -     0.004          
2 -     0.017   ***  -     0.007          
3       0.004   **  -     0.003          
4       0.018   ***  -     0.001          
5       0.034   ***        0.015   **  0.069   ***  0.018   **  
5 
1 -     0.024   ***  -     0.001          
2 -     0.014   ***  -     0.005          
3       0.002      -     0.004          
4       0.015   ***        0.008          
5       0.029   ***        0.012   **  0.053   ***  0.016   **  
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Table A.6: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Volatilityi,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Volatilityi,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.023   ***  -     0.010   *          
2 -     0.014   ***  -     0.004           
3       0.002   ***  -     0.004          
4       0.015   ***        0.005          
5       0.023   ***        0.011   **  0.047   ***  0.024   ***  
2 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.021   ***      
2 -     0.014   ***  -     0.001          
3       0.002   **  -     0.002          
4       0.015   ***        0.002          
5       0.034   ***        0.014   ***  0.065   ***  0.036   ***  
3 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.005            
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.009   *      
3       0.002   *  -     0.005          
4       0.019   ***        0.005          
5       0.036   ***        0.015   **  0.066   ***  0.020   *  
4 
1 -     0.033   ***  -     0.013          
2 -     0.017   ***  -     0.011   *      
3       0.000      -     0.005          
4       0.019   ***        0.001          
5       0.039   ***        0.016   **  0.071   ***  0.030   ***  
5 
1 -     0.034   ***  -     0.027          
2 -     0.018   ***  -     0.008          
3       0.004   *  -     0.006          
4       0.016   ***        0.000          
5       0.035   ***        0.025   **  0.069   ***  0.052   ***  
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Table A.7: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - ArbRiski,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
ArbRiski,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.019   ***  -     0.009   *          
2 -     0.011   ***  -     0.003           
3       0.002   *  -     0.002           
4       0.012   ***        0.003           
5       0.022   ***        0.010   *        0.041   ***        0.022   ***  
2 
1 -     0.029   ***  -     0.017   ***       
2 -     0.015   ***  -     0.006           
3       0.003   ***  -     0.002           
4       0.017   ***        0.007   *       
5       0.031   ***        0.008   *        0.061   ***        0.026   ***  
3 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.012              
2 -     0.015   ***  -     0.009   *       
3       0.002   *  -     0.003           
4       0.017   ***        0.001           
5       0.034   ***        0.013   *        0.064   ***        0.025   **  
4 
1 -     0.038   ***  -     0.018   *       
2 -     0.019   ***  -     0.010           
3       0.005   ***  -     0.011   ***       
4       0.022   ***        0.005           
5       0.040   ***        0.021   ***        0.078   ***        0.039   ***  
5 
1 -     0.034   ***  -     0.021           
2 -     0.017   ***  -     0.005           
3 -     0.002      -     0.003           
4       0.017   ***  -     0.004           
5       0.040   ***        0.028   ***        0.074   ***        0.049   ***  
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Table A.8: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - ExpRiski,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
ExpRiski,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.026   ***  -     0.030   ***          
2 -     0.012   ***  -     0.011   **       
3       0.002   *  -     0.009           
4       0.014   ***  -     0.002           
5       0.030   ***        0.009            0.056   ***        0.041   ***  
2 
1 -     0.026   ***  -     0.026   ***       
2 -     0.013   ***  -     0.008           
3       0.004   **  -     0.001           
4       0.016   ***  -     0.001           
5       0.028   ***        0.011   **        0.054   ***        0.038   ***  
3 
1 -     0.028   ***  -     0.012              
2 -     0.019   ***  -     0.004           
3       0.003   ***  -     0.005           
4       0.017   ***        0.001           
5       0.035   ***        0.017   **        0.062   ***        0.028   **  
4 
1 -     0.035   ***  -     0.014           
2 -     0.015   ***  -     0.009           
3       0.003   **  -     0.007   *       
4       0.020   ***        0.003           
5       0.038   ***        0.019   **        0.074   ***        0.033   ***  
5 
1 -     0.035   ***        0.005           
2 -     0.021   ***  -     0.003           
3 -     0.002            0.001           
4       0.019   ***        0.011           
5       0.037   ***        0.026   **        0.072   ***        0.021      
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Table A.9: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Spreadi,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Spreadi,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.024   ***  -     0.006              
2 -     0.017   ***  -     0.013   ***       
3       0.002   *  -     0.002           
4       0.017   ***  -     0.001           
5       0.028   ***        0.007   *        0.052   ***        0.016   ***  
2 
1 -     0.032   ***  -     0.009   *       
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.004           
3       0.002   *  -     0.007   *       
4       0.015   ***        0.007   *       
5       0.033   ***        0.014   ***        0.065   ***        0.023   ***  
3 
1 -     0.032   ***  -     0.012              
2 -     0.018   ***        0.000           
3       0.002      -     0.007   **       
4       0.019   ***        0.007           
5       0.036   ***        0.012   **        0.068   ***        0.024   **  
4 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.013           
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.005           
3       0.004   ***        0.001           
4       0.017   ***  -     0.004           
5       0.037   ***        0.022   ***        0.067   ***        0.035   ***  
5 
1 -     0.032   ***  -     0.036   **       
2 -     0.013   ***  -     0.011   *       
3       0.000      -     0.005           
4       0.017   ***        0.003           
5       0.033   ***        0.026   **        0.065   ***        0.062   ***  
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Table A.10: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Illiqi,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Illiqi,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -       0.02   ***  -       0.01   **       
2 -       0.01   ***  -       0.01           
3         0.00   *  -       0.01           
4         0.01   ***          0.00           
5         0.02   ***          0.00              0.05   ***          0.01   **  
2 
1 -       0.03   ***  -       0.00           
2 -       0.02   ***  -       0.00           
3         0.00      -       0.00           
4         0.02   ***          0.01   *       
5         0.04   ***          0.02   ***          0.06   ***          0.02   ***  
3 
1 -       0.03   ***          0.00              
2 -       0.02   ***  -       0.01   *       
3         0.00   **  -       0.01           
4         0.02   ***  -       0.00           
5         0.03   ***          0.02   ***          0.07   ***          0.01      
4 
1 -       0.04   ***  -       0.02   **       
2 -       0.01   ***  -       0.01           
3         0.00              0.00           
4         0.02   ***          0.00           
5         0.04   ***          0.02   ***          0.07   ***          0.05   ***  
5 
1 -       0.03   ***  -       0.05   ***       
2 -       0.01   ***  -       0.01   *       
3         0.00      -       0.01   *       
4         0.02   ***  -       0.00           
5         0.04   ***          0.02   **          0.06   ***          0.07   ***  
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Table A.11: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Pricei,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Pricei,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.032   ***  -     0.037   **          
2 -     0.013   ***  -     0.009           
3 -     0.001            0.000           
4       0.015   ***        0.004           
5       0.032   ***        0.026   *        0.062   ***        0.063   ***  
2 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.015           
2 -     0.017   ***  -     0.008           
3       0.004   ***  -     0.004           
4       0.017   ***  -     0.006           
5       0.039   ***        0.013   **        0.069   ***        0.028   **  
3 
1 -     0.032   ***  -     0.006              
2 -     0.016   ***        0.001           
3       0.002   **  -     0.004           
4       0.018   ***        0.010   **       
5       0.038   ***        0.014   ***        0.070   ***        0.020   **  
4 
1 -     0.028   ***  -     0.010   *       
2 -     0.015   ***  -     0.006           
3       0.003   ***  -     0.007           
4       0.020   ***        0.003           
5       0.030   ***        0.017   ***        0.058   ***        0.027   ***  
5 
1 -     0.028   ***  -     0.013   ***       
2 -     0.018   ***  -     0.011   ***       
3       0.003   **  -     0.007           
4       0.016   ***        0.002           
5       0.028   ***        0.012   ***        0.056   ***        0.025   ***  
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Table A.12: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Turni,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Turni,q 
ES 
Quintile 
Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.027   ***  -     0.052   ***          
2 -     0.014   ***  -     0.011   **       
3       0.001      -     0.009           
4       0.017   ***  -     0.004           
5       0.037   ***        0.018   **        0.062   ***        0.068   ***  
2 
1 -     0.034   ***  -     0.015           
2 -     0.014   ***  -     0.008           
3       0.002            0.000           
4       0.018   ***        0.007   *       
5       0.037   ***        0.029   ***        0.071   ***        0.043   ***  
3 
1 -     0.034   ***  -     0.007              
2 -     0.019   ***  -     0.005           
3       0.002   **  -     0.005           
4       0.018   ***        0.003           
5       0.035   ***        0.013   **        0.069   ***        0.020   **  
4 
1 -     0.030   ***        0.001           
2 -     0.017   ***  -     0.005           
3       0.002   *  -     0.001           
4       0.017   ***  -     0.001           
5       0.031   ***        0.015   ***        0.061   ***        0.014   **  
5 
1 -     0.025   ***  -     0.007           
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.006           
3       0.002   *  -     0.007   *       
4       0.015   ***        0.007           
5       0.029   ***        0.006            0.053   ***        0.013   *  
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Table A.13: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Mcapi,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Mcapi,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.054   ***          
2 -     0.014   ***  -     0.008           
3 -     0.000      -     0.003           
4       0.018   ***  -     0.003           
5       0.035   ***        0.017   *        0.063   ***        0.069   ***  
2 
1 -     0.038   ***  -     0.008           
2 -     0.017   ***  -     0.005           
3       0.006   ***  -     0.005           
4       0.018   ***  -     0.000           
5       0.041   ***        0.024   ***        0.079   ***        0.032   ***  
3 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.007              
2 -     0.017   ***  -     0.005           
3       0.001      -     0.006           
4       0.020   ***        0.004           
5       0.034   ***        0.012   **        0.064   ***        0.019   *  
4 
1 -     0.029   ***  -     0.009   *       
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.008   **       
3       0.001      -     0.003           
4       0.016   ***        0.005           
5       0.034   ***        0.018   ***        0.063   ***        0.027   ***  
5 
1 -     0.024   ***  -     0.002           
2 -     0.016   ***  -     0.006   *       
3       0.002      -     0.005           
4       0.013   ***        0.008   *       
5       0.023   ***        0.010            0.047   ***        0.011   *  
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Table A.14: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - BMi,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
BMi,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.036   ***  -     0.009              
2 -     0.024   ***  -     0.011   **       
3       0.003   **  -     0.005           
4       0.025   ***        0.004           
5       0.042   ***        0.010            0.076   ***        0.022   ***  
2 
1 -     0.035   ***  -     0.015   **       
2 -     0.020   ***  -     0.005           
3       0.002   *  -     0.006           
4       0.020   ***        0.008   **       
5       0.036   ***        0.013   **        0.071   ***        0.028   ***  
3 
1 -     0.026   ***  -     0.018   **          
2 -     0.015   ***  -     0.008           
3       0.001      -     0.003           
4       0.017   ***        0.002           
5       0.030   ***        0.015   ***        0.056   ***        0.033   ***  
4 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.012           
2 -     0.009   ***  -     0.004           
3       0.004   ***  -     0.004           
4       0.015   ***  -     0.004           
5       0.032   ***        0.025   ***        0.062   ***        0.037   ***  
5 
1 -     0.026   ***  -     0.021           
2 -     0.012   ***  -     0.007           
3 -     0.000      -     0.003           
4       0.009   ***        0.002           
5       0.029   ***        0.017   *        0.055   ***        0.038   ***  
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Table A.15: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Momi,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Momi,q ES Quintile Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.031   ***  -     0.016              
2 -     0.012   ***  -     0.002           
3       0.008   ***  -     0.001           
4       0.026   ***        0.004           
5       0.041   ***        0.016            0.070   ***        0.030   **  
2 
1 -     0.028   ***  -     0.013           
2 -     0.013   ***  -     0.001           
3       0.005   ***  -     0.001           
4       0.019   ***        0.003           
5       0.035   ***        0.020   ***        0.064   ***        0.034   ***  
3 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.013   *          
2 -     0.015   ***  -     0.005           
3       0.002   **  -     0.004           
4       0.017   ***        0.007   *       
5       0.034   ***        0.011   **        0.063   ***        0.024   ***  
4 
1 -     0.030   ***  -     0.020   ***       
2 -     0.020   ***  -     0.011   *       
3 -     0.001      -     0.006           
4       0.015   ***        0.002           
5       0.030   ***        0.015   **        0.060   ***        0.035   ***  
5 
1 -     0.033   ***  -     0.016   **       
2 -     0.020   ***  -     0.015   ***       
3 -     0.004   ***  -     0.008   *       
4       0.009   ***  -     0.004           
5       0.027   ***        0.019   ***        0.060   ***        0.035   ***  
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Table A.16: Computed Good-minus-Bad 60-day PEAD and 3-day Response across Factor Quintiles and across ES Quintiles - Dispersioni,q. 
 
See Table A.3 for explanation. 
 
Note: Only firm-quarter announcements with less than three analyst forecasts are removed. Number of observations: 46,336. 
 
    3-day Response 60-day PEAD 
Good News (ES Quintile 5) minus  
Bad News (ES Quintile 1) 
Dispersioni,q 
ES 
Quintile 
Mean of Quarterly Average Mean of Quarterly Average 3-day Response  60-day PEAD  
1 
1 -     0.041   ***  -     0.012              
2 -     0.023   ***  -     0.012   **       
3       0.002      -     0.002           
4       0.023   ***        0.007           
5       0.040   ***        0.027   ***        0.082   ***        0.039   ***  
2 
1 -     0.038   ***        0.002           
2 -     0.019   ***  -     0.011   **       
3       0.002   **  -     0.006           
4       0.024   ***        0.008   *       
5       0.038   ***        0.020   ***        0.076   ***        0.018      
3 
1 -     0.029   ***  -     0.004              
2 -     0.015   ***  -     0.001           
3       0.004   ***  -     0.004           
4       0.017   ***        0.001           
5       0.033   ***        0.005            0.062   ***        0.010      
4 
1 -     0.023   ***  -     0.005           
2 -     0.012   ***  -     0.007           
3       0.003   **  -     0.008   **       
4       0.015   ***  -     0.003           
5       0.031   ***        0.016   ***        0.055   ***        0.021   ***  
5 
1 -     0.021   ***  -     0.017   *       
2 -     0.011   ***        0.003           
3       0.000      -     0.000           
4       0.010   ***        0.006           
5       0.023   ***        0.009            0.044   ***        0.026   ***  
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A.5. Plot of PEAD Across Factor Portfolios 
I plot the mean of PEAD returns for each factor quintile as represented in Section A.4. Factors 
that proxy behavioural explanations are: 1) the percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors, proxying investor sophistication; 2) the number of earnings announcements per 
trading day, proxying investor distraction. Factors that proxy structural uncertainty 
explanations are: 1) the number of analyst forecasts, proxying information diffusion; 2) the 
volatility of abnormal returns, proxying uncertainty; and 3) the book-to-market ratio, proxying 
informational opacity. Factors that proxy limits of arbitrage explanations are: 1) the residual 
variance from the stock’s one-factor market model regression, proxying unhedgeable risk; 2) 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor, proxying stock illiquidity; 3) the average bid-ask spread 
at close, proxying direct transaction cost; 4) the end-of-quarter stock price proxying trading 
commissions; 5) the average daily dollar volume of shares traded, proxying indirect trading 
costs and order processing costs. I also include 1) the explained variance from the stock’s 
market model regression, proxying hedgeable risk;114 2) the market capitalisation, proxying 
size effects; and 3) the cumulative abnormal return for the 40 days prior to earnings 
announcement, proxying momentum effects.115 
                                                 
114 Inclusion of this variable follows Mendenhall (2004), Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and Chordia et al. (2009). 
An insignificant relationship with hedgeable risk affirms PEAD is not compensation for risks that can be hedged 
by the market portfolio. 
115 In Section A.1 of the Appendix I also consider 1) Volume-Synchronised Probability of Informed Trading 
(VPIN) as a proxy for the level of informed trading (Vega, 2006). The analysis of this factor results in a substantial 
loss of observations and therefore I consider it separately. 
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Figure A.1: Plot of PEAD across Factor Quintiles. 
Each plot represents PEAD across factor quintile groups. I compute PEAD as the difference between the mean of BHAR in the top ES quintile minus the mean of the BHAR 
for the worst ES quintile. BHAR is constructed by adjusting returns by 5x5 size quintile and BM quintile portfolio. ES breakpoints are computed in the previous quarter. Factor 
quintile breakpoints are computed based on within-quarter sort. The results below represent the average of the quarterly means. The variables are earnings surprise (ESi,q); 
institutional ownership (Instii,q); number of announcements released on same day (Distract_Ui,q); number of analysts issuing forecasts within the 90 days prior to the earnings 
announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); 
average of Amihud illiquidity measured across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Illiqi,q); average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to 
earnings announcement (Spreadi,q); stock price at the end of quarter, q (Price); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 22 trading 
days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); market capitalisation (Mcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across the past 40 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement (Momi,q). Period: July 1995 to June 2011.  
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A.6. Correlation Matrix of Ranked Explanatory Factors 
 
Table A.5: Full Sample Correlation Matrix of Scaled Factors Sorted Within-Quarter 
 
The below values are computed correlation coefficients for variables in the period July 1995 to June 2011. All variables except PEADi,q and 3DRi,q  are ranked. Therefore ESi,q 
is ranked to between 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. Other explanatory factors are sorted within-quarter to a decile rank of between 1 and 10. The variables are, across firm i and in quarter q, 
earnings surprise (ESi,q); institutional ownership (Instii,q); the decile rank based on number of announcements released on same day (Distracti,q); number of analysts issuing 
forecasts within the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (Analysti,q); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Volatilityi,q); 
arbitrage risk (ArbRiski,q); hedgeable risk (ExpRiski,q); the logarithm of average Amihud illiquidity measured across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (LogIlliqi,q); 
the logarithm of average of quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (LogSpreadi,q); stock price at the end of quarter, q (Pricei,q); average 
daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Turni,q); the logarithm of market capitalisation 
(LogMcapi,q); book-to-market ratio (BMi,q); BHAR across the past 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (Momi,q); BHAR from the 2nd to the 61st trading day after 
earnings announcement (PEADi,q); and BHAR from the 1st trading day before earnings announcement to the 1st trading day after earnings announcement (3DRi,q).  
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ESi,q                 
LogIlliqi,q -0.01 
               
LogSpreadi,q -0.03 0.74 
              
Instii,q 0.05 -0.26 -0.21 
             
Analysti,q 0.01 -0.66 -0.44 0.24 
            
Turni,q 0.01 -0.96 -0.68 0.29 0.69 
           
Distracti,q 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 0.05 0.05 0.08 
          
Pricei,q 0.03 -0.64 -0.73 0.22 0.35 0.57 0.10 
         
Volatilityi,q 0.00 0.34 0.47 0.04 -0.08 -0.21 -0.07 -0.46 
        
Momi,q 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 -0.03 
       
ArbRiski,q 0.03 0.40 0.49 0.08 -0.14 -0.28 -0.10 -0.52 0.68 -0.02 
      
ExpRiski,q 0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.11 -0.02 -0.13 0.29 0.01 0.38 
     
LogMcapi,q 0.00 -0.94 -0.72 0.17 0.63 0.91 0.09 0.65 -0.39 0.06 -0.48 -0.01 
    
BMi,q 0.05 0.33 0.29 -0.13 -0.19 -0.34 0.03 -0.32 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.32 
   
PEADi,q 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
  
3DRi,q 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02   
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APPENDIX B 
Below I present alternative specifications for testing the attenuation of time-varying PEAD. 
Each test shows PEAD has significantly declined since the early 2000s. The test specifications 
include 1) Carhart (1997) four-factor test; 2) Multivariate Analysis; and 3) Unknown Structural 
Break Test. 
B.1. Carhart (1997) Four-Factor Test 
I consider a factor-based pricing model using Carhart (1997) four factors and test the change 
in PEAD alpha after the Autoquote phase-in. I obtain Carhart (1997) four factors from WRDS 
and Professor Kenneth French’s website 116  and compute PEAD following the standard 
cumulative abnormal returns measure, where for firm i on announcement date t, ܥܣܴ௜,௧ is the 
cumulative abnormal returns: ܥܣܴ௜,௧ = ∑ ݎ௜,௧+௡ − ∑ ݎெெ,௧+௡ே௡ே௡ . I note ݎ௜,௧+௡  is the daily stock 
return, ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  is the daily risk free rate, and n represents the holding period from the nth day after 
the date of announcement to the Nth trading day. For computing PEAD, n is equal to 2 and N is 
equal to 61; for computing 3DR n is equal to -1 and N is equal to 1. I note the four factors of 
market risk premium, book-to-market ratio, size and momentum effects are also computed by 
summing daily returns from date n to N. For example ܯܭܴܶܨis the daily return of the S&P 
500 index (including dividends) minus the risk free rate from the nth trading day after earnings 
announcement to the Nth. I then only retain firm-quarter observations in the ES quintile equal 
to one or five and run the specification below: ܥܣܴ௜,௧  =  ߙ +  𝜌ଵܯܭܴܶܨ௧  +  𝜌ଶܪܯܮ௧  + 𝜌ଷܵܯܤ௧ +  𝜌ସܷܯܦ௧  +  ߚଵܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ + ߚଶܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௧ +  ߚଷܩ݋݋݀ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ (B.1) 
                                                 
116 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html. 
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Where ܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ is equal to one for observations in quintile five and zero otherwise; ܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ is equal to one for all announcements post-Autoquote but zero otherwise; 
and the interaction term ܩ݋݋݀ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ is equal to ܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ multiplied by ܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ. Following Hirshleifer et al. (2009) the dummy variable coefficients can 
be interpreted by the following: 1) a significant ߚଵ means good news firms before Autoquote 
have significantly different drift from bad news firms before Autoquote; 2) a significant ߚଶ 
means bad news firms after Autoquote are significantly different from bad news firms before 
Autoquote; and 3) a significant ߚଷ means the difference between PEAD for good news firms 
and bad news firms is significantly different before Autoquote compared with after Autoquote. 
Hence a significant and negative ߚଷ is consistent with PEAD attenuation. I adjust standard 
errors for heteroskedasticity through clustering by both announcement date and firm level 
following the double-clustering method of Thompson (2011). 
B.1.1. Results  
The regression results are presented in Table B.1 and show PEAD attenuated by two-thirds 
after Autoquote was phased-in. Testing on only NYSE firms (in Panel A) I show PEAD was 
3.62%  (significant at the 1% level) before Autoquote and shrank by 2.47% after Autoquote 
(significant at the 1% level). I then implement the test on non-NYSE firms and impose ܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௧  equal to 1 for observations after 30th June 2003 but equal to zero 
otherwise. The results in Panel B indicate PEAD rose by 0.06% after 30th June 2003 
(insignificant at 10% level) and therefore suggest PEAD did not attenuate for non-NYSE firms.  
My results also show for both NYSE and non-NYSE firms 3DR accentuated. NYSE 3DR grew 
by 2.24% (significant at the 1% level) after the phase-in of Autoquote from 4.62% (significant 
at 1%); and non-NYSE 3DR grew 1.51% (significant at the 1% level) from 6.23% (significant 
at the 1% level). Hence 3DR significantly accentuated across all firms but PEAD only 
attenuated for NYSE firms. 
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Table B.1: Factor-Based Model: the Change in 3DR and PEAD after Autoquote 
 
The table shows regression results from a factor-based pricing model employing Carhart (1997) four factors. For 
firm i on announcement date t, ܥܣܴ௜,௧ = ∑ ݎ௜,௧+௡ − ∑ ݎெெ,௧+௡ே௡ே௡  where ݎ௜,௧+௡  is the daily stock return and ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  
is the daily risk free rate. For computing PEAD n equals 2 and N equals 61; for computing 3DR n equals -1 and 
N equals 1. The results are based on the following regression specification where only firm-quarter observations 
in the ES quintile equal to one or five are retained: ܥܣܴ௜,௧  =  ߙ +  𝜌ଵܯܭܴܶܨ௧  +  𝜌ଶܪܯܮ௧  + 𝜌ଷܵܯܤ௧ + 𝜌ସܷܯܦ௧  +  ߚଵܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ + ߚଶܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௧ + ߚଷܩ݋݋݀ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ where ܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ is equal to one for observations in quintile five and zero otherwise; ܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ is 
equal to one for all announcements post-Autoquote but zero otherwise; and the interaction term ܩ݋݋݀ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ is equal to ܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ multiplied by ܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ. The four factors of 
market risk premium (ܯܭܴܶܨ௧), book-to-market ratio (ܪܯܮ௧), size (ܵܯܤ௧) and momentum (ܷܯܦ௧) effects are 
computed by summing daily factor returns from date n to N. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
across both announcement date and firm following the double-clustering method of Thompson (2011). ***, **, * 
represent significance level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.   
 
 Dependent Variable: Risk-Free Rate Adjusted 3DR Risk-Free Rate Adjusted PEAD  
Panel A: NYSE Firms 
Intercept -0.0215 *** -0.00297   ܯܭܴܶܨ௧  1.172 *** 1.017 *** ܪܯܮ௧   0.774 *** 0.610 *** ܵܯܤ௧   0.650 *** 0.671 *** ܷܯܦ௧   -0.345 *** -0.496 *** ܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜   0.0462 *** 0.0362 *** ܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ𝒕  -0.0118 *** 0.00830 ** ܩ݋݋݀ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁௜,𝒕  0.0224 *** -0.0247 *** 
Panel B: non-NYSE Firms 
Intercept -0.0290 *** 0.0199 *** ܯܭܴܶܨ௧  1.087 *** 1.071 *** ܪܯܮ௧   0.141 ** -0.093 *** ܵܯܤ௧   1.124 *** 1.344 *** ܷܯܦ௧   -0.357 *** -0.410 *** ܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜   0.0623 *** 0.0336 *** ܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ𝒕  -0.0112 *** -0.0286 *** ܩ݋݋݀ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎܣݑݐ݋ݍݑ݋ݐ݁௜,𝒕  0.0151 *** 0.0006   
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B.2. Multivariate Analysis 
I now control for a range of explanatory factors (listed in Section 3.3). To do so I employ a 
multivariate test with scaled interaction terms using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
measure to proxy for PEAD: ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤,௧ = ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௤,௧+௡ሻ଺ଵ௡=ଶ − ∏ ሺͳ + ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ ሻ଺ଵ௡=ଶ  where the 
adjustment-portfolio ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  represents 5x5 size and BM matched portfolios (details of the 
specification are explained in Section 2.5.1 in Chapter 2): ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ = ܽ௤ 
+ ߚଵܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ 
 + ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ +  ߝ௜,௤ (B.2) 
I then run Fama and MacBeth (1973) quarterly regressions and conduct a two-sample pooled 
student-t test where I compare the distribution of estimated ߚଵ prior to the 2nd quarter of 2003 
with the estimated ߚଵ after the 4th quarter of 2003. The results in Table B.2 show that after 
controlling for the full set of explanatory factors the mean of ̂ߚଵ reduced by 1.41% (significant 
at the 10% level) from 2.59% (significant at the 1% level) to 1.17% (significant at the 10% 
level). The right column shows the findings excluding quarters under recession. I do note this 
test may be inefficient if ̂ߚଵ is trending downwards across time (Vega, 2006), and that the test 
statistic may be under-estimated. To assess the robustness of my findings I therefore also 
consider whether the mean of PEAD has declined across 25 portfolios based on 5x5 sorts of 
arbitrage risk and institutional ownership. This extends my analysis in Chapter 2 that arbitrage 
risk and institutional ownership are robust explanatory factors for PEAD. The results are in 
Table B.3 and show PEAD declined for 17 of the 25 portfolios. The remaining 8 portfolios are 
concentrated in portfolios with low institutional ownership and high arbitrage risk (which are 
proxies for small-cap firms).  
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For example, for the quintile with the highest arbitrage risk three of five quintiles experienced 
a rise in PEAD (the second institutional ownership (IO) quintile at 0.14%, the third IO quintile 
at 0.003% and the largest IO quintile at 0.12%). Further, for the portfolios at the lowest 
institutional ownership (IO quintile equals 1), three of five portfolios are positive. The smallest 
arbitrage risk (AR) quintile shows 0.27%, second smallest AR quintile shows 1.08% and third 
smallest AR quintile shows 0.38%. The remaining portfolios almost entirely indicate a decline 
in PEAD.  
B.3. Unknown Structural Break 
Finally, I test for a structural change in PEAD and assess whether an unknown break point 
corresponds to a known structural change. To do so I follow the unknown structural break test 
of Andrews (1993) where the break point is selected across times series data by maximising 
the QLR statistic (Quandt, 1960): ܳܮܴ ܵݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿ = max [ܨ − ݏݐܽݐ݅ݏݐ݅ܿሺ𝜆ሻ] where 𝜆௜=݉௜/݊ 
is the unknown break date; and ݊ is the number of breaks. The maximising function maximises 
with respect to ݉௜ over [݉௔, ݉௕] where a and b are the min and max selected break points.  
I follow Andrews’ (1993) “naive” approach and set ݉௔ to the date period closest to the 15th 
percentile of the data period and ݉௕ closest to the 85th. I then run the specification:  ܥܣܴ௜,௧  =  ߙ +  ߚ ∗ ܯܭܴܶܨ௧   +   ߛ ∗ ܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ + ߝ௜,௧ (B.3) 
Where ܥܣܴ௜,௧ is defined under Section B.1, ܯܭܴܶܨ௧ the daily return of the S&P 500 index 
minus the risk free rate from the 2nd day after earnings announcement to the 61st day and ܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏܦݑ݉݉ݕ is equal to 1 for good news observations and zero otherwise. 
I conduct the test on only NYSE firm-quarter observations and my results show that periods 
close to the introduction of Autoquote are selected as the structural break. For yearly break 
dates (30th June of every year are the reference break points), 30th June 2003 is chosen with a 
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QLR Statistic of 90.9 which is significant at the 1% level.117 For quarterly break dates I find 
the selected break date is 30th June 2002 (with a QLR statistic of 73.3) and again significant at 
the 1% level.118 Hence the unknown structural break of time-varying PEAD of NYSE firms 
corresponds to the phase-in of Autoquote. 
To visualise this break in Figure B.1, I plot the annual difference in PEAD between the top and 
bottom ES quintiles. I calculate PEAD as measured by the cumulative abnormal return ܥܣܴ௜,௧ as defined under Section B.1.119 The graph shows PEAD averaged consistently at just 
below 4% before the year 2001 and then experienced a sharp decline in the early 2000s. The 
plot of 3DR shows inversely that 3DR has trended upwards over time. 
  
                                                 
117 The 1% level is 13.39 (Andrews, 1993). 
118 For the quarterly break test I first purge the firm-quarter observations for quarters under economic recession 
(as defined by NBER). 
119 I note computing 3DR and PEAD by either CAR or BHAR does not change my findings. 
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Table B.2: Change in Fama-Macbeth coefficient after Autoquote 
 
The table show the mean of ̂ߚଵ estimates for sample period before and after 30th June 2003. ̂ߚଵ is estimated from 
the specification ܤܪܣܴ௜,௤ = ܽ௤ + ߚଵܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ + ∑ [ߛ𝑧ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܶ݁ݎ݉𝑧,௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ]௓𝑧=ଵ + ߝ௜,௤  where the dependent 
variable is PEAD (PEADi,q) of NYSE firms. All factor deciles are scaled to between -0.5 to +0.5. The variables 
are: earnings surprise quintile (ܧ ௜ܵ,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); institutional ownership (ܫ݊ݏݐ݅௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); number of announcements 
released on same day (ܦ݅ݏݐݎܽܿݐ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); number of analysts issuing forecasts within the 90 days prior to the 
earnings announcement (ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); volatility of daily BHAR in the 40 trading days prior to earnings 
announcement (ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); arbitrage risk (ܣݎܾܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); hedgeable risk (ܧݔ݌ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); average of 
quoted spread at closing across 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); stock price at the 
end of quarter, q (ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); average daily turnover (in millions of dollars) measured from 271 trading days to 
22 trading days prior to earnings announcement (ܶݑݎ݊௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); market capitalisation (ܯܿܽ݌௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ ); book-to-
market ratio (ܤܯ௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ); BHAR across the past 40 trading days prior to earnings announcement (ܯ݋݉௜,௤ௌ௖௔௟௘ௗ). 
The results represent Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions where the computed mean is based on the average of 
estimated coefficients from quarterly regressions. Period: July 1995 to June 2011. ***, **, * represent t-test 
significance level at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. 
 
  All Quarters Exclude Quarters Under Recession       
Pre-Autoquote 0.0259 *** 0.0259 *** 
Post-Autoquote 0.0117 * 0.0134 *** 
      
Two sample t-test -0.0141 * -0.0124 * 
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Table B.3: Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Change in 3DR and PEAD after Autoquote 
 
The table below computes the sample mean of 3DR and PEAD before and after Autoquote. Means are computed across arbitrage risk quintiles and institutional ownership 
quintiles. To compute means, earnings announcements are sorted within-quarter by arbitrage risk (ܣݎܾܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤) and institutional ownership (ܫ݊ݏݐ݅௜,௤) into quintiles; and only 
firm-quarter observations in the top and bottom ES quintiles are retained. 3DR and PEAD are then computed by taking the quarterly difference in mean between the top and 
bottom ES quintiles. The sample data is separated into before and after Autoquote based on 30th June 2003.  
 
 
    3DR PEAD ܣݎܾܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤  ܫ݊ݏݐ݅௜,௤  Pre-Autoquote  Post-Autoquote  Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote Pre-Autoquote  Post-Autoquote  Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote 
Low Arbitrage Risk 
Low IO 0.0096 0.0182 0.0086 0.0118 0.0145 0.0027 
2 0.0112 0.0209 0.0097 0.0180 0.0130 -0.0051 
3 0.0169 0.0219 0.0050 0.0119 0.0068 -0.0051 
4 0.0129 0.0292 0.0163 0.0132 0.0020 -0.0112 
High IO 0.0155 0.0215 0.0060 0.0197 -0.0040 -0.0237 
  mean  0.0132 0.0223 0.0091 0.0149 0.0064 -0.0085 
2 
Low IO 0.0099 0.0286 0.0187 0.0087 0.0195 0.0108 
2 0.0184 0.0302 0.0118 0.0355 0.0161 -0.0194 
3 0.0154 0.0296 0.0142 0.0074 0.0034 -0.0041 
4 0.0187 0.0342 0.0155 0.0130 0.0135 0.0005 
High IO 0.0194 0.0398 0.0204 -0.0019 0.0044 0.0063 
  mean  0.0164 0.0325 0.0161 0.0126 0.0114 -0.0012 
3 
Low IO 0.0202 0.0333 0.0131 0.0270 0.0308 0.0038 
2 0.0249 0.0365 0.0116 0.0185 0.0032 -0.0154 
3 0.0189 0.0342 0.0153 0.0043 0.0025 -0.0017 
4 0.0208 0.0397 0.0188 0.0109 -0.0025 -0.0135 
High IO 0.0286 0.0413 0.0126 0.0012 -0.0073 -0.0084 
  mean  0.0227 0.0370 0.0143 0.0124 0.0053 -0.0070 
4 
Low IO 0.0242 0.0370 0.0128 0.0225 0.0208 -0.0017 
2 0.0263 0.0446 0.0183 0.0315 -0.0235 -0.0550 
3 0.0282 0.0324 0.0042 0.0180 0.0348 0.0168 
4 0.0264 0.0428 0.0163 0.0026 -0.0001 -0.0027 
High IO 0.0260 0.0446 0.0185 0.0026 -0.0068 -0.0095 
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    3DR PEAD ܣݎܾܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௤  ܫ݊ݏݐ݅௜,௤  Pre-Autoquote  Post-Autoquote  Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote Pre-Autoquote  Post-Autoquote  Post-Autoquote minus Pre-Autoquote 
  mean  0.0263 0.0403 0.0140 0.0154 0.0050 -0.0104 
High Arbitrage Risk 
Low IO 0.0201 0.0350 0.0150 0.0343 0.0239 -0.0104 
2 0.0289 0.0472 0.0184 0.0095 0.0109 0.0014 
3 0.0376 0.0479 0.0103 0.0203 0.0203 0.00003 
4 0.0311 0.0452 0.0141 0.0206 0.0026 -0.0180 
High IO 0.0221 0.0482 0.0261 0.0016 0.0028 0.0012 
  mean  0.0279 0.0447 0.0168 0.0173 0.0121 -0.0052 
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Figure B.1: Plot of Annual PEAD and 3DR 
The figure plots annual 3DR and PEAD across time. The plot represents the annual difference in mean between 
firm-quarter observations in the top and bottom ES quintiles. 3DR and PEAD are measured by the cumulative 
abnormal return measure: ܥܣܴ௜,௧ = ∑ ݎ௜,௧+௡ − ∑ ݎெெ,௧+௡ே௡ே௡  where ݎ௜,௧+௡  is the daily stock return and ݎ௜,௧+௡ெெ  is the 
daily risk free rate. For computing PEAD n equals 2 and N equals 61; for computing 3DR n equals -1 and N = +1. 
The vertical axis represents return and the horizontal axis represent calendar year. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
C.1. Description of Variables 
The variable name and descriptions are outlined below. Variables are calculated based on each 
stock j and each trading day t. 
Variable Description Data Source 
qspreadj,t turnover-weighted quoted half-spread (bps)  TRTH  
espreadj,t  turnover-weighted effective half-spread (bps) TRTH  
rspreadj,t  turnover-weighted realised half-spread (bps) at 5 minutes  TRTH  
adv_selectionj,t  turnover-weighted adverse selection half-spread (bps) at 5 
minutes  
TRTH  
messagesj,t  number of order book changes (/day)  TRTH  
turnoverj,t  daily share turnover ($million) TRTH  
volatilityj,t  daily price range standardized by the daily close price (%)  CRSP  
pricej,t  daily closing price ($)  CRSP  
ticksizej,t   0.01 divided by pricej,t. 
 
market_capj,t  number of shares outstanding times price as of June 2003 
($billion)  
Compustat  
trade_countj,t  number of trades (/day)  TRTH  
trade_sizej,t  mean daily trade size ($1,000)  TRTH  
volumej,t  number of shares transacted (1,000)  TRTH  
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C.2. Cleaning TRTH data 
Following Boehmer, Fong and Wu (2015) I conduct the following filters on the SIRCA TRTH 
data.  
Trade data must satisfy: 
a) Trades must be inside regular trading hours (9:30 to 16:00) 
b) Regular sales conditions120 
c) Trades with positive trade price (price>0) and positive trade size (size>0) 
d) Trades with absolute change in trade price from the previous trade price of less than or 
equal to 10%. 
Quote data must satisfy: 
a) Quotes must be inside regular trading hours (9:30 to 16:00) 
b) Regular quotes (on-market quote) 
c) Quotes with positive bids (bid>0), positive ask price (offer>0), ask price greater than 
bid price (offer>bid), positive bid size (bidsize>0) and positive offer size (offersize>0) 
d) Quotes with relative quoted spreads of less than or equal to 20% 
e) Quotes with absolute change in bid price from the previous bid price (in same trading 
day) of less than or equal to 10% and with absolute change in ask price from the 
previous ask price (in same trading day) of less than or equal to 10%. 
 
                                                 
120 Qualifiers include either: "[PRC_QL2]", "[CTS_QUAL];   [PRC_QL2]", "[CTS_QUAL];   [PRC_QL2];High", 
"[CTS_QUAL];    PRC_QL2];Low" 
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C.3. Adverse Selection and Realised Spreads 
Adverse Selection declined after Autoquote and realised spreads increased after Autoquote. To 
show this result I test the following specification:  ܮ௝,௧ = ߙ௝ + ߛ௧ + ߚଵܣܳ௝,௧ + ߛଵݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ + ߛଶݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଷݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ +ߛସ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧ + ߝ௝,௧ ( C.1 ) 
Where ܮ௝,௧ is the daily turnover weighted liquidity measure, ߙ௝ represents firm fixed effects, ߛ௧ 
represents day dummy variables for day t, and ܣܳ௝,௧ is the Hendershott et al. (2011) dummy 
variable equal to +1 for periods with Autoquote phased-in and zero otherwise. I also include 
the following control variables: share turnover, tick size, the log of market capitalisation and 
volatility based on daily price range standardized by the daily stock price ሺ ௝ܲ,௧ு௜𝑔ℎ − ௝ܲ,௧௅௢௪ሻ/ ௝ܲ,௧  
(see Parkinson, 1980). The estimated standard errors are robust to general cross-sectional and 
time-series heteroscedasticity and within-group autocorrelation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Table C.1 show results for adverse selection and realised spreads across size quintiles. The 
change in adverse selection range between -0.513 basis points for the largest firms and -1.002 
for the smallest firms (all significant at the 1% level). The change in realised spreads range 
between 0.365 basis points for the largest firms and 1.603 for the smallest firms (all significant 
at the 1% level). In other words overall asymmetric information declined after Autoquote and 
realised spreads increased after Autoquote.  
 
210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.1: Regression Results following Hendershott et al. (2011) 
 
The table regresses measures of liquidity on the Hendershott et al. (2011) Autoquote dummy variable. Sample period is from 1st January 2003 to 31st July 2003. The specification 
is: ܮ௝,௧ = ߙ௝ + ߛ௧ + ߚଵܣܳ௝,௧ + ߛଵݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ + ߛଶݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଷݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛସ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧ + ߝ݆,ݐ where the dependent variable ܮ௝,௧  is measures of daily  turnover-
weighted liquidity in basis points and 1) half adverse selection, and 2) half realised spreads, ߙ௝ represents firm fixed effects, ߛ௧ represents day dummy variables and ܣܳ௝,௧ is a 
dummy variable equal to +1 for periods with Autoquote phased-in and zero otherwise. The remaining factors are control variables: share turnover, volatility, tick size and the 
log of market capitalisation. Market capitalisation break points are computed based using market capitalisation at the end of June 2003. Standard errors are robust to general 
cross-sectional and time-series heteroscedasticity and within-group autocorrelation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Adverse Selection By Market Capitalisation Quintile 
 ܣܳ௝,௧ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧  ݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧  ݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧   ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧  
Dependent Variable: adverse selection (bps)       
1 (smallest) -     1.002   ***  -     0.026            1.800   ***        0.184   **  -     3.765   ***  
2 -     0.846   ***  -     0.011            1.361   ***  -     0.201   ***  -     6.194   ***  
3 -     0.765   ***        0.003            0.359   ***        0.413   ***  -     2.082   ***  
4 -     0.613   ***        0.000            0.501   ***        0.283   ***  -     1.580   ***  
5 (largest) -     0.513   ***        0.001   **        0.334   ***        0.295   ***  -     1.434   ***  
Panel B:  Realised Spreads By Market Capitalisation Quintile 
Dependent Variable: realised spreads (bps)       
1 (smallest)       1.603   ***  -     0.020      -     0.630   ***        1.327   ***        4.565   ***  
2       0.669   ***        0.018   *  -     0.561   ***        0.087   ***  -     2.822   ***  
3       0.738   ***  -     0.004      -     0.089   *  -     0.193   ***  -     2.923   ***  
4       0.456   ***  -     0.001      -     0.220   ***  -     0.110   ***  -     2.651   ***  
5 (largest)       0.365   ***  -     0.001      -     0.158   **        0.090   ***  -     0.833   ***  
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C.4. Summary Statistics of TI at the 5th percentile 
Table C.2 shows the distribution of TI at the 5th percentile. For the largest quintile at the 5th percentile the median ranked firm has an upper bound 
TI of 0.055 minutes (3.32 seconds). In other words, for half of all large firms a trade is eligible to be collapsed only if its TI is less than 3.32 
seconds. In comparison, the first row of Table C.2 shows the median ranked firm for the smallest quintile has an upper bound of 0.333 minutes 
(20 seconds). Table C.2 also shows 95% of large firms have a TI upper bound of less than 20 seconds (hence for 95% of large firms a trade is 
eligible to be collapsed only if the associated TI is less than 0.337 minutes or 20 seconds) and in comparison 95% of small firms have a TI upper 
bound of less than 2.876 minutes.  
Table C.2: Distribution of Time Interval At The 5th Percentile 
 
The table shows the summary statistics of each firm’s TIj,t  upper bound at the 5th percentile. TI j,t is computed by taking, for each stock j, the nth trade’s timestamp minus the 
timestamp of the immediate previous trade. TI j,t is computed only if both trades occurred on the same day. The upper bound is then chosen by sorting, for each stock, TI j,t and 
selecting the 5th percentile. Values are computed based on 913 NYSE-listed stocks sorted into market capitalisation quintiles where 1 is the smallest firms and 5 is the largest 
firms. The sample period is 1 January 2003 to 31 July 2003. 
 
 
 mean 1st  5th  25th  median 75th   95th  99th  
Market Cap 
Quintile 
1 (smallest)          0.774  6.67×10--5          0.016           0.066           0.333           0.974           2.876           4.863  
2          0.477  3.33×10--5          0.015           0.053           0.203           0.613           1.777           3.099  
3          0.320  <1.00×10--5          0.014           0.044           0.143           0.404           1.173           2.078  
4          0.195  <1.00×10--5          0.012           0.036           0.093           0.236           0.705           1.272  
5 (largest)          0.100  <1.00×10--5          0.001           0.023           0.055           0.123           0.337           0.604  
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C.5. Relaxing TI Upperbound  
Further to the results in Section 4.6.1 I relax the TI upper and find results that remain consistent 
with my findings. In other words, changes in effective spreads as a result of Autoquote remains 
insignificant if sequences of consecutive buy or sell orders are collapsed at a slower trade speed. 
The results are in Table C.3 and show, collapsing trades up to each stock’s 25th TI percentile, 
the change in market capitalisation-weighted effective spreads following the Autoquote phase-
in is close to zero, declining 0.47 basis points (insignificant at the 10% level). This is in 
comparison to the significant decline of 9.72 basis points for uncollapsed trade data (see Panel 
A of Table 4.4) and suggests higher AT is not associated with an improvement in liquidity once 
trade sequences are collapsed. Panel B shows the change in effective spreads is also 
insignificant across all size quintiles except for the smallest firms (which exhibit a significant 
increase in effective spreads of 137 basis points). Panel C shows the fastest trades experienced 
significant rise in realised spreads (an increase of 15.6 basis points and significant at the 1% 
level) and experienced the least reduction in asymmetric information (a decline of 16.1 basis 
points (significant at the 1% level).  
Relaxing the TI upper bound too much however may also introduce bias. While Kim and 
Murphy (2013) did not impose an upper-bound for TI (their study was on the highly active and 
liquid S&P 500 ETF), I show in Table C.4 that an appropriate upper-bound is likely necessary 
when adjustments are made for order-splitting.121 Collapsing trades without considering the 
size of TI, Panel A in Table C.4 show market capitalisation-weighted effective spreads 
significantly increases following Autoquote, rising by 42.3 basis points. Panel B show the 
largest firms experienced a rise in effective spreads (38.0 basis points and significant at the 5% 
level) while Panel C show the fastest trades were subject to a significant rise in realised spreads 
                                                 
121121 I note I do not discuss model calibration with respect to TI upperbound in this thesis. 
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(an increase of 14.3 basis points and significant at the 1% level) as well as a significant rise in 
asymmetric information (an increase of 34.0 basis points and significant at the 1% level).  In 
other words,  the selection of an appropriate TI upper bound is likely a relevant consideration 
(and especially relevant for low-liquidity stocks with long periods of market inactivity) when 
collapsing trade data: while computed effective spreads that are un-adjusted for order splitting 
are potentially subject to under-estimation bias, over-adjustment for order splitting can also 
lead to over-estimation bias. 
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Table C.3: Regression Results After Collapsing Trade Sequences (at the 25th Percentile of TI) 
 
The table regresses measures of liquidity on the Hendershott et al. (2011) Autoquote dummy variable. The liquidity measure is computed by collapsing sequences of consecutive 
buy or sell orders into a single transaction. For each stock trades are only collapsed if the time interval between consecutive trades is less than the 25th percentile. Sample period 
is from 1st January 2003 to 31st July 2003. The specification is: ܮ௝,௧ = ߙ௝ + ߛ௧ + ߚଵܣܳ௝,௧ + ߛଵݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ + ߛଶݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଷݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛସ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧ + ߝ݆,ݐ where the 
dependent variable ܮ௝,௧ is measures of daily turnover-weighted liquidity in basis points: 1) half effective spreads; 2) half adverse selection; and 3) half realised spreads, ߙ௝ 
represents firm fixed effects, ߛ௧ represents day dummy variables and ܣܳ௝,௧ is a dummy variable equal to +1 for periods with Autoquote phased-in and zero otherwise. The 
remaining factors are control variables: share turnover, volatility, tick size and the log of market capitalisation. Panel A shows market capitalisation-weighted results. Panel B 
results are quintile-specific based on market capitalisation. Panel C results are quintile-specific based on the time interval between trades (collapsing at the 25th percentile of 
TI). Standard errors are robust to general cross-sectional and time-series heteroscedasticity and within-group autocorrelation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). ***, **, * represent 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Market Capitalisation Weighted 
 ܣܳ௝,௧   ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧  ݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧  ݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧   ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧  
          
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)       
 - 0.0047        0.0001   ***    0.1386   ***    1.0695   ***  - 1.2031   ***  
Panel B: Quintile by Market Capitalisation 
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)       
1 (smallest)   1.3695   ***  - 0.0489   ***    1.1526   ***    1.5275   ***    2.0264   ***  
2 - 0.1779        0.0050        0.8117   ***  - 0.1121   ***  - 8.9480   ***  
3   0.1332      - 0.0024        0.2875   ***    0.3226   ***  - 4.8554   ***  
4 - 0.0536      - 0.0008        0.2598   ***    0.2110   ***  - 3.9594   ***  
5 (largest)   0.0427        0.0003        0.1755   ***    0.3728   ***  - 2.1028   ***  
 
Panel C: Quintile sorted by Time Between Trades 
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)       
1 (fastest) - 0.0081        0.0002   *    0.1916   ***    2.1591   ***  - 1.5782   ***  
2 - 0.0524      - 0.0028   ***    0.3986   ***    0.2600   ***  - 3.1410   ***  
3 - 0.2322   ***  - 0.0213   ***    0.6297   ***    2.6252   ***    0.3765   **  
4   0.1037      - 0.0467   ***    0.9933   ***    1.3139   ***  - 2.5392   ***  
5 (slowest)   1.9116   ***  - 0.1963   **    0.5871   ***  - 0.0509   ***  - 5.9965   ***  
Dependent Variable: adverse selection (bps)       
1 (fastest) - 0.1645   ***    0.0010   ***    0.3094   ***    2.8804   ***  - 0.7955   ***  
2 - 0.4153   ***    0.0012        0.6130   ***    0.6039   ***  - 1.4971   ***  
3 - 0.7032   ***  - 0.0203   ***    0.9628   ***    1.9638   ***    0.9215   ***  
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Panel C: Quintile sorted by Time Between Trades 
4 - 0.7338   ***  - 0.0245   *    1.3952   ***    0.8644   ***  - 0.8496   **  
5 (slowest) - 0.8558   **  - 0.1208        0.8336   ***  - 0.1462   ***  - 4.1023   ***  
Dependent Variable: realised spreads (bps)       
1 (fastest)   0.1572   ***  - 0.0008   ***  - 0.1164   ***  - 0.7168   ***  - 0.7911   ***  
2   0.3878   ***  - 0.0043   ***  - 0.2092   ***  - 0.3405   ***  - 1.6456   ***  
3   0.4796   ***  - 0.0007      - 0.3411   ***    0.6630   ***  - 0.5277   **  
4   0.8408   ***  - 0.0218   *  - 0.4132   ***    0.4467   ***  - 1.7417   ***  
5 (slowest)   2.7611   ***  - 0.0764      - 0.2487        0.0941   ***  - 1.9169   **  
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Table C.4: Regression Results After Collapsing Trade Sequences (No Upper Bound) 
 
The table regresses measures of liquidity on the Hendershott et al. (2011) Autoquote dummy variable. The liquidity measure is computed by collapsing sequences of consecutive 
buy or sell orders into a single transaction. For each stock trades are only collapsed irrespective of the time interval between consecutive trades. Sample period is from 1st 
January 2003 to 31st July 2003. The specification is: ܮ௝,௧ = ߙ௝ + ߛ௧ + ߚଵܣܳ௝,௧ + ߛଵݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧ + ߛଶݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧ + ߛଷݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧ + ߛସ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧ + ߝ݆,ݐ where the dependent 
variable ܮ௝,௧ is measures of daily turnover-weighted liquidity in basis points: 1) half effective spreads; 2) half adverse selection; and 3) half realised spreads, ߙ௝ represents firm 
fixed effects, ߛ௧ represents day dummy variables and ܣܳ௝,௧ is a dummy variable equal to +1 for periods with Autoquote phased-in and zero otherwise. The remaining factors 
are control variables: share turnover, volatility, tick size and the log of market capitalisation. Panel A shows market capitalisation-weighted results. Panel B results are quintile-
specific based on market capitalisation. Panel C results are quintile-specific based on the time interval between trades (collapsing without a TI upper-bound restriction). Standard 
errors are robust to general cross-sectional and time-series heteroscedasticity and within-group autocorrelation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 
10% significance level respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Market Capitalisation Weighted 
  ܣܳ௝,௧ ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௝,௧  ݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௝,௧  ݐ݅ܿ݇ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁,௧   ݈݋݃݉ܿܽ݌௝,௧  
          
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)       
      0.4234   ***  -    0.0003   ***  -    0.0148           0.2249   ***  -    0.7783   ***  
Panel B: Quintile by Market Capitalisation 
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)        
1 (smallest)      0.6415      -    0.0126      -    0.4231           1.2381   ***       0.4454      
2      0.8203   ***       0.0038      -    0.2085           0.0452   **  -    4.5702   ***  
3      1.2244   ***  -    0.0052      -    0.0839      -    0.1380   **  -    3.0833   ***  
4      0.7670   ***  -    0.0013           0.0130           0.2787   ***  -    0.0745      
5 (largest)      0.3804   **  -    0.0006           0.0169      -    0.3462   ***  -    1.6119   ***  
 
Panel C: Quintile sorted by Time Between Trades 
Dependent Variable: effective spreads (bps)        
1 (fastest)      0.4848   ***  -    0.0004   ***       0.0151      -    0.0142      -    1.2646   ***  
2      0.6762   ***  -    0.0056   ***       0.0359      -    0.2482   ***  -    1.8419   ***  
3      0.8300   ***  -    0.0160   ***  -    0.0396           1.4814   ***  -    0.2280      
4      1.3938   ***  -    0.0565   ***  -    0.0215           1.0506   ***  -    0.8028      
5 
(slowest) 
     0.2811      -    0.1506      -    0.2430           0.0417      -    0.4999      
Dependent Variable: adverse selection (bps)       
1 (fastest)      0.3404   ***       0.0004   *       0.1371   ***       0.9189   ***  -    0.3288   ***  
2      0.2385   ***  -    0.0003           0.2770   ***       0.4874   ***       0.1046      
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Panel C: Quintile sorted by Time Between Trades 
3      0.1403   *  -    0.0206   ***       0.3956   ***       1.1113   ***       0.3643      
4      0.1274      -    0.0439   ***       0.4037   ***       0.8483   ***       0.4087      
5 
(slowest) 
-    0.2115      -    0.0169      -    0.5156   ***  -    0.2522   ***  -    4.1802   ***  
Dependent Variable: realised spreads (bps)       
1 (fastest)      0.1426   ***  -    0.0008   ***  -    0.1173   ***  -    0.9272   ***  -    0.9435   ***  
2      0.4564   ***  -    0.0056   ***  -    0.2397   ***  -    0.7314   ***  -    1.9545   ***  
3      0.6915   ***       0.0045      -    0.4294   ***       0.3515   ***  -    0.6395   *  
4      1.2705   ***  -    0.0120      -    0.4400   **       0.1976   **  -    1.2552   **  
5 
(slowest) 
     0.5086      -    0.1610           0.3953           0.2905   ***       3.6422   **  
 
 
